De-escalating the Jubaland Crisis to Secure Somalia and Stabilize the Horn of Africa
Abstract
The Jubaland crisis has evolved from a federal–state dispute into a grave threat to Somali stability and a flashpoint for regional rivalries. The confrontation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Jubaland under President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) has been militarized, diverting scarce military resources from counter-insurgency against Al-Shabaab. This has generated security vacuums, strengthened the insurgency, and undermined trust in Somali institutions. Regionally, Jubaland’s instability is entangled in broader rivalries. Kenya sees it as a buffer against Al Shabaab and essential for the Lamu Port-South Sudan- Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) corridor.
Executive Summary
The Jubaland crisis has evolved from a federal–state dispute into a grave threat to Somali stability and a flashpoint for regional rivalries. The confrontation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Jubaland under President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) has been militarized, diverting scarce military resources from counter-insurgency against Al-Shabaab. This has generated security vacuums, strengthened the insurgency, and undermined trust in Somali institutions. Regionally, Jubaland’s instability is entangled in broader rivalries. Kenya sees it as a buffer against Al-Shabaab and essential for the Lamu Port-South SudanEthiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) corridor. Ethiopia regards it as a defensive shield for its Somali Region. Egypt’s entry into the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) has added a new variable, linking Jubaland to the Egypt–Ethiopia confrontation over the Nile and Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This brief identifies five interlinked issues, which include contentious federalism; unfulfilled campaign promises; militarization of political disputes; geopolitics of AUSSOM expansion; and strate
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