

The **GLOCEPS**

INAUGURAL CONFERENCE

Regional Peace and Security:
**The Future of State Stability and
Development in Eastern Africa**

May 24th - 25th 2022 | Serena Hotel, Nairobi



**KEY SPEECHES &
CONFERENCE PAPERS**



Conference participants (Day 1) - 24th May 2022





Conference participants (Day 2) - 25th May 2022

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ABOUT US

The Global Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) The Global Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) is a think-tank based in Nairobi, Kenya with an overarching vision of being a leading global centre of excellence in policy influence and strategy formulation. We provide strategic linkage between experience and research by bringing together distinguished professionals, thought leaders and academia to advance key issues on peace and security. Our work cuts across five pillars namely: Foreign policy, Security and Defence, Transnational Organized Crimes, Governance and Ethics, and Development.

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An epitome of excellence in action research, policy influence and strategy formulation.

MISSION

To contribute to global peace and prosperity through action research in diplomacy, security and development.

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01 Provide a platform for continuous exchange of knowledge in security, diplomacy and development at national, regional and global levels.

02 Generate policy advisories to improve governance and strategic leadership in both public and private sectors.

03 Facilitate skills and knowledge transfer between experienced practitioners and emerging professionals.

04 Cultivate professional linkages through continuous collaboration and networking to support research in security, diplomacy and development.

05 Continuously set the research agenda for state and non-state policy environments to influence evidence-based strategic decision-making processes.



THE GLOBAL CENTRE FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY
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The pillar focuses on understanding emerging peace and security threats locally and globally using the lenses of human security. Key areas of concern for the pillar include conflict-security-development nexus, new wars and countering violent extremism.

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The pillar focuses on how transnational organized crimes threaten state security, and undermine development and the rule of law.

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Development Pillar

The pillar analyses national and global development agenda within the ambit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It seeks to advance policy debates contributing to substantive social and economic transformation of nations. While providing a trusted space for policy dialogues and sharing of policy best practices, the pillar helps to isolate and confront development challenges facing nations globally.



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Concept Note

The Eastern Africa region is characterized by changing peace and security dynamics. These include the ever-present state fragility in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia; the terror contagion in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The persistent resource-based contestations and rebel menace in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and DRC compound the human security threats. The region is also overrun by international syndicates involved in transnational crimes transversing from Djibouti to the Western Indian Ocean islands of Comoros and Seychelles. More so, competing geopolitical interests complicate the future of state stability and development in these states. These internally and externally-induced conflicts challenge the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union's development blue-print, Agenda 2063. The ever-evolving security nuances warrant research and policy conversations to inform policymaking and regional stabilization processes. To this end, The Global Centre for Policy and Strategy (GLOCEPS) will convene a conference to advance regional and global conversations on the changing nature of peace and security in Eastern Africa. The conference aligns with the Centre's mission to contribute to global peace and prosperity through action research in diplomacy, security and development.

The symposium will bring together seasoned academics, analysts, humanitarian actors, practitioners and policymakers to engage in intellectual and policy dialogues on stabilizing Eastern Africa. The forum shall take a problem-solving approach to provide an opportunity to reflect and engage on policy solutions in fragile contexts in Eastern Africa. The two (2) day conference will stimulate discussions on conflict management and governance models to situate regional stability and development. It will reflect beyond the Western-centric approaches in dissecting conflict management, political inclusion, regional cooperation, and security in Eastern Africa.

The conference intends to:

- 1 exchange ideas on the emerging peace and security dynamics and policy actions to strengthen state stability and development in Eastern Africa;

- 2 explore continental and region-centric conflict management models relevant to state stabilization in Eastern Africa;
- 3 deliberate on the approaches to sustaining and accelerating policy research on state stabilization, peace and security interventions in Eastern Africa; and
- 4 open and advance further possibilities of mutual collaborations and partnerships for research, training, and publications.

Conference Themes

Conference discussions will be organised around themes that allow participants to explore the diverse topics addressed during the event. The key themes are:

i) Governance Dynamics in Eastern Africa

The theme will attract discussions on various forms of governance [federalism, centralization, devolution and consociational democracy] and their contribution to the peace and security in regional stability.

ii) Geopolitical interests and security in Eastern Africa

The theme will attract discussions on transboundary resources management, private militaries, and politico-economic, security and diplomatic interests of great and midsize powers in peace and security dynamics in Eastern Africa.

iii) Regional Economic Integration in the Age of Free Trade Agreements

The theme will attract discussions on regional economic unions, free trade and its contribution to regional peace and security.

iv) Conflict Dynamics in Eastern Africa

The theme will attract discussions on terrorism and violent extremism, gender, conflict and security, irredentism, state fragility, resource-based conflicts and conflict management in Eastern Africa.

v) Transnational Organized Crimes [TOCs]

The theme will attract discussions on environmental crimes, maritime security, trends in small arms and light weapons (SALW) smuggling, human trafficking and border security in Eastern Africa.



Foreword



Brig (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage, PhD, EBS, **Executive Director, GLOCEPS**

I am pleased to offer some remarks on this collection of speeches and selected papers emanating from our first inaugural conference convened by GLOCEPS, themed **The Future of State Stability and Development in Eastern Africa**. These speeches and papers are part of the research output that emerged out of the conference held between May 24-25 in Nairobi, Kenya.

The two-day event was designed to broadly address regional peace and security dynamics in Eastern Africa. It particularly focused on aspects that impact the future of state stability and development in the region. The conference was held on the backdrop of several security threats in the region with national, regional and international implications. These include: fragility in Somalia; Ethiopian Tigray Crisis; South Sudan and Eritrea; the recurrent terror threat in Somalia, Uganda and Kenya; and the rebel groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), causing havoc in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The conference was also held in the context of other internally and externally induced conflicts in our region that needed to be addressed, including the highly contested elections in Kenya; the clamour for democratic space in Uganda and Rwanda; the demand for constitutional change in Tanzania; and the maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean. All these are impediments to the attainment of United Nations Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union Development Blue Print-Agenda 2063.

These issues and many more stirred our concern and informed the decision to organize this conference. We grouped the issues into five sub-themes: governance dynamics, geopolitical interests, regional economic integration in the age of trade agreements, conflict dynamics, and transnational organized crimes.

The conference assembled seasoned African-centric experts, diplomats, peace and security practitioners, academics, analysts, and policymakers with knowledge, and understanding of regional dynamics. This platform enabled the interrogation and provision of remedies to some of the challenges while adopting the mantra of finding "African Solutions to African problems".

The output of this conference, such as the selected papers and speeches in this publication, shall assist GLOCEPS to develop advisory opinion to policymakers across the region and beyond, in line with our mission of contributing to global peace and prosperity. The papers and the speeches in this collection are an invitation to our varied stakeholders to find opportunities to engage in robust scholarly and policy conversations centered on state stability and development in Eastern Africa. To our esteemed stakeholders, we look forward to cultivating new networks, research frontiers, and collaborations.

A special appreciation to our two distinguished chief guests, Amb. Eng. Maalim Mahboub and Lt. Gen. (Rtd) Lazaro Sumbeiywo, for respectively offering the opening and closing remarks during the conference. I appreciate too the select contributors to this publication.

Do enjoy the read.

Editorial Note



Dr K O Asembo, OGW, HSC,
Associate Director, GLOCEPS

This special issue presents selected speeches and conference papers delivered at the Global Centre for Policy and Strategy's inaugural conference themed **The Future of State Stability and Development in Eastern Africa** held on May 24th -25th 2022 at the Serena Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya.

The collection reflect peace and security concerns within the Eastern Africa region. The thread of commonality is their reflection of security matters from different angles. The themes include contemporary and traditional security threats within the Eastern Africa but with wider geopolitical ramifications. They comprise electoral security, transnational organized crimes, economic outlook and the growing challenge of climate change. The contributions of the following authors are pertinent in developing policy recommendations that will help address the key issues discussed during the conference.

Dr Westen Shilaho's paper explores the possible contributions to consociational democracy and devolution on state stability in the eastern Africa region. He argues that political actors must adhere to good governance, promote credible elections, democracy, the rule of law, respect human rights, and the limits of the terms in office.

Dr Peter Kirui focuses on strengthening economic integration in Eastern Africa by drawing lessons from history. His paper argues that while economic

integration holds many prospects for the promotion of trade, stability, peace, and economic development, several challenges stand in the way of integration. The paper calls for the need for a careful balance between national politics and the need for regional prosperity that would be achieved through enhanced cooperation.

Prof Noah Midamba's examines the nexus between climate change and water conflict in Eastern Africa. It delves into the ongoing impacts of climate change and suggests several adaptation measures from a security and a defence perspective. The key recommendations in his paper include the actualization of the East Africa Community (EAC), and climate change policy.

Prof X N Iraki assesses the current global economic upheavals and their implications for East African integration. His paper reviews the effects of COVID 19, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, oil crises and the effects of climate change and their impact on local and global economies. It makes a case for regional integration to overcome the economic upheavals. Areas of integration, the paper argues, would include cooperation in trade, education and natural resources use and cultural exchange.

Dr Philip Ouma and Eric Kayiranga examine the challenges surrounding the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALWs). Their paper review international, regional, normative and institutional frameworks to address the problem of illicit proliferation of SALW in East African region and offers several recommendations including capacity building for national focal points and commissions on SALWS.

Editorial Note

Dr Michael Sitawa, Major Dr Obwogi Cliff and **Ogaye Martin** examine the challenges faced in peace support operations in the quest for state building in conflict ridden regions in Eastern Africa. The paper offers pertinent recommendations around funding, operations, doctrine and geopolitical actors engaged in state stabilization missions.

Zephaniah Aura reflects on historical and contemporary challenges facing a number of electoral management bodies (EMBs) as well as other actors in the electoral process in the Eastern Africa region. His paper offers policy, legislative and administrative recommendations for future improvements in electoral democracy in the region.

Elias Benyu reviews violent extremism trends in Africa and their implications in the Eastern Africa region. The paper observes that violent extremism threats have been evolving on the continent based on contextual push and pull factors, and external influences. The article further evaluates current counter violent extremism interventions and offers appropriate recommendations, including the adoption of hard and soft power solutions.

Rumbidzaishe Matambo evaluates the gender and peacebuilding nexus with a focus on conflict hotspots in the region. This paper assesses the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2240, and the African Union's Agenda 2063. The article makes a case for the valuable contributions that women make in peacebuilding and, hence, a need for their meaningful involvement.

Raudhat S Saddam and **Asia M Yusuf** assess the frameworks of existing counter terrorism centres pioneered by regional economic communities such as the SADC, Regional Counter Terrorism Centre (RCTC), IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), and the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). These frameworks are assessed to benchmark for the EAC to establish an effective regional counter terrorism centre. The paper isolates key roles that the EAC centre of excellence would play in countering violent extremism and related cross cutting crimes.

The selected papers, we hope, shall stimulate further conversations on the theme of state stability and development in the Eastern Africa region.

We invite you to enjoy the read and engage with us on info@gloiceps.org

Keynote Address

Opening Ceremony



**Amb Mahboub Maalim Mohammed, CBS, OGW,
Chairman KPLC, Former IGAD Executive Secretary,
Former Permanent Secretary Office of the President,
Former Ps. Min. of Water & Irrigation Kenya**

The Executive Director, GLOCEPS, Brig (Rtd) Dr Kabage and your staff, Lt Gen (Rtd) Lazaro Sumbeiywo, excellencies ambassadors and heads of missions present, distinguished guests, conference participants, ladies and gentlemen, **good morning.**

I am delighted to be here today, among a phenomenal diverse group of participants, economists, diplomats, academics, analysts, and policymakers, who share a common agenda for regional peace and security in Eastern Africa. I was ecstatic when I received the invitation from GLOCEPS because even after I left IGAD, I still share a lot of passion for proactive efforts to resolve conflict and developmental concerns in Africa and Eastern Africa in particular.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Eastern African region continues to witness the proliferation of terror groups and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts emanate from questions of identity and belonging, a scramble for natural resources, while some are outrightly fueled by geopolitical entities. Most of these conflicts have been confined within states, creating state formation crises, governance deficits and structural violence. This fragility has made Eastern Africa vulnerable to cross border mobility of violent extremists and transnational criminal networks who partake in trafficking of people, narcotics and resources.

Ladies and Gentlemen, if we do not proactively strategize on bringing stability into the region, all

other efforts towards our respective national visions and the Continental Vision Agenda 2063 will be undermined. I say this because a fortnight ago I was reading the 2021 Africa Governance Report (AGR) which presented three scenarios of what Africa will look like in 2063. It has been dubbed "the futures report".

The first scenario is the baseline scenario in which 'Africa is united' and achieves Agenda 2063, in which most states are resilient and well-governed. The second scenario is the "utopia scenario", where Africa attains way above the Agenda 2063. This leads the continent to become a formidable competitor on the global stage with democratic, sustainable economies and thriving, crime and conflict free societies. The third scenario is the "dystopia scenario", where "Africa is defeated", with failed socio-economic and political systems.

If we continue to bury our heads in the sand, Africa is headed to a dystopia where conflict, poverty, hunger, violent extremism and poor governance will reign over us. This is not the Africa we want for our grandchildren, and it is certainly not what we want for East Africans. We must consciously make deliberate efforts, and we cannot expect non-African actors and international institutions to lead us to the light.

I must acknowledge that Eastern Africa has made tangible peace and prosperity efforts. In the last few years, we have held relatively peaceful elections, which have ushered in democratic transfer of power in Somalia, Tanzania and Burundi. We continue to pursue peace in South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia through our region-centric entities. These interventions reiterate the mantra of 'African solutions for African problems'. This mantra speaks to African urgency in finding solutions to our local problems as Africans. We Africans understand the local dynamics, and we are to come up with solutions.

Keynote Address

Opening Ceremony

Having had years of engaging with the peace and security environment in this region, I have often pondered how to stabilize our region. And I believe this is why we are here today. I am excited when I look at the programme. I see case studies touching on states from all over the region: South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, DRC, the Indian Ocean littoral and island states (such as Comoros and Seychelles). As we brainstorm on regional stability, I would like to provoke your thoughts on a number of positions that will require your interrogation:

One is on the need to embrace Africa-centric and home-grown conflict management models within the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) mechanism of the African Union. Let us, for a moment, evaluate the challenges that the Panel of the Wise, the Africa Standby Force, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the Peace Fund continue to face and how can they be strengthened.

Two, we have to recognize that the region has indigenous/home-grown peace-building mechanisms that are culturally sensitive in conflict management. These are the "African potentials for peace". Thus, what can we borrow from the Mato Oput in Northern Uganda, Gacaca courts in post-genocide Rwanda, Ubuntu in South Africa, Shimiglina councils in Ethiopia and Guurti in Somalia?

Three, what is the value of regional cooperation? I am excited that DRC has joined the EAC but could we think about how the larger Eastern African region can effectively address cross-cutting security threats such as various transnational organized crimes, violent extremism, and transboundary resources governance? I strongly believe regional economic communities and ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area are opportunities for greater stability.

Four, how can we revitalize region-based peace support operations in conflict-ridden regions to complement the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) in peace support endeavours? How can IGAD support the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)? How should EAC support the MONUSCO force in DRC? How can we enhance mission support funding, equipment inter-operability and coordination mechanisms for successful and effective peace support operations in our region?

Five, what power-sharing models in governance can we adopt to promote peace and stability in fragile contexts. I believe it is time to demystify the western-centric conceptualization of democracy, as we lay the ground for a long-term institutional building to pre-empt power-based conflicts.

Of course, to know what works, why, where and how, I would like to underscore the importance of action research in addressing conflict dynamics in the region through policy influence and strategy formulation. This is why I am particularly proud of GLOCEPS for convening this inaugural conference in line with the Centre's mission and vision. I believe it is timely and will provide fruitful deliberations and collaborations on new research frontiers that will contribute to peace and security in the region.

Thank you very much.

Keynote Address

Closing Ceremony



Lt Gen (Rtd) Lazaro Sumbeiywo
Former Kenya Army Commander and
Mediator of Southern Sudan Peace process

Brigadier (Rtd), Dr. Robert G. Kabage, PhD, EBS, the Executive Director, GLOCEPS, Rtd. (IG) Mr. Joseph Boinnet GLOCEPS Board Members, Your Excellencies Ambassadors and Heads of Missions present, GLOCEPS staff, Presenters and expert discussants, Distinguished guests, Conference participants, Ladies and gentlemen,

Good afternoon.

It is indeed an honour to have been invited to deliver the closing address of this conference. Allow me to thank the Executive Team at GLOCEPS for the consideration. For the past two days I have been privileged to listen to presentations on the five key themes of the conference. The conference has deliberated on varied peace and security dynamics in the Eastern Africa region. Indeed, the region is characterized by intra-state conflicts, fragile peace environments, and human security threats such as drought, locust infestation and related effects of climate change, the problem of refugees, internal displacement and violent extremism. Peace remains a prized possession that all humanity must collectively pursue.

Kenya, and indeed regional organizations such as IGAD and the East African Community (EAC), remain committed to engaging in diplomacy, regional cooperation and mounting peace

interventions for state stabilization in our region. This conference is relevant in the context of reflecting Agenda 2063, the continental blue print, alongside the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), aspirations for peace, security and stability.

In my closing address, I would like to draw on my own experiences in the Sudan peace process and offer some reflections aligned to conflict management in the region. I shall rely on our experiences of mediating the Sudanese peace process that culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. One of the outcomes of the CPA was the independence of South Sudan. I will spare you the details, and instead highlight some lessons that would be relevant in this conference.

First, peace processes are long term, and, therefore, patience and resilience are important. In the Sudan peace process, our mediation under the auspices of IGAD appreciated that peace processes are long term and gradual. Moreover, it requires clear framing of issues to be discussed beforehand. The latter is a good mediation model for the declaration of principles (DOPs), and the diagnosis of the conflict.

Second, the ability to win the trust of multiple conflict actors is critical in mediation process. There is need to build synergies and partnerships with multiple local, regional and international partners for technical and financial support. The new and emerging conflict dynamics that occur during negotiations necessitate an honest demonstration of trust. This is due to the competing interests which include geopolitical influences, and which come with acceptability of non-partisan mediation.

Third, mediation requires both logistics and technical expertise and indeed the contribution of think tanks and academic experts.

Keynote Address

Closing Ceremony

Fourth, mediation needs to also consider the aftermath. When we consider the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA 2005) that led to the birth of South Sudan, we notice that we did not put in place measures that would guide the young state to actualise the fruits of independence. We were not successful in the South Sudan peace process in Addis Ababa because the mediation team was not on the same page. Regretfully, the current status of the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) continues to experience delays.

As a way forward, let me reflect on strategies that think tanks like GLOCEPS, research institutes, academics, and policy makers can invest in the pursuit of global peace and prosperity with a focus on Eastern Africa region.

The following are my thoughts in line with that pursuit.

i) We need to appreciate the value of academic and applied research in order to unravel the root causes and changing conflicts dynamics in the region. For the past two days we have deliberated on several peace and conflict dynamics in the region. These include the Tigray crisis, the Somali state stabilization process, strengthening peace support operations, inclusive politics, and democratization challenges. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of women and youth in peace and security. These are the biggest losers in conflict situations. The importance of research in this scenario cannot be understated, as it is critical in arriving at a fair assessment of conflict situations before offering conflict management interventions.

ii) We need to recognise the significance of documentation. It is important every so often to document our peace-building or states stabilization interventions for the sake of our history and our future generations. These days there are calls to decolonize knowledge and, therefore, the need for Africa-centric debates and perspectives on what works and does not work in peace stabilization interventions. Given the academic and the policy expertise in the room, there is need to archive our multiple knowledge and contribute to scholarly and policy debates on building peace in our region.

iii) We need to reflect through a comparative lens on some of the good practices of peacebuilding and stabilization interventions, drawing from local, regional and global experiences. These could be in the form of seminars, academic conferences, and publications.

Let me conclude once again by thanking the Executive Director, GLOCEPS and his team for putting together such an intellectually engaging conference. I hope the insights gained here shall be used for policy and opening new research frontiers in the peace and security domain.

With these few remarks, I wish to now officially close this conference.

**May God bless you
Asanteni Sana**



Photo Credit: Time Zimbabwe Elections

Consociational Democracy and Devolution: the Sine Quo Non for Political Stability in East Africa?



Dr Western K Shilaho, PhD¹
Elections and Governance Expert
Senior Lecturer, Daystar University

Abstract

In Africa, like elsewhere in the world, the concept of democracy is contested. To some, it is the solution to Africa's myriad problems while to others it is the bane. A discourse about democracy in relation to Africa always runs the risk of overlooking Africa's diversity. This paper foregrounds political actors as opposed to democracy per se to explain incessant political conflicts within the East African region. It critically analyses Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy coupled with devolution as conflict management approaches in deeply culturally and politically fragmented societies in East Africa. Methodologically immersed in systematic literature analysis, the paper shows that, for desired outcomes, consociational democracy and devolution depend on the behaviour of the political elite. In a polity in which the political elite is willing to compromise, these approaches enhance social cohesion, thus political stability. The converse is true. The paper argues that in as much as consociational democracy and devolution could stabilise the East African region, political actors must adhere to good governance, promote credible elections, democracy, the rule of law, respect human rights and term limits for embedded inclusiveness. This obviates the need for consociational democracy which is no more than band aid to intractable societal contradictions.

Key Words: East Africa, Kenya, consociationalism, democracy, devolution

Introduction

Historically, the East African region is bedevilled with political instability that has undermined democracy, the rule of law, social cohesion, and regional integration. Regional countries including the Zanzibar archipelago, part of the United Republic of Tanzania, have experienced instability at some point or the other to the detriment of the very survival of these states. South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 already broken, and immediately sank into civil strife. These conflicts chiefly stem from contestation over power for primitive accumulation among predatory political actors in deeply fragmented societies devoid of constitutionalism. Often these political operatives create and exploit divisions among interest groups to their economic and political advantage. Beholden to external forces, Western powers and emerging ones such as China, East Africa's political elite, like Africa's elite generally, derive their legitimacy externally to the detriment of regional peace and security. Intrastate conflicts are in essence regional and invariably assume an ethno-regional dimension owing to the salience of sectarianism and political mobilisation hinged on primordial considerations as

¹Dr. Westen K. Shilaho, Senior Lecturer, Daystar University and Senior Research Fellow, University of Johannesburg

opposed to crosscutting social, economic, and political concerns.

Consociational democracy and devolution of power and resources across East Africa have the potential to enhance political stability. Centralisation of power in Africa among tiny cabals of elite, a legacy of one party and military autocracies, accounts for per capita and regional development disparities, poverty, and conflicts. Before 2010, when Kenya promulgated a constitution that provided for partial dispersal of power and national resources to the periphery, concerns affecting the populace had never mattered. Self-servingly, the president, as head of a plutocratic establishment, dominated the political and economic spheres. Since elections held in 2013, popularly elected governors head devolved units, counties, and control allocated revenue from the exchequer in as much as the centre is still overbearing. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), governors are also elected through universal suffrage but that has not mitigated governance challenges and incessant political instability whose causes are complex and legion.

South Sudan is divided into states under governors who are presidential appointees. This arrangement has been a source of tension between the government and opposition. So contested is this administrative system that it has, on occasions, triggered violence. South Sudan's challenges emanate from years of warfare, militarisation of politics, rampant kleptocracy, and political tribalism which militate against its viability as a nation state. In Ethiopia, ethnic federalism, that accords discontented groups the right to secede, was designed to address the country's socio-economic and political challenges following a history of autocracy and civil strife but has not helped to stem secessionist attempts, tribal conflicts, state violence, and political instability owing to entrenched state repression and exclusion. The ongoing civil conflict pitting federal forces against Tigray region forces bears testament to the tension between the centre and regional governments.

Economic progress and consociational democracy are in sync with African Union's Agenda 2063, and its ambition to silence guns at some point in the future having overrun its deadline in 2020 and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Kenya has trail blazed devolution in the East African region and also experimented with some semblance of consociationalism, forced by risks posed by state fragility, and institutional impunity which have dogged it throughout its postcolonial period. Devolution was rolled out almost a decade ago, yet the Kenyan state remains precariously fragile since the rule of law, democracy, compromise, and constitutionalism are alien among Kenya's political elite and their ardent supporters. Good

governance has been displaced by patronage, political tribalism, impunity, and bigotry.

Attempts to stabilise the Kenyan state have to contend with numerous challenges owing to the exclusivist character of the state as a site of personal enrichment through primitive accumulation which impedes the state from meeting its core functions. Much as their legislative powers tend to be constricted to varying degrees, devolved and federal units, if well run, could address zero sum politics and attendant conflicts over control of the state and its resources. The old order, however, hinged on predation, divisiveness, and repression, resists and even sabotages efforts geared towards dispersal of opportunities for political and economic inclusiveness. I argue that in as much as consociational democracy and devolution could stabilise the East African region, regional rulers must submit to good governance, credible elections, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and term limits for embedded inclusiveness.

As strategies that fragmented societies can employ to mitigate problems of political and economic exclusion, consociational democracy, and decentralisation or devolution ensure that all sections of the society are included in governance, decision making and equitably benefit from national resources. Decentralisation of power and resources to the grassroots ensures participatory governance that forestalls and deescalates conflicts. The ideal of democracy and decentralisation are integral to good governance (Das 1996, 250). Kenya's constitution provides for devolution to address historical injustices, exclusivist winner-take-all politics and the attendant conflicts (Republic of Kenya 2010). Its implementation, however, has been frustrated by reactionary forces attuned to centralisation and the consequent fragmentation, hence opposed to state overhaul, equity, equality before the law and equality of opportunity for collective advancement and social cohesion. This paper focuses on the viability of consociational democracy and devolution as conflict resolution strategies in deeply fragmented societies within the East African region and beyond. Using a systematic literature analysis method, it illuminates the interface between consociationalism, and devolution on one hand and political (in)stability and state building on the other. As such, it makes reference to relevant journal articles, books, official documents, and newspapers. Elaborate reference has been made to Arend Lijphart's seminal works on consociationalism. In this paper, the East African region is defined broadly beyond membership to the East African Community (EAC), thus the mention of Ethiopia. Evocation of other jurisdictions beyond the region accords the analysis a comparative continental and global outlook. The paper is relevant to

scholars, practitioners and policymakers interested in governance, regional integration, security, and peacebuilding within the region and even beyond. The first section conceptualizes the study, the second underscores the centrality of democracy in political stability, the subsequent one focuses on consociationalism and devolution in East Africa followed by case studies then the conclusion.

Consociational Democracy: A Conceptualisation

Consociational democracy, by definition, refers to a government by elite cartel designed to turn a fledgling democracy embedded in a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy (Lijphart 1969, 216). It looks contradictory that an elite cartel, a phrase that connotes skulduggery, could found a democracy out of fragmentation. Consociational democracy is not the panacea for fragmentation as it is sometimes portrayed since political elites often carry themselves without regard to political will and forbearance qualities required for enforcement of the four anchor principles of consociationalism (Lijphart 2007, 14):

Government by “grand coalition”, that is, by a broadly representative coalition of all significant groups

Although this is the most salient attribute of consociationalism, “grand coalitions” are hardly representative where they have been tried within the East African region. They tend to be exclusively composed of elite from warring parties derived from major ethnic or religious formations and lock out significant interest groups such as youth, people living with disabilities, minorities, and historically marginalised groups. Grand coalitions have a tendency to operate beyond checks and balances which creates room for grand corruption and other acts of predation on a mutually beneficial basis. Coalition governments in Kenya and South Sudan were cases in point regarding institutional sleaze.

Group autonomy by means of territorial federalism and decentralisation

Group or segmented autonomy entails ceding power to various segments of the society so that they take charge of their own affairs without affecting the ability of the elites to compromise (Lijphart 2007, 79–80). It, however, requires political elite not demeaned by narrow interests. Autonomy is attained through federalism, whereby segments in a divided society run their own affairs in geographically concentrated regions. However, this is not feasible in geographically intermixed societies such as Burundi and Rwanda in which ethnic groups share

locations (Lijphart 2007, 80). In both countries Tutsi and Hutu communities have intermarried over generations and inhabit the same regions and hamlets which makes it hard to distinguish them. At some point the distinguishing factor was the number of cattle one kept. More livestock identified one as Tutsi while less accorded one Hutu identity (Lemarchand 1998; Prunier 1970).

Cultural federalism is one way of sidestepping the challenge posed by Burundi and Rwanda and it entails “giving citizens freedom of ethnic identity, and allowing them to voluntarily join independent cultural or ethnic organisations which may have important advisory functions on the national government level” (Lijphart 2007, 80). It guarantees political security to small segments which allays fears of domination and enhances a sense of cooperation among the elite (ibid). Group or segmented autonomy creates tensions and frictions in Africa where colonial boundaries are inviolable and centralisation of power holds sway. It is easily conflated with secession by a paranoid ruling elite at the centre. Federalism and decentralisation are resisted by beneficiaries of centralisation too for fear that they could herald secession by excluded ethnic groups from power and economic opportunities. Such is the case in Kenya where devolution, faces resistance and sabotage from the ancient regime.

Proportionality, especially with regard to political representations

The notion of proportionality is based on the understanding that political security, thus elite cooperation, can be enhanced through political and civil service representation, and allocation of resources in accord with relative population of a group within the overall population (Lijphart 2007, 80). In deeply divided societies, however, this principle does not address the concerns of minority groups. To address mistrust and fear, this principle is sometimes replaced by proportionality overrepresentation or parity since small segments do not believe that they can rely on proportionality to guarantee their security. Under proportionality, all sectors are provided with roughly the same proportional influence, while in the case of minority overrepresentation, each sector is provided with enough influence for an acceptable balance of political security (Lijphart 2007, 80). Elitism that informs grand coalition governments, however, does not allow for proportional representation and, therefore, many sections of the society tend to be left out. Ordinarily, proportional representation (PR) electoral system is hardly in use across Africa. The winner-take-all zero-sum approach is the norm, which entrenches exclusiveness, political upheavals and recriminatory conflicts.

◆ **Minority veto power concerning issues of vital and fundamental importance to minorities**

Lijphart describes minority veto as “the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their vital interests” (Lijphart 1990, 495). Minority veto, he adds, “prevents decisions by the grand coalition that would be so unacceptable to the minority group as to cause them to leave the government” (Lijphart 2007, 8). The downside is that if a minority veto is used often, it could destroy consociational democracy. To cure this seemingly inherent pitfall, minority veto contains an inbuilt safeguard in the sense that “the very security which the existence of the minority veto provides, will remove the strongest reasons for its being used” and this does not have to be codified constitutionally as informalisation suffices (Lijphart 2007, 81).

This principle is challenging to implement where the state is ethnic or religious in orientation such that the more populous an ethnic or religious group the more bargaining power for its political elite and vice versa. Issues core to minorities, thus democratic stability, are easily ignored even if codified in the law. Usually, minorities are not consulted during law making process owing to the notion that not being demographically significant, they do not have much political leverage and therefore pose no threat. They are expected to fit in whatever arrangement arrived at.

Although hailed by proponents, consociational democracy did not yield desired results in Burundi, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Lebanon, Cyprus, Nigeria, Uruguay, among other countries. The reasons for this consistent failure may vary from one country to another but the basic rationale for the collapse of grand coalitions is the absence of political will and inability by a power consumed political elite to appreciate the far-reaching consequences of continued fragmentation. For consociational democracy to succeed, the political elite must transcend narrow self-serving interests and prioritise national goals and the collective wellbeing (Lijphart 1969, 2016):

- ◆ i The elite must have the ability to accommodate divergent interests and demands of the subcultures
- ◆ ii This requires that the elite have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures
- ◆ iii This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability
- ◆ iv Finally, all the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation.

◆ **Democracy and State Stability**

It is imperative to reflect on the concept of democracy often bandied around, autocrats inclusive, yet easily misunderstood, cynically reinterpreted or simply bastardised (Gitonga 1987, 6). Although imperfect, it is almost universally accepted that democracy provides the ideal form of government through which economic, political, cultural and social needs can be achieved. In Armatya Sen’s thinking, democracy is a universal value such that, “A country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit through democracy” (Sen 1999, 2). Governance problems witnessed in East Africa and across Africa such as unemployment, insecurity, ethnic conflicts, impunity, and crime are primarily symptomatic of the failure of democracy, specifically the rule of law, inclusive politics and constitutionalism. Once a state is unable to meet people’s political, economic and social needs, because of institutional atrophy, it risks collapse (Acemoglu, and Robinson, 2012). Significantly, it is not enough to afford people universal franchise, the right to vote. It is imperative that their basic needs - food security, healthcare, jobs, education, housing, sanitation, and infrastructure - be met (Das 1996, 241).

Principally, democracy is welfare oriented. Across generations, democracy was widely seen as an avenue for bettering people’s lives through social welfare. Memorably, through democracy basic demands were met in the wake of the great depression in the US. The tendency, however, to equate democracy to ritualistic elections of dubious credibility in autocratic polities or arrested transitions is flawed. To put it differently, “Democracy is not about counting votes. In a true democracy, citizens will always give priority to general interests” (Das 1999, 241-2). Rousseau had a dim view of representative democracy which he likened to slavery because it does not give people a chance to fully participate in the affairs of the state and reflect upon their collective wellbeing. As such, “It is the primary duty of democracy to engender this attitude and create a congenial atmosphere for its blossoming” (Das 1996, 242). This is what is called participatory democracy (Sandel 1998).

In a democracy, compromise, which is the crux of consociationalism, counts. A society is composed of shades of ideas, beliefs, identities and ideologies. Intolerance towards dissenters who hold divergent views, or identify themselves differently be it on the basis of creed, political affiliation or ethnicity heralds the demise of democracy. History is awash with examples of how religious, and ethnic bigotry or exploitation of autochthonous politics have tipped over societies into violence. In East Africa, fragmentation in Kenya, Burundi,

South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is evidence of how damaging sectarian politics is. Hobbes and Bodin disturbingly made a case for dictatorship claiming that it rescues a society from disorder, chaos, and intolerance (Hobbes 1967; Franklin 1973). They were wrong. Dictatorship breeds political intolerance and goes against fraternity, good will and cooperation without which democracy cannot thrive (Das 1996, 242). In fact, dictatorship is a recipe for chaos and instability because it is based on a flawed belief in the infallibility of the dictator. When the political elite choose to subvert democracy, the alternative cannot be dictatorship. Instead of blaming democracy, saboteurs of democracy must be held to account.

Democracy enables various disparate societal groups to coexist for mutual benefit. When groups are inhibited from relating, characteristic of authoritarianism, it curtails democracy. Pointedly, "democracy also recognises that every national group shall have the right to determine its own self. Hence right to self-determination is not apathetic to democratic ideal, rather it is part of it" (Das 1999, 243). Democracy affirms plurality, coexistence and uniqueness of individuals and groups within a society. No person or group is subservient to another and none should be denigrated, demeaned or dominated. In a word, oppression and social stratification are inconsistent with democracy.

Why Liberal Democracy Matters

Liberal democracy affirms plurality of groups and organisations. The notion that liberal democracy can hardly find traction in Africa owing to mass poverty, inequalities and fusion between society and state cannot stand scrutiny. Liberal democracy is a prerequisite to overcoming these challenges. David Apter avers that "liberal pluralism depends on factionalisation of class, the disappearance of primordial cleavages, and the differentiation of roles, so that no individual is wholly identified with a single class, occupational, ethnic, religious or other affiliation" (Apter 1978 in Das 1996, 244). In liberal democracy, people make political choices on the basis of socio-economic concerns away from retrogressive kinship ties and religious bigotry. They reserve the right to elect their representatives and replace them as and when they feel like either through a popular uprising (as happened during the Arab Spring or recently in Sri Lanka) or elections. Sovereignty rests in the people and representatives only exercise it in their trust. Individuals, and their political rights and civil liberties, are at the core of liberal democracy.

One of the cardinal principles of liberal democracy is not only rule of majority but also recognition of the importance and status of the minority (Das 1996, 245). Rule of the majority does not imply that the minority have no say or do not matter. In liberal democracy, the minority are just as significant as the majority. Minorities could be religious, linguistic, cultural, political or caste. In dictatorships, and pseudo-democracies, minorities are discriminated against, suppressed, excluded from public goods and other basic needs. They are constantly subjected to state sponsored violence, othered and suffer from historical injustices as seen in the East African region, Africa, India, Myanmar, China. Even in the West, the bastion of democracy, minorities hardly enjoy the full benefits of democracy as illustrated by the disproportionate effects of Covid-19. Ideally, in a liberal democracy, the rights of minorities are codified in the constitution and ring-fenced against abuse. They have an inalienable right to assert their grievances which ought to be heard and addressed (Das 1996, 246). Democracy, regardless of the variation, affirms multiplicity of views and standpoints and could be summed up thus: "The purpose of democratic government is to honour and give effect to all opinions...It believes that the truth will come out of the cross currents of views. This is an important principle of liberal democratic system" (Das 1996, 246).

Democracy is not without flaws and its deficiencies are more prominent in poor countries (Chege 1987). In the developing world - Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, and Latin America - the crisis of democracy is widespread owing to entrenched contradictions and divisions resulting from wide economic disparities. Mobilisation along the axes of religion, caste, ethnicity, language, culture, and regionalism creates and exacerbates fault lines. Cynical rulers exploit inequities and disparities for short term political and economic gain. Ultimately, "... inequality in any of its form is an enemy of democracy" (Das 1996, 247). To sustain democracy and political stability, it is imperative that poverty and inequalities are addressed through redistribution of economic opportunities and political inclusion. The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed disparities between developed and developing countries and inequalities within individual countries. This has raised consciousness around class interests and pushed some polities, such as Colombia, towards populist politics. Colombians, traditionally attuned to reactionary politics, got their first leftist government in 2022 and eventually joined the rest of Latin America in embracing leftist governments hinged on resentment against exploitation of the poor and inclined towards redistribution politics.

Consociationalism in East Africa

Consociationalism has been tried on various occasions in Kenya, Burundi and Kenya within the East African region with mixed results. Despite devolution and federalism in Kenya and Ethiopia respectively, centralisation of power is the norm within this region, including in these two countries. Eritrea, that gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, is an extreme outlier that is still battling to transition into a modern state. As a veritable gulag, the repressive state has tight control over the state and society. Uganda, Rwanda, Djibouti, and Burundi are characterised by centralisation of power and resources mixed with dictatorship. Tanzania is arguably the bastion of political stability, social cohesion, forbearance, and political tolerance within the region. Except during the tenure of John Magufuli when unprecedented state repression was witnessed, Tanzania has role modelled nationhood, pan-Africanism, and inclusiveness. Magufuli, who passed on in office in 2021, succumbed to suspected Coronavirus related complications, a pandemic that he had eccentrically downplayed, consistent with an intolerant streak that typifies his regime. Somalia, without a stable government, is a metaphor of state collapse. It is illustrative of state failure mired in civil war, and extremist violence since 1991 when Siad Barre's autocratic regime was toppled by a motley of clan based militias. Dispersal of power and resources at the centre and from the centre to the periphery is, therefore, integral to socio-economic, and political inclusion, peace, and stability.

Political and economic exclusion enhances inequalities, poverty and social stratification which in turn elicit politicisation of identity along regional, religious, linguistic, racial, or ethnic fault lines. Cynical political elite tap into politics of affection manifested through informalisation of power, kinship ties, ethno-regionalism to create almost immutable political loyalty that panders to the basest instincts while either making claims on the state or defending capture of the same (Hyden 2012). The resultant conflicts are intractably characterised by mutual attrition. Devolution, institutions, norm edifying politics and consociationalism serve as guardrails against life negating politics. Much as it is often portrayed as an antidote for perennial disputes in divided societies, Lijphart argues that whereas, "consociational solutions may enhance political cohesion, they inherently have a tendency to result in some degree of immobilism" (Lijphart 1969, 225). Consociationalism provides an avenue for mending broken societies subject to certain prerequisites foremost being a

political elite willing to transcend insularity, embrace diversity, the rule of law and constitutionalism.

Political contests are sometimes likened to a game. But this analogy is misleading since "a game is only a good game when the outcome is in doubt and the stakes are not too high. When the stakes are too high, the tone changes from excitement to anxiety" (Almond in Lijphart 1969, 2015). And when the "rules of the game" are either opaque, only known to one of the contestants or are arbitrarily shifted while the game unfolds, then the contest could easily degenerate into a conflict. In a legitimate political contest, the outcome is uncertain yet the procedure - rules of the game - must be transparent for credibility thus acceptability of the outcome by competing parties. Confidence in the process drastically reduces chances of a conflict.

In fragmented societies, however, violence is normalised because political contests are personality based and shrouded in opacity. The rule of law and its derivatives such as accountability, and transparency countermand anxieties, animosities, hostilities, and the resulting conflicts and violence that divisive politics are invariably steeped in. In a consociational democracy, politics is akin to a serious business, not a game (Lijphart 1969, 2015-16). Politics happens within a structured framework in which certainty is codified and stability is maintained through compromises. This political arrangement seeks to address the core causes of political instability which are usually about exclusion from power, representation, and national resources. Contested natural resources often sit in an area inhabited by the excluded community which raises issues of social justice. Hence consociationalism recognises the right by a group for self-determination politically, linguistically, and culturally.

Consociational democracy, well implemented, militates against constant power struggles in fragmented polities that, if not managed, often spiral into mass violence, economic turmoil and societal rupture. In extreme cases these centrifugal forces could result in mass atrocities as has happened in Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya. Divided polities are, in effect, immobilist democracies which, in Lijphart's understanding, are societies that are neither advancing nor decaying but stagnant - the opposite of stable democracies. The East African region is characterised by ebbs and flows in the sense that states within the region oscillate between stability and chaos. These states are largely immobilist and, like other divided societies, are marred by "fragmentation, both in cultural and structural

sense and by the absence of consensus on government structure and the process" (Lijphart 1969, 209). Consociational democracies are oddities. Although fragmented, they are said to be stable which sounds oxymoronic. Stability is fleeting and precarious. Pivotal in the durability of this conflict resolution measure is the behaviour of the political elite which, in large measure, accounts for the durability or failure of consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969, 212).

Although the grand coalition cabinet is the salient attribute of consociationalism, Lijphart holds that "grand coalition" is narrow and the ideal reference would be "universal participation" or "a cartel of elites" (1969, 213). It is also referred to as power sharing or elite-pacting or simply, "eat and let eat" approach, to cynics. The stability of consociational democracy, as stated, is not so much predicated on peculiar attributes of a political system "as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilise the system" (Lijphart 1969, 2013). Political tolerance and forbearance ensure the stability of a democracy, grand coalitions and indeed competitive politics (Levitisky and Ziblatt 2018).

Consociational Democracy: Case Studies

In the East African region, power sharing between erstwhile political rivals happened in Kenya following violently disputed presidential elections in 2007, and before then several times in Burundi that momentarily stabilised the country following years of civil strife before it plunged into violence again because of political deceit and impunity (Daley and Popplewell 2016). South Sudan has also had grand coalition governments with minimum breakthroughs. South Sudan invariably orbits between tranquillity and ethnic violence despite numerous power sharing deals between factions of a fragmented political elite. Further afield, Zimbabwe, in the wake of damagingly disputed elections in 2008, had a grand coalition government which, for a while, ended a vicious crackdown by the state against opposition leaders and their supporters but did not translate into sustainable political stability. The state and affiliated militia continued to unleash violence against the opposition even after the long serving liberation hero turned dictator, Robert Mugabe, was toppled in 2017. Once violence is entrenched in the body politic, governments of national unity are no more than band aid unless structural problems are addressed (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010).

Kenya

In Kenya, the grand coalition was a ceasefire agreement. The protagonists were forced into the arrangement not so much because they met the requirements of consociationalism as because of external pressure and fear of economic and political freefall. The inability to transcend the smallness of the politics that had precipitated the disputed presidential elections in 2007 and the subsequent fratricidal violence was exhibited throughout the duration of the grand coalition government. Effectively these were two governments in one and there was virtually no concurrence between the protagonists regarding national objectives because of narrow personal interests and legitimacy issues. The differences were often about sheer vanity involving the pecking order between the President and Prime Minister, Prime Minister and the Vice President, access to star largesse, and the perceived differential stately treatment accorded to the President and the Prime minister.

Malignant differences arose over cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC) involving suspected masterminds of the mass atrocities during the 2007 electoral violence with one side aligned to the Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, supporting the trial of the cases before The Hague based court while the side aligned to Mwai Kibaki, the president, argued for postponement or referral of the cases to Kenya. Kibaki, upon being controversially sworn in amidst raging violence over contested presidential elections, appropriated the so-called lucrative cabinet positions while his nemesis, Odinga, who joined the government through the grand coalition, was left with the so called less glamorous portfolios. It was illustrative of lack of political tolerance, forbearance and perils of persistent political deceit, mistrust and fragmentation. No sooner had power sharing been sealed than Kibaki aligned camp set its sights on the transitional elections in 2013 thus the constant bickering.

In spite of its challenges, Kenya's grand coalition was significant in the sense that it halted the violence that threatened the viability of the Kenyan nation state as anarchy through mass displacement, rape, arson, looting and murder were increasingly becoming normative. Cheeseman and Tendi observed that, "power sharing involved the construction of a more or less inclusive government that represents a broad range of concerned parties, but may also include provisions regarding the distribution of bureaucratic posts and new rules for the make-up of the security forces and their subsequent management"

(Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, 204). These scholars are in favour of power sharing over other alternative conflict resolution strategies based on three grounds.

First, power sharing quickly ends conflict since it affords all political parties access to power. Second, it confers legitimacy on the government and its actions, accused of subverting democracy in the first place. Second, the inclusive participation enhances reconciliation among the warring parties. Lastly, power sharing is expected to incentivise warring factions to maintain their proximity to power, moderate their positions for institutional reform necessary to address the root causes of the conflict (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, 204). However, Kenya's grand coalition plodded along fairly inefficiently largely because of fear over possible relapse into violence had it collapsed. Khadiagala argued that this fear compelled the gladiators, Kibaki and Odinga, to work for the stability of the coalition government (Khadiagala 2010, 78). The coalition government provided stability for the realisation of a constitution in 2010, a framework for reform. In the Kenyan context, however, the absence of justice and conflict of interest by the ruling elite has stymied resolution of the core issues of its postcolonial challenges thus reconciliation.

Cheeseman and Tendi faulted the grand coalition as a conflict resolution measure. In their view, the approach should be applied only as a last resort because power sharing is no more than "a generous title for a process which has condemned opposition parties to accept inferior positions within the government, despite their success at the ballot box" (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, 225). Therefore, power sharing amounts to democratic backsliding. First, it is a throwback to single party monolith and a disincentive to opposition activists since it unites the political elite through access to state largesse which dislodges accountability, checks and balances. Second, it places opposition politicians in an awkward position in the sense that they cannot justify their stance on issues at variance with the aspirations of their supporters. Third, and crucially, it enables elements that had derailed democracy to keep the privileges of incumbency which impedes state reform and threatens the impartiality of subsequent elections (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010, 225).

The National Accord that entrenched power sharing under the constitution was not a solution to historical intercommunal animosities. Neither could it have prevented politicians from inciting Kenyans subsequently. The National Accord did not imply that sectarianism, mistrust and exclusion within

Kenya's polity would end. The 2010 constitutional referendum campaigns and elections campaigns indicated that old habits die hard. Some politicians employed tribal innuendoes and hate speech, the very political setting that had triggered postelection maelstrom before (Daily Nation October 15, 2010). Subsequent elections campaigns in 2012, 2017 and 2022 were also marred by ethnic bigotry. The National Accord was significant because it created a political atmosphere within which comprehensive institutional, legal and constitutional reform was to be undertaken and its centrepiece was Agenda 4 which spelled out Kenya's reconstruction. Agenda 4, however, has been sacrificed on the altar of opportunism, self-interest and conflict of interest. No sooner had the political elite shared power than they abandoned Agenda 4, the crux of durable stability. Its implementation would have addressed institutional and constitutional challenges, impunity, land injustices and facilitated justice, reconciliation and healing. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report, for instance, is yet to be made public since being submitted to President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2013. There was state interference in work of the commission particularly about doctoring of a chapter on the incandescent land question that implicated Kenyatta's family in historical land inequities (Slye 2018).

Burundi

Burundi has had three attempts at consociational democracy and all failed. Following elections held in 1993 after civil war, Pierre Buyoya, Burundi's former president, was succeeded by Melchior Ndadaye. Ndadaye assumed office and set up a consociation, democracy that included Tutsi and Hutu representation (Sullivan 2007, 77). The most essential requirement of consociational democracy, that is, a grand coalition which means an overarching cooperation among the elite, was present in this culturally fragmented polity (Sullivan 2007, 78). The political situation, however, plunged back into turmoil after Ndadaye was assassinated by a Tutsi dominated army opposed to change. The government ambled along until it was eventually brought down through a putsch in 1996. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 was a second attempt at consociational democracy, yet violence continued unabated owing to exclusion of some of the rebel groups from power for lack of compromise among the political elite.

In 2004, yet another power sharing agreement between the government and rebel groups was signed and bore all the hallmarks of consociational democracy (Sullivan 2007). It culminated in the ascendancy of Pierre Nkurunziza, a former rebel leader, to power in 2005 but peace remained a mirage. Nkurunziza dramatically reneged on the Arusha Accord at the end of the second and final five year term and insisted on running for a third term amid mass protests and lethal crackdown by state forces that once again precipitated displacement of refugees into neighbouring countries. Nkurunziza argued that the first term did not count since he had been elected by parliament not through universal franchise (Vandeginste 2015). His opponents accused him of deliberately misinterpreting the Arusha Accord thus going against its spirit. Nkurunziza prevailed and ruled with an iron fist for five more years and was only taken out by Covid-19 in 2020, not before he had handpicked a successor and hoisted him into power. Like Magufuli, Nkurunziza had ignored protocols about the disease.

South Africa

South Africa is arguably a compelling illustration of consociationalism in Africa (Lijphart 2007). The grand coalition, emblematic of this pacifying approach, came into being in the run up to and after all-race inclusive elections in 1994 after decades of separate development - apartheid. The country has, to a large extent, maintained the letter and spirit of consociationalism through a liberal constitution, political tolerance, political inclusivity, and recognition of dialogue as the country's default conflict resolution mechanism (Lijphart 2007). Consociationalism seems enduring in South Africa because of awareness among the political elite that the cost of fragmentation is steep. Given that South Africa is mired in structural and overt violence, owing to a history of white domination and segregation, it would not take much effort for South Africa to collapse into sectarian violence were its political elite to act recklessly. Generations of subjugation, and dehumanisation of blacks, and the consequent racial polarisation, poverty and inequalities constitute a tinder box within the South African society. Economic exclusion that disproportionately affects majority blacks, imperils the stability of South Africa and unless addressed deliberately through well thought out policy formulation and implementation, liberal democracy

per se cannot be relied upon to sustain the country.

Even with two thirds majority under former President Thabo Mbeki following 2009 elections, the ruling party, African National Congress (ANC), did not amend the constitution to address lingering historical injustices related to land redistribution, inequalities, or attempt to nationalise banks. Neither did they interfere with the property rights, a cornerstone of liberal democracy. These issues continue to polarise South Africa along racial and nationality lines pitting whites against blacks. Economic and political exclusion coupled with weak governance steeped in corruption account for incessant tensions that often spill over into xenophobic violence pitting poor black South Africans against immigrants from the rest of Africa, Bangladesh, and Pakistan in the informal economy (Solomon and Kosaka 2013).

South Africa's electoral system is mixed and includes proportional representation (PR) and First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) to ensure representation by minorities and other interest groups. Even if the government of the day were to realise the two thirds threshold as happened under Mbeki, it cannot amend the law to encroach on inalienable rights such as the right by minorities to form linguistic and cultural groups. If they tried to, the amendment would be quashed by the courts of law which have consistently, albeit with criticism, displayed fidelity to the rule of law. Driven by the quest for self-aggrandisement, however, South Africa's political elite, across the political spectrum, has increasingly become insular, inward looking and almost lost sight of political tolerance, the rule of law and constitutionalism. The preponderance of corruption in public and private sectors, hollowing of state institutions and politicisation of race, and nationality (that constantly spawns xenophobic violence) shows that the current crop of South African politicians is far removed from ideals that informed the framers of the constitution and founders of an inclusive democratic South Africa.

Conclusions

Consociationalism, federalism, and devolution are meant to ensure that no section of the population feels neglected and left out of the mainstream politics and economy since alienation easily snowballs into intercommunal discontent and violence. The three-step process in consociational democracy, that is, cooperation among the elites of different groups in a fragmented society, a higher level of elite cooperation strengthened by political security for smaller segments of society, and a higher level of elite cooperation culminating in peace (Lijphart 2007, 78) hardly runs seamlessly in societies undergoing reconstruction. In some societies these elites form coalitions aware of the risks posed by unabated fragmentation which compels them to rationally take remedial measures (Lijphart 2007, 79). But in others, recalcitrance, skulduggery and bad blood among the political elite make it almost impossible for such societies to renew themselves through justice, healing and reconciliation. East Africa presents a mosaic picture regarding state building efforts against histories of fragmentation. On the whole, it is a fragile region that calls for compromise among the elite and inclusion. The durability and possible success of consociationalism as conflict management approach is predicated on rapprochement among the elite for the sake of the nation state and their people. Fundamentally, institutionalisation of politics through the rule of law and norms is of greater import to ensure political and economic inclusivity, and good governance. The significance of dispersal of power and resources through devolution cannot be overemphasized.

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Strengthening Economic Intergration in Eastern Africa: lessons from history



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Abstract

Economic integration is expected to promote trade and cohesion, and hopefully reduce tendencies of conflict within the economic communities because of increased dependencies. With the operationalization of the ambitious African Continent Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), theoretically, it is expected that the continent will be more integrated and intra-Africa trade will increase. While there is reason to be optimistic about the prospects of AfCFTA, in practice, implementing the AfCFTA requires massive political will that is deficient among many African political leaders. African countries must therefore not only ratify AfCFTA's legal instruments and protocols but more importantly demonstrate this through the political will that ensures effective implementation. Besides that, integration may also suffer setbacks as domestic politics overshadow the integration agenda. Drawing from lessons from History, especially of the East African Community (EAC), the paper argues that political will is essential for any meaningful economic and political integration.

Key Words: Economic Integration, peace and security, free trade

Introduction

Eastern Africa comprises East Africa and the Horn of Africa. For purposes of this paper, countries in this region include Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. More broadly, several other countries neighbouring these countries may also be considered part of Eastern Africa. In a bid to promote free trade and movement of people, Eastern Africa has taken the lead to promote economic integration within the region. The motive of integration is always to eliminate or reduce tariff and non-tariff restrictions that hamper the free movement of people and international trade. Integration also tends to promote peace and stability among states that have integrated as it encourages team spirit and emphasizes convergence of interests over divergence.

Consequently, two Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are active in Eastern Africa: The East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The EAC, with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania, is a regional intergovernmental organization of seven partner states: The Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republics of Burundi, Kenya,

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Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania. The vision of EAC is to be a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable, and politically united East Africa. IGAD on the other hand comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. Its vision is to be the premier REC for achieving peace and sustainable development in the region.

Research Puzzle

While economic integration holds many prospects in the region in terms of promoting trade, stability, peace, and economic development, several challenges stand in the way of integration. While in theory, RECs like EAC and IGAD have established legal and institutional frameworks to promote economic integration in the region, in practice, this has been difficult to implement. Besides that, integration takes place in an environment of peace and political stability, which is not the case in Eastern Africa. This paper explores the historical and political perspectives in an attempt to unpack the challenges facing integration and hopefully suggest entry points towards improving integration in Eastern Africa and the African continent at large.

Research Methodology

This paper draws from existing literature to put both historical and political dynamics of integration into perspective. It, therefore, reflects on both historical and contemporary challenges of integration to establish the nexus and legacies that could help shape pathways for successful integration into the future.

The paper is based on political realism which stresses the competitive and conflictual interests of states. This theory was picked as it was likely to demonstrate the pitfalls of integration which if not carefully executed may collapse under the weight of competing interests of individual member states.

Collapse of EAC In 1977: Lessons From History

Integration in East Africa dates back to the colonial period, but postcolonial EAC as we know it was established in 1967. A decade later, the EAC collapsed because of several reasons. The reasons cited for the collapse of the then EAC are very important as they are very similar, except for the context, to the challenges faced by the EAC in the 21st century. Among the reasons that led to the collapse of the EAC in 1977 include:

- 1 Kenya was accused of **benefitting more** from the EAC and was seen as a **monopoly**.
- 2 **Ideological differences** between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. This was especially more pronounced

between Tanzania which was socialist-leaning and Kenya which was more capitalist in its economic policies. These ideological differences are expounded in Kenya's Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 and Tanzania's Arusha Declaration.

- 3 **Personal differences and leadership styles** of the leaders made it difficult to convene meetings and dialogue for unity. For example, President Nyerere of Tanzania refused to recognize President Idi Amin of Uganda, who had overthrown his long-term friend President Obote in 1971. Consequently, Nyerere refused to share a platform with Idi Amin. Nyerere would later oust Idi Amin in 1979 after a military engagement during the Tanzania-Uganda war of 1978-1979
- 4 Hostility towards nationals from member states working for the community
- 5 Failure by member states to **remit funds** to the EAC crippled its mandate and operations
- 6 Suspicion and **trust deficit** in managing EAC's resources by member states
- 7 Tanzania closed its border with Kenya further hindering the community's mandate
- 8 Too **much power** was placed on the **Head of States** of the EAC member states with no or little institutional capacity. The EAC mostly lacked policies on cooperation
- 9 **Personal ambitions** of leaders like Amin who claimed part of Kenya's territory strained the relationship between the two countries.
- 10 The interests of individual member states superseded those of the EAC. Any conflicting interests, therefore, meant that nationalism won over regionalism.

In this first quarter of the 21st century, the challenges faced by the EAC remain the same despite changing contexts and leaders. While the EAC has improved its institutional capacity with time, there are still many challenges to be overcome. Indeed, the Covid_19 pandemic exposed the underbelly of the levels of integration in the EAC and raised questions about integration beyond East Africa.

COVID-19: Kenya-Tanzania Border Row Bad News for EAC

At the height of the Coronavirus pandemic, Tanzanian authorities retaliated against Kenya's decision to restrict movement between the Kenya-Tanzania border over Coronavirus by forbidding all automobiles and persons

from Kenya. This decision followed fears of cross-border transmission between Kenya and Tanzania that were first expressed by Kenya after identifying the Kenya-Tanzania and Kenya-Somalia borders as hotspots for Coronavirus³. As a preventive measure, Kenya maintained that cross-border long-distance truck drivers must be tested for Covid-19 before being granted entry into Kenya. The diplomatic tiff⁴ between Kenya and Tanzania came shortly after President Magufuli skipped the video conference between East African Community (EAC) heads of state and governments on 12th May 2020⁵. According to EAC, the consultative video conference was meant to assess the development of Covid-19 in the region in a bid to develop a regional approach. President Magufuli would later in June 2020 claim that Tanzania was free of Covid and that God had answered their prayers⁶.

President Magufuli unfortunately passed on in March 2021 paving the way for his successor, President Samia Suluhu. While late president Magufuli was sceptical of the Coronavirus, president Suluhu was cautious, took a Covid jab, and opened up to working with World Health Organisation (WHO) and other players in taming the pandemic - this was a major policy reversal.

Besides the personality differences between individual heads of states that the pandemic seems to have revealed, the Coronavirus exposed the underlying structural and systemic weaknesses within the EAC community that need to be streamlined for better integration. Although the pandemic was unpredictable and state actors hastily explored a raft of measures to tame it, it was evident that the reaction was knee-jack and disjointed among EAC member states. Many did not see the power of tackling the pandemic jointly, notwithstanding that no one was safe until everyone was safe.

Albeit public health is/was essential for both Kenya and Tanzania, bilateral consultation ought to have been conducted between the two countries before any cross-border Coronavirus protocols were developed and implemented. Indeed, such consultation should apply to any other aspects like customs, and immigration among others to enable seamless transactions at points of entry. This is the only sure way to promote free trade and enhance good neighbourliness between the two countries.

³<https://www.president.go.ke/2020/05/16/the-sixth-presidential-address-on-the-coronavirus-pandemic-at-state-house-nairobi-saturday-16th-may-2020/>

⁴<https://standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001372080/magufuli-uhuru-phone-call-eases-border-tension>

⁵<https://www.eac.int/communique/1725-communique%C3%A9-heads-of-state-consultative-meeting-of-the-east-african-community>

⁶[iv] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52966016>



Challenges and Prospects of Integration in East Africa

While members of the EAC may be committed to the integration agenda, there are tendencies of the spirit of nationalism rising, especially when the interests of individual member states clash. This is especially the case because most countries of the EAC tend to produce similar goods and services and hence compete for the market among themselves. To avoid domestic political backlash, leaders of governments are consequently forced to adopt protectionist policies that are popular at home, but which tend to undermine integration and free trade among member states.

The Buy Kenya Build Kenya Strategy⁷ and the Buy Uganda Build Uganda Policy⁸ are examples of policies that may be termed protectionist. To the respective countries, however, the policies are meant to promote the consumption of local products whose consumption has not significantly improved with population, as consumers prefer imported commodities. Sadly, most of the imported goods to the EAC are from the West and China, where production is mechanized and heavily subsidized by governments. This has disadvantaged farmers and manufacturers in the EAC and many have been driven out of business and into poverty. Free trade within EAC, just like free trade elsewhere should not destroy livelihoods.

The EAC member states should therefore seek to diversify their economies in such a way that they are dependent on each other as each member state can leverage its competitive advantage. This way, each EAC state will either import or export depending on their individual needs and capabilities. If implemented well, integration in EAC can improve the cost of production and trade, enhance the availability of goods and services hence better choices, improve employment prospects, and may ultimately enhance consumer purchasing power.

Besides diversifying their economies, EAC member states should consider strengthening the EAC institutions to build public trust and promote their legitimacy. For example, the EAC parliament needs to be more robust and visible in driving the legislative agenda of the EAC. This could be done through budgetary support, capacity building, and generally raising the profile of the EAC parliament in the EAC. To fix the question of the legitimacy of the EAC parliament among EAC citizens,

⁷<https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/by-country/kenya/576-buy-kenya-build-kenya-strategy-june-2017/file.html>

⁸<https://www.bubuexpo.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/BUBU%20Policy.pdf>

there is need to consider having members of the EAC parliament elected by citizens of the EAC. This will bring public participation to the EAC agenda and will increase the likelihood that its decisions will be embraced by citizens of the EAC. There is need to bring the EAC conversation to the local level, where citizens of EAC can identify with the broader EAC vision and mission.

Kenya-Tanzania Trade Row: Lessons and Prospects for Ambitious African Continent Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

Besides the Coronavirus public health concern, the diplomatic spat between Kenya and Tanzania spelled doom for the EAC and by extension, the highly ambitious African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) entered into force on 30th May 2019, after 24 countries had deposited their ratification instruments. This is because RECs are generally seen as the building blocks in the ambitious AfCFTA. The inability of RECs to robustly solve emerging challenges regarding their constitutive Acts and the envisaged mandates points to much bigger challenges awaiting the AfCFTA. While such a trade border dispute between Kenya and Tanzania could be dismissed as "small", it helps put into perspective the enormous challenges awaiting African states in their attempt to eliminate trade barriers under AfCFTA. While AfCFTA is welcome and long overdue, especially for the post-Corona economic recovery of Africa, African politicians must show leadership if this trade agreement is to succeed.

AfCFTA seeks to promote intra-African trade and integrate the African market, hence making Africa a strategic player in global trade and policy. As of May 2020, only Eritrea was yet to sign the AfCFTA agreement- which 30 African states have already ratified. If successful, AfCFTA will create a single market for its population of about 1.3 billion people, perhaps the best news for Africa since breaking colonial chains. The implementation of AfCFTA that was set for 1st July 2020 has, however, been postponed indefinitely following the Covid-19 epidemic.

Closer home, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Ethiopia have all ratified AfCFTA. While ratifying the AfCFTA is indeed a milestone, there is need to demonstrate this with the commensurate political will that will actualize the AfCFTA dream as envisaged in its instruments.

The Kenya-Tanzania border trade dispute following Coronavirus fears exposes African political leaders as the weak link in promoting African integration. While integration, both political and economic, is always challenging, the opportunities it provides to the African continent are enormous. The United States of America

(USA) and the European Union (EU) would not have attained the level of development they experience today if they had existed and transacted business as individual states. The average population of the EU's single market is at least 520 million, the USA about 330 million, China 1.4 billion, and India has 1.3 billion. There is power in numbers. They are good for negotiating favorable trade agreements and for market access. If fully implemented, the AfCFTA market of 1.3 billion people will catapult Africa into the league of China and India, in terms of market. It is estimated that AfCFTA "could boost Africa's income by \$450 billion, bring 30 million people out of extreme poverty, and raise the incomes of 68 million others who live on less than \$5.50 a day⁹".

African leaders, including those in the EAC, must therefore look into the bigger picture of African integration even as they battle with Covid-19. The Coronavirus, or cheap political brinkmanship, should not be used to deny East Africans and indeed all Africans the benefits that accrue from integrated markets. There is no pride in ruling starving poor nations, and African integration is partly the solution to economic freedom for the African people. After all, the international borders of Africa are nothing but a European colonial creation. We must love ourselves and African freedom. As the pandemic abates and life comes to normalcy, there is need to address the areas of weaknesses that the pandemic exposed and seek to mitigate to build a more resilient community.

Armed Conflict as a Threat to Integration and Regional Peace: The Role Of IGAD

IGAD was formed in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Disaster (IGADD) which was founded in 1986 to mitigate the effects of drought and other natural disasters in the region¹⁰. IGAD, therefore, took over with an expanded mandate of three cooperation priority areas of "food security and environmental protection, economic cooperation, regional integration and social development, peace and security¹¹."

Despite the mandate of IGAD, Eastern Africa continues to experience challenges especially related to political instability and peace in the Horn of Africa (HoA). HoA is cited "as a region engulfed by struggles over economic and political power, famine, droughts, poverty and starvation, and civil conflicts and interstate wars¹²". More specifically, since November 2020, Ethiopia is embroiled in an armed conflict with its Tigray region. While PM Abiy reconciled with Eritrea and signed a peace deal in 2018 earning him the coveted Nobel Peace prize, peace within Ethiopia was short-lived as the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict continues to threaten peace and stability in Ethiopia.

On the other hand, Kenya has a longstanding maritime dispute with Somalia that has brought ties between the two countries to their lowest and at some point was threatening an armed conflict. Although the maritime dispute was arbitrated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and a ruling¹³ made on delimitation, Kenya rejected ICJ's decision while Somalia embraced it. Sudan and South Sudan are experiencing internal strife that has caused political instability in the two countries with thousands killed and displaced. Somalia, which recently held a presidential election after postponing it for several months is struggling to keep the Al-Shabaab militia at bay despite getting international backing under African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), recently renamed Africa Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).¹⁴

While IGAD has the legal and institutional norms meant to address the challenge of peace and security in the region, it has not been successful in deterrence and conflict transformation. This is partly because the level of integration especially at the HoA is still very low, and neighbouring states still perceive each other as a national threat. The mistrust and suspicion among political leaders in the region are partly to blame for this failure.

Besides that, historical unresolved border issues emanating from the colonial past also made the transition into postcolonial Eastern African states mucky and troublesome. The Cold War exposed newly independent African states to ideological wars that did not concern them. The end of the Cold War too, meant that African states were obliged to embrace democracy, rapidly expand political space and freedoms and adopt a liberal democracy. Yet this was not the trajectory that the developed countries followed in their economic development and prosperity.

The end of the Cold War ushered in the second liberation and seemed to have emphasized the importance and role of western liberal democracy as a model for future politics and economics. Indeed, Francis Fukuyama had in the early 1990s predicted the end of history where all countries would converge under the western liberal democracy model. Consequently, many countries in Africa adopted multiparty politics and free-market economic policies characterized by privatization with no or limited state control.

While the Cold War (in which wars were fought through proxies) ended, there still exists major power

rivalry in Africa in the 21st century. Major world powers continue to set military bases in Africa as they seek to strategically position themselves geopolitically. Specifically, the United States of America is attempting to tame the rising power of China and Russia (Gavin, 2021). The presence of foreign militaries in Africa, therefore, continues to complicate the peace and security situation in the region.

Consequently, African countries were exposed to democratic ideals when their economies and states were too fragile to provide for an environment that could allow a functional democracy to thrive. The result was African countries with western-like political institutions such as executive, parliament, and "independent" judiciary, but where actual or real power would be exercised outside these political institutions, with a strong patron-client relationship overshadowing their independence. There is, therefore, need to gradually build the capacity of institutions, especially in HoA to gradually move power from individuals to institutions.

Peace and stability, even with limited political space or with no liberal democracy, can spur countries to great strides in their economic development if they rightly prioritize so. Nothing illustrates this better than the so-called Asian Tigers who made great economic strides at a time of little or no political space at all. Besides the Asian Tigers, China has emerged as a global economic powerhouse despite the little political space provided for by its tightly controlled Communist Party. Many countries in Western Europe, too, underwent the industrial revolution at a time when democracy and political space were still limited.

The peace and security challenges in the Eastern Africa region, therefore, have both domestic and foreign dimensions. Economic integration will, however, have a pacifying effect as combatants focus their attention on opportunities for business brought about by integrated markets and more responsive and inclusive institutions. A more integrated Eastern Africa would therefore help attain non-economic benefits such as peace and security, as neighbouring member states become more dependent on each other. A more integrated Eastern Africa will not only guarantee peace and security but would help free up high military budgets, which can be redirected into other development initiatives.

⁹<https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/speeches/implementing-african-continent-al-free-trade-area-afcfta-agreement-assessing-country-readiness-and-implications-capacity-building-opening-speech-prof-kevin-chika-urama-39093>

¹⁰<https://igad.int/about/>

¹¹<https://igad.int/about/>

¹²https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/SVNP-2021-Joint-Paper-Getachew-Asgedom_0.pdf

¹³<https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/161/161-20211012-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf>

¹⁴<https://atmis-au.org/about-atmis/>

Integration and Multilateralism: Globalized Yet Localized?

While integration promotes trade and the free movement of goods and services, member states are sometimes conflicted and may adopt protectionist policies that are more local-oriented and politically correct. States as actors in international relations are therefore more likely to respond to national pressures or demands as opposed to demands from or of RECs because governments draw their legitimacy from the electorate and not the RECs. The government of the day is therefore politically responsible and accountable to the electorate and many will go a long way to appease them regardless of whether this works to promote or undermine regional integration. While we live in an increasingly globalized world, where states act multilaterally, individual governments

either stand or fall based on the domestic/national politics that install governments.

When Integration Fails: The Brexit Experience

While integration has enormous benefits, there are also cases of integration backsliding where members of an economic or political bloc either fail to cooperate or withdraw as was the case with Britain which exited the European Union (EU). While many reasons may have informed Britain's exit from the EU, the reasons point to the feeling that Britain, like other EU member states had ceded much power to the EU to an extent that it no longer had control of domestic matters like immigration. Mandates of supranational organizations like the EU may need to be balanced with domestic realities that may threaten or cause disintegration.

Conclusions

1. Peace, security, and stability are essential for any meaningful economic integration and subsequent development
2. While legal and institutional frameworks on economic integration may be in place, it takes political leadership and goodwill to realize it, whether in the EAC, IGAD, or with the framework of AfCFTA.
3. To address the question of legitimacy and political accountability of RECs, there is need for states to sensitize citizens on the importance of regional economic integration. Seeing the bigger picture of a united Africa despite the existing sibling rivalry.
4. While political integration ideally comes after economic integration, there is need to consider electing members of parliament of the EAC so as help tackle the question of legitimacy and accountability of RECs to the electorate.
5. There is need to strike a balance between the good intentions of trade agreements/RECs and national politics that may derail the process of integration whenever there are conflicting interests.
6. There is need for members of the EAC and by extension AfCFTA, to appreciate the bigger picture of seeking to be a regional and global power, despite the sibling rivalry amongst themselves

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Photo Credit: NOAA Research

Climate Change and Water Conflicts in Eastern Africa: Implications for Defense and Foreign Policy



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Abstract

Climate change is real and is happening now. The average global surface temperature has warmed up to 0.8° Celsius in the past century and 0.6° in the past three decades (Biswas, 1993; WLF, 2005) largely due to human activities (IPCC, 2020). A recent report produced by the US National Academy of Science confirmed that decades of the 21st century were in fact the warmest in the past 400 years (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1996; Githeko & Yan, 2004).

The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] has projected that if greenhouse gas emissions, the leading cause of climate change, continue to rise, the mean global temperature will increase by 1.4 - 5.8°C by the end of the 21st century (Falkenmark, 1989).

The effects of climate change, such as rising temperature, are undeniably clear with the impact already affecting ecosystems, biodiversity and people. In both developed and developing countries, climate impacts are reverberating through the economy from threatening fresh water availability to sea level rises and extreme weather impacts to coastal regions and tourism.

One region of the world where the effects of climate change are being felt particularly hard is Africa. The negative impacts associated with climate change are also compounded by many factors, including widespread poverty, human diseases, and high population density which is estimated to double the demand for food, water and livestock within the next thirty years (Biswas, 1993).

East Africa witnessed an increase in temperatures that is almost double the 1.1°C warming the globe has experienced since pre-industrial times. Since 1860, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) has warmed by 2.2°C, Khartoum (Sudan) by 2.09°C, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) by 1.9°C, Mogadishu (Somalia) by 1.9°C and Nairobi (Kenya) by 1.9°C.

The ice cover on Mt. Kilimanjaro decreased by 85% between 1912 and 2007. The snow could disappear in less than 20 years. We might as well be the last generation to see snow on Mt. Kilimanjaro and the first to witness the disruption of the ecological systems and biodiversity it supports.

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Introduction and Background

Throughout the world, water is recognized as the most fundamental and indispensable of all natural resources. It is clear that neither social and economic development nor environmental diversity can be sustained without water. Today, virtually every country faces severe and growing challenges in its efforts to meet the rapidly escalating demand for water that is driven by burgeoning populations (Biswas, 1993; Gleick, 1998). Water supplies continue to dwindle because of resource depletion and pollution, whilst demand is rising fast because population growth is coupled with rapid industrialization, mechanization and urbanization (Lundqvist, 2000; Ashton & Haasbroek, 2002). This situation is particularly acute in the more arid regions of the world where water scarcity, and associated increases in water pollution, limit social and economic development and are linked closely to the prevalence of poverty, hunger and disease (Falkenmark, 1989; Gleick, 1998).

In comparison to the rest of the world, the distribution of water resources in Africa is extremely variable and water supplies are unequally distributed in both geographical extent and time. Large areas of the African continent have been subjected to a series of prolonged and extreme droughts; very often these droughts have been "broken" or "relieved" by equally extreme flood events. There is also compelling, though unproven, evidence that projected trends in global climate change will worsen this situation. In addition to climatic variability, a significant proportion of the continent's water resources are comprised of large river basins or underground aquifers that are shared between several countries. The countries sharing these water resources often have markedly different levels of social, economic, and political development, accompanied by very different levels of need for water. The wide disparities between socio-economic development and the need for water further complicate the search for equitable and sustainable solutions to water supply problems (Falkenmark, 1989).

In virtually every African country, population numbers have grown dramatically during the past century; these trends are expected to continue, albeit at a reduced rate, despite the ravages caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic that is sweeping across most parts of Africa ([ACCORD] 2000), (Whiteside & Sunter, 2000). Regardless of obvious inequalities within a variety of social, economic, and political dispensations, this population growth has been accompanied by an equally dramatic increase in the

demand for water. Several African countries have already reached or passed the point considered by Falkenmark (1989) to indicate severe water stress or water deficit, where the scarcity of water supplies effectively limits further development. Based on present population trends and patterns of change in water use, many more African countries will reach, and exceed, the limits of their economically usable, land-based water resources before the year 2025 (Falkenmark, 1989); Whiteside & Sunter, 2000). These sobering statistics emphasize the urgent need to find sustainable solutions to the problem of ensuring secure and adequate water supplies for all African countries.

Equitable access to sufficient water to sustain basic human needs (variously estimated at between 25 and 40 litres per person per day) is recognized as a fundamental right of all peoples (Ashton & Ramasar, 2002; Falkenmark, 1999). However, whilst this principle has been endorsed implicitly in international conventions, it seems that differences of opinion over the quantity of water required to support basic human needs have prevented explicit endorsement and approval (Falkenmark, 1999).

In parallel with the right of equitable access to sufficient water to satisfy basic human needs, it is vitally important that we develop a shared appreciation of the true value of water, and understand the critically important need to change or redirect our approaches to water management and utilization on regional and continental scales (Gleick 1998). Whilst water allocation and distribution priorities in each country need to be closely aligned with national and regional development objectives, greater emphasis now needs to be placed on concerted efforts to ensure that the continent's scarce water resources are used to derive the maximum long-term benefits for the peoples of Africa as a whole. However, this goal can only be achieved if water resource management is both judicious and cautious. As water supplies become scarcer, a key consideration will be the pressing need to evaluate the necessity to reallocate water from less productive sectors to those that are able to derive greater long-term economic returns per unit of water used (Gleick, 1998; Falkenmark, 1999). In this process, it will be critically important to ensure that every community still has equitable access to the available water resources to meet their basic human needs. This aspect is particularly important in the case of Africa's shared river basins. Ideally, each country's water resource management strategies need to be closely aligned with that of its neighbours if peace and prosperity are to be maintained and conflict is to be avoided (Gleick, 1998; Falkenmark, 1989; Lundqvist, 2000; Pallett, 1997).

Against this general background, it is instructive to examine the availability and distribution of water resources across Eastern Africa and to evaluate the likely trajectories of change in the demand for water that will occur as Eastern Africa's populations continue to increase. Special attention is paid to those areas where water resource depletion has reached a point where the prospect of chronic water shortages could provide a strong incentive for disputes or even conflict between neighbouring countries. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to support the collaborative development and implementation of new water management policies and strategies that are specifically shaped to cope with the pressures of economic growth in situations where water supplies and water demand are unevenly distributed. The likely success or failure of different management strategies to change the existing patterns of water demand and use will determine whether or not we are able to avoid the looming potential for conflict over water resources in Eastern Africa.

The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the major impacts of climate change and water conflicts on Eastern Africa, and its implication on defence and foreign policy. The paper briefly reviews mitigation activities undertaken by governments for building resilience to avoid conflict.

Dispute Over Water in the Nile Basin

The Nile basin features significant conflict over access to and right over the Nile water resources among eleven riparian countries. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), founded by 9 out of 10 countries in 1999 with backing from major donor institutions, has achieved success in its attempts to strengthen cooperation. Yet since 2007, diverging interests between upstream and downstream countries have brought negotiations to a stand-still, putting Egypt (and to a lesser extent, Sudan) against upstream riparian countries, especially Ethiopia.

In 2015, trilateral negotiations among these three countries over Renaissance Dam, under construction in Ethiopia, led to a framework agreement that may in time prepare the ground for a broader agreement.

Droughts, Livestock prices and armed conflict in Somalia

Frequent droughts in Somalia put significant pressure on pastoral livelihoods. Droughts make herders to sell more of their livestock than they would under normal conditions, resulting in plummeting livestock prices and deteriorating rural incomes. Widespread poverty and lack of economic alternatives provides incentives for illicit activities, for example joining groups such as Al-Shabaab

which offer cash revenue and other benefits to their fighters. Especially the record drought of 2011 is believed to have swelled the ranks of the militant Islamic groups.

Security Implications of Growing Water Scarcity in Egypt

Egypt is currently using more water than its renewable resources, mainly based on Nile fresh water inflows. Water stress in Egypt is expected to further increase in the future as a result of rapid population growth, rising temperatures, and an increase in water consumption. If not properly dealt with, growing freshwater scarcity will put a severe strain on Egypt's economy and make the country more vulnerable to renewed internal strife. Moreover, it risks putting increasing pressure on Egypt's diplomatic relations with other states along the Nile.

As the introduction illustrates, climate change in Africa is not only a conservation problem but also a socio-economic issue that must be dealt with on a global scale (Smith & Al-Rawahy, 1990).

Water Availability in East Africa

Arguably one of the most widespread and potentially devastating impacts of climate change in East Africa, water unavailability is expected to occur frequently with high intensity as precipitation becomes more unpredictable. Changes in regional precipitation will ultimately affect water availability and may lead to decreased agricultural production and potentially widespread food shortages. Projection of climate change suggests that East Africa will experience warmer temperatures and 5-10% decrease in rainfall from June to August by 2050 (IPCC, 2020; Smith & Al-Rawahy, 1990; Gleick, 1993; Ohlsson, 1995).

Not only are these changes not uniform throughout the year but also will they likely occur in sporadic and unpredictable ways. It is expected that the unpredictable precipitation will come in a few very large rainstorms, mostly during already wet seasons, thereby adding erosion and water management issues. It is expected that there will be less precipitation in East Africa during the already dry season, which may cause more frequent severe draughts and increased desertification in the region.

There is a strong link between climate and East African livelihoods. East Africa depends heavily on rain-fed agriculture, making rural livelihoods and food security highly vulnerable to climate variability, such as shifts in growing season conditions (IPCC, 2020). Further, agriculture contributes 40% of the region's gross domestic product and provides a living for

80% of East Africans (Homer-Dixon & Percival, 1996; Githeko & Yan, 2004).

However, because temperature has increased and precipitation in the region has decreased in some areas, many people are already being affected. For example, from 1996 to 2003 there was a decline in rainfall of 50-150mm per season (March to May) and corresponding decline in long cycle crops e.g., slowly maturing variety of sorghum and maize across most of Eastern Africa (Birkett & Allan, 1999). Long cycle crops depend upon rain during typical wet seasons and progressive crop maturity deficit results in low crop yields towards end of the year, thereby affecting available food supply.



Planning for Resilience in East Africa Through Policy, Adaptation Research and Economic Development


Both short and long-term adaptation of strategies in response to regional climate change is beginning to emerge in a region that is rife with challenges. For every one dollar spent preparing for a disaster, seven dollars are spent recovering from the disaster (Falkenmark, 1986; Prescott, 1979; Sims, 2005).

As organizations test and develop new conservation concepts, it is clear that poverty alleviation must be considered with the conservation of nature and biodiversity. As some resources become scarce, conflicts between conservation and other land uses are likely to emerge under climate change scenarios. However, human communities across East Africa are bonding together cooperatively to conserve resources and protect their livelihoods.

The East African Community has developed a six-year plan program with an overall goal of strengthening the resiliency and sustainability of East African economies, trans-boundary fresh water ecosystems and communities. The program focuses on three priority key areas: biodiversity conservation, natural resource management (NRM) and sustainable access to water, sanitation and hygiene and climate change.

According to Falkenmark (1986), Prescott (1979) and Sims (2005), the program seeks to perform the following functions:







-  i improve climate change adaptation technical capacity, policy leadership and action readiness of regional institutions;
-  ii strengthen resilient and sustainable management of biologically significant transboundary freshwater ecosystems in East Africa community region; and

-  iii enhance and have a sustainable drinking water supply, sanitation and waste water treatment services in the Lake Victoria basin.

EAC Climate Change Policy Framework

The chairperson of the East African Community (EAC) directed the EAC secretariat to develop climate change policies and strategies to address the adverse impact of climate change in the region and harness the potential opportunities posed by climate change in the context of the principle of sustainable development.

The overall objectives of the EAC climate change policy are:

-  i to guide partner states and other stakeholders on the preparation and implementation of collective measures;
-  ii to address climate change issues in the region while assuming sustainable social economic development;
-  iii to guide the region on climate change adaptation and mitigation to reduce vulnerability;
-  iv to enhance adaptive capacity and build socioeconomic resilience of vulnerable population and ecosystems;
-  v to provide long term vision and a basis for partner states to operationalize a comprehensive framework for adapting mitigation of climate change in line with EAC protocol on environment and Natural Resources Management; and
-  vi to ensure that the people, the economics and the ecosystems of EAC partner states are climate resilient and adapt according to climate change.

Strategies to Avoid Conflicts or Diminish Potential Conflicts

In light of evidence already presented, it is clear that water conflicts in Africa will be inevitable if nothing is done to prevent them from occurring. This statement is guided by the knowledge that East Africa fresh water resources are finite and cannot continue indefinitely to support the escalating demands that we make of them. If no actions are taken, competition for the available water supplies will continue to increase to a point where radical interventions will be required to avoid conflicts (Turton & Ohlsson, 1999; Ashton, 2002; Falkenmark & Lundqvist, 1995; Turton, 1999; Priscoli, 1998).

The common-sense statement "Prevention is better than cure" provides a perfect outline of the goals and objectives that should direct the East African Community strategies and actions when they seek to deal with the complex of water related conflicts.

Four key questions need to be answered, namely:

- i How will water resources be managed to ensure compliance with any agreement?
- ii What fraction or proportion of water can be allocated for society's use without impairing the resource beyond unacceptable limits?

- ◆ How will the water requirements of rural and urban populations in each member state be equitable and timeously be allocated within the constraints of national economies and international treaties obligations?
- ◆ What constitutes a fair and equitable share of water resources for each country?

This final question is what constitutes the most difficult one to answer and one where participating states are most likely to disagree. Clearly the basis of the answer will depend on the relative degree of importance that participating states attach to the need of their people for water, and the necessity to mainstream essential ecosystem functions and services.

Conclusions

Based on the available evidence, we can conclude that conflicts over water in East Africa will be inescapable unless we can jointly take preventive actions. The inevitable increase in population numbers continues to place ever increasing stress on the continent's finite water resources. It is important to remember that any solutions to the problem of water supply must involve the people. Purely technological solutions that are designed to provide more water will not resolve the underlying demographic problems.

A set of preventative strategies has been outlined as a suggested basis for preventing water-related conflicts. The success or failure of these strategies will depend on processes of joint decision-making within suitable institutional and legislative frameworks. It is important to note that the possible options for conflict prevention are generic in nature and these will have to be customized to make them site-specific, to suit the individual needs of the communities and countries involved. The issue of the scale of a potential conflict is important, as well as the specific circumstances that may have given rise to the problem. It is clear that "downstream" countries and communities will always be more vulnerable than "upstream" countries. In turn, the degree of vulnerability felt by a "downstream" individual, community or country would be determined by perceptions of the relative strengths and power relationships of the different parties (ACCORD, 2000). Despite dire predictions to the contrary, the available evidence suggests that it is highly unlikely in the short to medium term that "true" water wars will occur in East Africa. However, this is no reason for complacency on our part. We all share the responsibility of ensuring that water conflicts never occur in Africa, or the Eastern Region. We need now jointly to identify those so-called "hot spots" where water conflicts are imminent or could arise in future, and then to develop collaborative strategies to defuse these situations (ACCORD, 2000). Each of us shares the responsibility to promote the principles of equity, sustainability and maximum efficiency of use in all our dealings with water users and water resource management throughout East Africa. Particular attention must be paid to water demand management in a concerted effort to reduce inefficient and wasteful patterns of water usage. Similarly, we should also seek new ways to influence the relevant water management institutions and authorities to focus their efforts on those longer-term policies, plans and actions that will prevent water disputes, rather than retaining only a short-term focus and then trying to resolve disputes after they have occurred. If we fail to achieve this, there is a very strong possibility that water-related conflicts will occur.

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Global Economic Upheavals: Implications for East African Integration




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Introduction

John Maynard Keynes tried to explain economic cycles through human behavior, and animal spirits, referring to emotional mind-sets. Kondratieff noted that such cycles occur after long periods. Kondratieff waves describe 40-60 year "boom and bust" economic cycles in

capitalist development (Hepworth, 2020). The cycles are booms and busts. Some booms and busts are global, like the oil crisis, while others are localized, like the debt crisis in Sri Lanka.

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Source: Allianz Global Investors. "The sixth Kondratieff – long waves of prosperity" (January 2010)

Figure 1: Kondratieff cycles




Figure 2: Conflicts since the end of World War II

In this paper, we investigate the implications of such upheavals on integration in Eastern Africa.

Most global upheavals are political but have economic implications. Think of war in Ukraine and inflation. Coup attempts in Venezuela raised oil prices. COVID-19 in China reduced the price of oil because of the expected lower demand as the economy slowed.

The formation of institutions like the United Nations (UN) and its affiliates was supposed to reduce such upheavals. The objectives are clear: to maintain international peace and security and to take adequate steps to avert wars; to develop friendly relations among nations based on equality; to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character; and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Despite UN, conflicts, and upheavals have persisted, not necessarily wars. It seems just when we think things are settled, another upheaval follows. We thought COVID-19 was behind us, now it's the Ukraine war. The memories of the financial crisis of 2008 are still fresh in

our minds. While the frequency of such upheavals has gone down, they have become more global as the world got more interconnected with advances in technology, from ICT to transport. The speed at which COVID-19 was transmitted demonstrated this interconnectedness. The upheavals often slow down the progress towards integration. Notice the fewer conflicts in the diagram above.

Methodology

This paper reviews secondary literature such as books, journals, websites, and expert opinions. The data gathered is extrapolated to the contemporary issues and implications derived.

Upheavals: causes

Upheavals include wars which Huntington (1996) argued would in the future be between civilizations or cultures and not countries. Ukraine war has demonstrated conflicts between countries are still possible. Other upheavals have been driven by religion. Think of the crusades from 1095-1291 AD (Asbridge, 2011). The Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, Shiites and Sunni in

Yemen, Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, Muslims and Christians in the Balkans, and Muslims and Hindus in India among others. Other upheavals are between tribes or even clans. Examples include those in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya to some extent. Resources are another cause of upheavals. For example, oil in the Middle East, Sudan, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Minerals in DR Congo have been a source of conflict.

Other causes of upheavals include poor governance or state capture. That is common in South America. Examples include Mexico and Colombia. In many African countries, poor governance has been the cause despite nascent democracy. Elections dissipate tensions and renew leadership. In some of those countries drug trafficking threatens legitimate power.

Other causes of upheavals include weather. Climatic change is threatening livelihoods leading to conflicts. One Kenyan from the northern part narrated to me how the start of the rainy season leads to peace! Africa is certainly not alone in experiencing the linkages of climate shocks and extreme social instability, says Jeffrey Sachs, the director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and the U.N. Millennium Project.

We can add nationalism, driven by politicians. From Nazi Germany to the partition of India, Korea, and Vietnam nationalism led to upheavals. Remember the Vietnam war? The Balkan wars? Or frozen conflicts in central Asia? Separatism is also rife in Senegal, Angola, Cameroon, Sudan, Somalia, DR Congo, Nigeria, India, Egypt, Russia, Canada, Spain, and other regions.

Colonialism caused upheavals, interrupting lives with diseases or conflicts among communities that once co-existed peacefully. A more recent cause of upheavals is epidemics. COVID-19 is the most recent and will not be the last one.

We can add natural disasters like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, drought, hurricanes, and cyclones. Some upheavals are emotional but have economic consequences too. Racism in some parts of the world stifles the economic progress of some communities. In the USA racism and discrimination still exists (from my own experiences), India has castes, and blacks from other parts of Africa (makwerekwere) are not welcome in South Africa. In Kenya class and tribalism are evident in residences.

◆◆ Upheavals: Consequences

The most noticeable consequence of upheavals is inflation, as the Ukraine war and oil crises have demonstrated. The number of refugees rises and so do child labour and trafficking. Europe has been on the receiving end of refugees from conflicts in Syria, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Kenya has hosted lots of refugees

from neighbouring countries and so does the USA. Jobs are scarce for refugees in countries where the refugees are escaping to.

◆◆ Implications of upheavals on integration

The founding fathers like Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah harboured the Pan-African dream, with black Africans coming together to fight for their rights and hopefully advancing their economic welfare. Upheavals postponed that dream with coups and countercoups soon after independence. Add to that the cold war and its proxies that left the African continent divided.

There have been bold efforts to keep the embers of integration glowing. We have the East African Community (EAC) now enlarged to include 4 more countries to make seven. The eight regional economic communities (RECs) recognized by the African Union are the EAC, Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Community of the Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The new thinking is that integration will reduce upheavals as European Union has demonstrated in the last 60 years or so. The vision of EAC is the best evidence that integration leads to fewer upheavals, "to be a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa".

One consequence of integration is that there is more cultural and economic interaction through trade, education, and at times marriage. That reduces upheavals. Remember the University of East Africa where East Africans could go to any campus in the three countries? Remember the Bologna accord for credit transfer in European Union? Single currency (euro)?




Figure 3: Upheavals and Integration have reverse causality

Upheavals create the need for integration whose benefits reinforce integration. In integration, we should focus more on commonalities than differences. Examples of commonalities are language (Swahili for Eastern Africa), religion, economic aspirations, and even shared resources like rivers or oceans.

But we often focus on differences like histories (different colonial rulers), economic activities (ujamaa vs

vs capitalism), cultures, receptiveness to foreigners, class consciousness, and nationalism among others.

Upheavals reduce trade, tourism, cultural exchange, marriages, and innovations - all of which enhance integration and economic growth. Once citizens see the fruits of integration, jobs, and higher living standards they

are more willing to support integration. That is the soft underbelly of integration in Eastern Africa. Citizens rarely feel the benefits. The citizens and their leaders are inward-looking, against integration. Think of devolution in the Kenyan constitution versus the spirit of the EAC.

Conclusions

Integration can reduce upheavals but only when citizens see and feel the benefits. Local and global interests must be balanced. How do we make citizens keep their identity while becoming members of global or regional blocs? Should we add Ethiopia and Somalia to EAC? How do regional blocs like EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and COMESA enhance integration without cross purposes? Will Africa's free trade area succeed where others failed? Africa has just started her journey to integration. It is a worthy pursuit as other regions have demonstrated. But intergration must consider her uniqueness.




Figure 4: Growth patterns reflect upheavals in Kenya and other countries.

Recommendations

We can improve on infrastructure to connect the countries, leverage information technology, and student exchange, brand the region and build institutions like courts, parliament, education, and security. We can also benchmark with other successful integration projects like European Union. What of the Chinese One Belt-One Road (OBOR) initiatives at the global level? Integration of also about a change in mindset, seeing the benefits which often take a long time to manifest themselves. Our leaders must believe in integration and should not fear losing power to supranational bodies.

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Photo Credit: Flickr

Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Eastern Africa: challenges to Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)



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Abstract

This paper is about the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as an immediate security challenge to individuals, societies, and states in East African region and an enormous hurdle to sustainable security and development. This is because there is a nexus between security and development. Small arms fuel civil wars, organized criminal violence, and terrorist activities. The paper examines the impact of small arms and light weapons on the human security which include economic security, food security, social and health security, environmental and personal security in East African region. Specifically, the paper discusses the international and regional normative and institutional frameworks to address the problem of illicit proliferation of SALW in East African region.

The continuous proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the hands of civilians is occasioned by weak institutional and normative framework within East African region; and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons has had a negative impact on peace, security and development of civilians in the region.

The paper has proposed the following recommendations: that in order to create a safe and secure environment, it is necessary to identify, understand and subsequently address the entire range of factors that create, fuel

and enable insecurity that necessitate demand for SALW and conflict in Eastern Africa region.

The paper highlights SALW regional initiatives, the challenges of Nairobi protocol implementation and policy recommendations in relation to Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) secretariat, intra- and inter-states cooperation and coordination. Another recommendation is that the government needs to review the legislation on small arms and light weapons and to enhance regional cooperation in combating the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country.

Introduction

The illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons ranks among today's most pressing security threats¹⁸. Tens of thousands of people are killed or wounded each year in conflicts that are fought primarily with these weapons and in crime-ridden areas outside of conflict zones. They are also the weapons of choice for terrorist attacks.

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In terms of conceptualization of SALW there is no agreed upon definition, however the article one (art. 1) of the Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of SALW defines **small arms** as weapons designed for personal use and include light machine guns, sub-machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles.

Light weapons shall include the following portable weapons designed for use by several persons as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 10mm calibre, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder-fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers and air defence weapons.

These weapons are also relatively light in weight, and so can be used by the child soldiers who have played such a significant role in recent conflicts¹⁹. Small arms and light weapons are used both by government forces (military and police) and non-state actors (guerrillas, ethnic militias, warlords, brigands, and so on) engaged in low-intensity conflicts. Most small arms and light weapons would not be lethal without their ammunition.

On the other hand, **ammunition** forms an integral part of small arms and light weapons used in conflicts. They include cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, anti-personnel and anti-tank hand grenades, landmines, explosives, and mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems that are used by civilians during war.

Traditionally, small arms and light weapons control efforts have tended to focus on the symptoms of small arms and light weapons misuse rather than the fundamental issues which cause people to procure and misuse them. Control efforts have often taken place in post-war settings and have been based on a misleading assumption that enhancing state rather than community security is the most important factor in preventing a return to conflict.

In addition, the weight and size of small arms make them easy for children to operate them and in turn encourages the use of children as combatants. In some areas of the world children as young as eight years old have been taught how to fire an assault rifle. Not surprisingly, hundreds of thousands of children are currently serving as child soldiers in conflicts.

¹⁸<https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006-06/features/small-arms-large-problem-international-threat-small-arms-proliferation-misuse>

¹⁹<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1552131>

Methodology

This paper was based on both desk review and experiential knowledge.

Literature review

The writers undertook an in-depth analysis of literature review of relevant secondary data sources such as policy papers, official documents, reports, journals, magazines, newspapers, periodicals and other published works. The aim was to collect relevant written information on the challenges to implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The data was majorly desk review of online journals, online reports from various organizations, government publications and reports, and policy papers.

Experiential knowledge

The writers of this paper adopted the experiential knowledge gained through practical experience. Experiential knowledge was succinctly defined in 1994 as "information and wisdom gained from lived experience". It signifies a way of knowing about and understanding things and events through engagement.

Assessment of SALW Proliferation in East Africa

East Africa has long been confronted with the challenges of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation. The history of small arms in the region goes back to pre-colonial times. These arms have fuelled insecurity leading to population displacement, deaths and injuries, low intensity conflict, insurgencies, and urban crime, often affecting the vulnerable groups in society.

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has had and continues to have devastating consequences not only in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lake Regions, but in the entire Sub-Saharan Africa and many other parts of the world. Illicit trafficking of SALW is prevalent in the Sub-Saharan Africa where achievement of stability and peace remains elusive and a far-fetched reality to most African countries.

Continued conflicts throughout the region over the past two decades have contributed to the ever increasing demand for the small arms and light weapons as the primary tools of violence, causing deaths and injuring

²⁰<https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/03/SALW-Report.pdf>

thousands of people, among them innocent civilians. The wake of insecurity in the region continues to threaten democracy and stability, thereby impacting negatively on trade and economic growth. In spite of being endowed with many natural resources, the region has some of the poorest nations of the world.

Poor governance and insecurity, coupled with corruption, has also contributed to inability of the countries concerned to deter the trading and spread of weapons in the region. Premised on this reality, most countries, however, have acknowledged the need for initiatives and policies to arrest the problem of proliferation of SALW and its negative drawback on the economic development in the Sub-Saharan Africa and the Great Lakes Region countries. Even though there are efforts through regional trading blocks and initiatives of the international community, success is yet to be realized due control in the region to deter the trading and spread of weapons on the continent.

The relation between SALW proliferation and conflict is complex, multi-faceted, and context dependent²⁰. In view of this, states that are embroiled in one or multiple conflicts have lost the monopoly on the use of force, lack of rule of law, ineffective border control combined with weak democratic institutions and this creates a favourable environment for terrorist organizations and organized networks to operate in such an environment. SALW function as a threat multiplier by enabling terrorist organisations to pursue their violent agenda, consolidating and expanding their power bases directly through terrorist attacks, and indirectly to exert control over populations and territories to extort tax or kidnap for ransom.

The negative effects of leftover SALW are felt not only in the immediate conflict area, but in neighboring countries and regions as well. Small arms can easily spread across porous borders, igniting violence²¹ in adjacent areas. In some societies, these surplus weapons may create a culture of violence that traps whole populations in an endless cycle of war. As a result, the United Nations, many regional organizations, certain states, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have initiated efforts to curb the global spread of small arms and to remove such weapons from areas of conflict. These wars and armed violence destroy economies, affect food insecurity, inflation pressures, displacements, degrade healthy conditions and environment.

The lack of government control and instability in the region has done much to facilitate the illicit trade and spread of weapons on the continent. The inability of the majority of the governments to exercise control over their borders makes it difficult to stop the trafficking of illicit arms. Even though there are recognizable efforts undertaken by individual states, the porosity of borders and lack of inadequate control measures and interstate coordination and cooperation make the efforts on control and management of SALW a challenge.

With the majority of the countries having three to five neighbouring countries with porous borders, it becomes difficult to stop the flow of arms from one country to the next. In addition to the lack of adequate structures, corruption is extremely prevalent in the region. This lack of control has led to the flow of weapons from one conflict area to the next.

²¹<https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/firearms/module-1/key-issues/indirect-impacts-of-firearms-on-states-or-communities.html>




Image 2. Routes of SALW flow

RECSA member states efforts in SALW control and management

Among other efforts, countries of the region have embraced firearms record keeping and marking to limit the proliferation of small arms and easily trace the firearms to the source. The construction of armouries for safe keeping of the arms stockpiles, collection of illicit arms and destruction of obsolete or unserviceable ones are some of the efforts done by RECSA member states in the control and management of SALW.

RECSA member states hold sensitization programs to the communities on SALW management through different campaigns like amnesty month, barazas, forums on television and radio, different social media, schools and holding workshops.

Regular training of law enforcement agencies and military on weapons and ammunition management (WAM) helps in enhancing capacity of security agencies in the fight against illicit SALW.

For RECSA to implement its mandate, member states have continuously honoured their financial contribution towards the operationalization of its interventions. Finally, member states have adopted the principal of secondment of staff to RECSA secretariat to strengthen its operational capacity and coordination of activities in the region.

SALW Control Regional initiatives

Nairobi Declaration

On March 15th, 2000 foreign affairs ministers of 10 countries from the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa regions, namely Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda signed what is known as the Nairobi Declaration. This is basically a policy document outlining how governments should cooperate to fight the illegal proliferation of small arms. The objectives of the Nairobi declaration are: (a) prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession and use of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region; (b) prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region.

Nairobi Protocol

In April 2004, 11 countries from the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region adopted the Nairobi Protocol for the prevention, control and reduction of SALW.

The Nairobi Protocol requires the registering of brokers operating within the territories of the state parties. Furthermore, it requires all registered brokers to seek and obtain authorization for each individual

transaction. The Nairobi Protocol also establishes that all brokering transactions shall provide full disclosure on import and export licences or authorization and accompanying documents of the names and locations of all brokers involved in the transaction. Moreover, the Nairobi Protocol includes a provision for checking regularly and randomly on brokers.

In this protocol, states parties agree to control and regulate the transfer, possession, storage, disposal and destruction of small arms and light weapons. They also agree to adopt legislative measures, facilitate information exchange and improve operational capacity to counter the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The objectives of the protocol are: To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture, trafficking, possession, use and excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region; to promote information-sharing and cooperation between Governments in the sub-region in matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons; to promote cooperation at the sub-regional level to combat effectively the small arms and light weapons problem, in collaboration with relevant partners; to encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient control and management of small arms and light weapons held by states parties and civilians.

The key elements of the protocol are: reviewing and harmonizing legislation governing the control of firearms, including controls over civilian possession of SALW; improving the operational capacity of law enforcement agencies; The collection, destruction and disposal of SALW; tightening controls and ensuring accountability over state-owned stockpiles of weapons; raising public awareness of the negative impacts of SALW proliferation; marking, tracing and record-keeping of SALW; establishing effective import, export, and licensing systems; and establishing systems for regulating dealers, brokers and brokering in SALW.

Establishment of Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA)

RECSA is an inter-governmental legal entity with an international juridical personality. The Centre works with National Focal Points in an effort to fulfil the major objectives of the Nairobi initiative: reducing the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons which contributes to prolonged conflicts, political instability and violent crime; pursuing peaceful resolutions to conflicts in the region and improving regulation of the possession and transfer of small arms to promote human security.



Image 4. RECSA member states

RECSA has recorded several areas as key to the successful implementation of the declaration: coordinated national inter-agency action, military and law enforcement capacity building, the development of partnerships between governments, civil society, donor agencies and the raising of public awareness on the problem of small arms proliferation.

RECSA has been assisting member states on the creation of national institutions responsible for SALW control and management and development of national action plans on small arms. The key issues covered are stockpile management, import, export and transfer, tracing and brokering, public awareness raising, collection, disposal and destruction and mutual legal assistance and operational capacity.

These guidelines have been considered by members of the international community as comprehensive and as going beyond the measures to strengthen the implementation process of the United Nations Program of Action (UNPoA), International Tracing Instrument (ITI), Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) and International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs).

Other RECSA's initiatives include the development of the best practice guidelines for practical disarmament, giving options of voluntary surrender of illegally owned SALW. Since 2020, RECSA in partnership with the AUC and the UN has extended this initiative in 13 countries of the African continent namely, DRC, Kenya, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Central Africa Republic, Niger, Madagascar, Liberia, Togo and Tanzania.

In reference to Article 7 of the Nairobi protocol and in the efforts to fight against the proliferation of SALW in the region, with focus on identification and tracing, RECSA has facilitated the marking and electronic record keeping of firearms in member states of Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,

South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic.

As per the provision of article 8 and 9 of the Nairobi Protocol, with a view to prevent the diversion and unintended explosions of SALW and ammunition, RECSA has facilitated the destruction of obsolete, surplus and unserviceable firearms and unexploded ordinances. For safe government stockpile of weapons and ammunition, RECSA, with its partners, continues to provide safe storage facilities and trains practitioners in weapons and ammunition management (WAM). Since its establishment, RECSA conducts thematic research and baseline studies to provide relevant knowledge results to influence decisions and for public education and awareness campaigns.

◆ Challenges to the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW

The implementation of the Nairobi Protocol faces a number of challenges and these include:

◆ Lack of sufficient human resource and limited financial resources

The lack of human and financial resources in many states, in addition to conflicting priorities, continues to hinder any significant progress. Since its inception, RECSA has been dependent on foreign donors and some non-governmental organizations have also assisted RECSA with the implementation of its extensive mandate. This is problematic since it is at the national level that change must take place if the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol is to take place.

◆ Developing and mending legislation

Developing and amending legislation is a major challenge since many states have outdated firearms laws. Lack of capacity, technical knowledge and political will have prevented measurable progress in developing, amending or adopting legislation. The provisions of the protocol require states to develop legislation covering a broad range of issues. These include: legislation pertaining to the importing and exporting of firearms; legislation restricting the number and type of firearms civilians may possess; legislation regulating the brokering, dealing and manufacturing of firearms; legislation on the marking, seizure and confiscation of firearms; and criminalizing all illicit firearms-related activities.

Despite the existence of legal drafting committees in almost all of the member states to the Nairobi Protocol, measurable progress in amending or adopting new firearms legislation to cover all aspects outlined in the protocol is yet to be effected. This can be attributed to a number of reasons, including a lack of capacity, technical knowledge and even lack of political will.

East African states face a wide range of challenges and amending firearms legislation may not be a high priority for a particular government, which makes any advancement of the process difficult. RECSA is, however, actively providing states with technical legal assistance and feedback on legislative issues in order to encourage advancement of the process.

Poor Coordination

Another obstacle faced by states in the region is that in many instances a single person is responsible for coordinating all the activities of an NFP. Furthermore, the designated person often has additional policing duties alongside those of the NFP. Given the various government departments that comprise many focal points, it can be difficult for NFP coordinators to obtain consensus on issues and bring about significant progress.

While the involvement of all relevant departments in matters such as the development of NAPs is essential, the day-to-day running of NFPs should be left to departments that deal primarily with matters of internal security, such as the police and department of defence. Given the various government departments that comprise many NFPs, it can be difficult for coordinators to bring about significant progress.

Appointed persons in other relevant departments should be available for consultation when needed. Mandating a few key persons to carry out the daily functions of the NFP and ensuring that they have the necessary resources to do so would ensure that they are more functional and able to carry out implementation measures more efficiently than a single person trying to steer a number of departments with different agenda and mandates.

Unending Conflicts

Conflicts complicate arms control efforts, particularly since many of them spill across state borders, making it difficult to regulate the flow of weapons. States in post-conflict situations face the additional challenge of addressing the excess accumulation of SALW within their borders from the period of conflict. Conflict stimulates

the demand for SALW, not only among those involved in the conflict, but also among members of the civilian population who acquire SALW for self-defence during a conflict. As a result, large numbers of weapons are circulated within a country and across its borders during conflict and post-conflict periods.

States attempting to control the proliferation of SALW within their borders bear the heavy burden of ensuring that large numbers of SALW are removed from circulation during the post-conflict period to ensure that they are not used to fuel future conflicts²². In addition to this, states need to promote a sense of security among the civilian population and address the root causes of the conflicts in their region to encourage disarmament and minimize the chances of rearmament.

Knowing that the magnitude of the menace caused by SALW proliferation is too big. The following, thus, are the main challenges in the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol: The commitment of the state's actors to eradicate this menace is small; the unpredictable funding that do not bring interventions to logical conclusions leading to piecemeal implementation of SALW interventions; the prevention measures are not given due attention they deserve since the relevant stakeholders are not involved in the process; and there is inadequate coordination among development partners and recipients on handling issues related to SALW proliferation. Furthermore, some countries have not prioritized SALW in their overall national development strategies, and there is shifting of priorities among development partners making the implementation of SALW control efforts unsustainable.

In some countries there is lack of political will, while in the region there are prolonged conflicts. Countries of the region have common porous borders. There is also lack of appreciation of the nexus between security and development by development partners and member states. Finally, coordination organs have no capacity in terms of qualified personnel and funding.

²²Efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons: from persistent crisis to norm failure? Published: 17 May 2022

Policy Recommendations

While progress has been made in the establishment of the national SALW coordination organs, there is need to enhance the capacity of national focal points and commissions on SALW.

1. Among other initiatives, strengthening continental and regional mechanisms on SALW control and management such as cross border cooperation and interagency coordination is vital.
2. Enhancing public education and awareness among the communities and political class is important to enable ownership of SALW processes while manufacturers/suppliers and recipients of SALW must cooperate in the war against proliferation as recommended by the arms trade treaty (ATT).
3. Governments should integrate SALW interventions in national development agendas to increase chances of local ownership and resource allocation.
4. If states have ratified/adopted global and regional instruments, then relevant provisions of these instruments should be reflected in their national legislation and, therefore, there would be need for harmonization. In addition to legislation, national authorities should have developed national weapons and ammunition normative frameworks and/or operational guidance documents, including a SALW national action plan and SOPs in accordance with the IATGs and MOSAIC. These standards, strategies, national action plans and/or strategic and operational guidance documents should, at an early stage, be taken into consideration when planning and executing weapons and ammunition interventions. National institutions need to develop and review the national action plans (NAPs) while national authorities, with their partners, need to have in their priorities the following action points: enhance marking of SALW for continuous identification and tracing; promote public private partnerships in SALW control interventions; and continuously train law enforcement agencies on weapons and ammunition management.
5. Improve safe storage infrastructure, encourage civilian disarmament and destruction of obsolete and surplus SALW and ammunition.

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Statecraft through effective deployment of Peace Support Operations in Eastern Africa



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Abstract

Since 1960, there have been more than ten peace support operations (PSOs) missions across Eastern Africa, cognizant of the fact that a handful of ad-hoc security operations launched by regional economic communities (REC) and regional mechanisms (RMs) are increasingly playing crucial roles in peacekeeping efforts (Felter & Renwick, 2021). The increasingly complex security environments continue placing high demands on African PSOs, and complicating efforts at long-term peace and state building (Coning, Gelot, Karlsrud, 2015). These environments lack a functioning state, human security and international security is considered at risk, thus making it a political imperative to re-establish state structures in areas where they have collapsed (Andersen, 2007). Therefore, PSOs are seen to be as not only a prelude to, but an integrated part of, post-conflict state-building (Chesterman, 2005). From a PSO perspective, state-building interventions are aimed at building functioning and self-sustaining state structures that can allow external state-builders to complete their mission and withdraw. PSOs operations have always presented unique challenges based on various factors, some internally-driven whilst others externally driven. It is worth noting that these upheavals do have a bearing on the duration which a PSO takes to be rolled out, to deliver on its mandate and to wind up upon its term coming to an end.

Introduction: PSOs in State Building

Without a functioning state, both human security and international security is considered at risk, and it has thus become an almost political imperative to re-establish state structures in areas where they have collapsed (Andersen, 2007). Therefore, peace operations are seen to be as not only a prelude to, but an integrated part of post-conflict state-building (Chesterman, 2005). The increasingly complex security environments continue placing high demands on African peace support operations, and complicating efforts at long-term peace- and state building (Coning, Gelot, & Karlsrud, 2015).

Since the end of World War II, PSOs have become increasingly extensive in nature. Military powers have built specific structures and capacities to fulfil the comprehensive approach. A clear continuation would increase, which is probable to result in the military component of PSO personnel receiving new tasks, perhaps with development or humanitarian characters. This would involve military personnel becoming more interactive with the population, both its civilian and combatant parts (Tejpar, 2009).

More personnel on the ground, especially engaged in civilian military coordination (CIMIC), and more capital goods would demand more security and maintenance of

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material and equipment. This would probably increase the local procurement and an increased scope of the peace operation and military intervention would demand increased security capacity with private security probably being used in order to obtain this. Furthermore, the greater scope of PSOs is likely to have a stronger regional impact as national and regional resources are attracted to PSO camps and bases (Tejpar, 2009).

From a PSO perspective, state-building interventions are usually aimed at building functioning and self-sustaining state structures that can allow external state-builders to complete their mission and withdraw. Moreover, these structures, with the international actors, are supposed to re-establish the social contract between the rulers and the ruled and provide for a state that is considered legitimate by its citizens (Andersen, 2007).

Definition of key terms

The term Peace Support Operations (PSO) describes structured international assistance initiatives to provide support towards maintenance, monitoring and building of peace and prevention of recurrence of violent conflict. PSOs are categorized into two: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping operations play the role of monitoring and offering support to the establishment of peace. This is ordinarily within the backdrop of a peace agreement. Peace enforcement operations on the other hand are set out to provide conditions for peace and are granted the latitude to use force (Johnston, N, n.d.).

Rhoads, E. P., & Laurence, M. (2019) also define peace support operations as per their multifaceted nature and involvement with the "holy trinity" of peacekeeping principles: non-use of force except in self-defence, consent and impartiality. The scholars further observe that these central element of peacekeeping doctrine were conceived during the Cold War. Lightly-armed missions were the deployed and peacekeepers were ordinarily tasked with the observation of cease-fire agreements as well as monitoring the implementation of peace agreements between states. In the United Nations, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is mandated to implement PSOs with UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA) is usually the lead UN agency in political peacebuilding operations (Johnston, N, n.d.).

According to the Centre for Global Development (2005), state building is seized of the creation and

fortification of fundamental institutions for the support of economic, social, and political development for prosperity and posterity.

A comprehensive definition of state building under the lens of peace support operations, presenting a meshing of and transition from one to the other (PSO to state building) is offered by Garrett W, McLean, and McMillan, A. (2018) when they define it as approach that can be found within both academic discourse and practice of international relations. It contends that the best approach to securing peacekeeping is through the promotion of sound structures that are state-based, within the realm of political, economic, and social development.

The premise of the concept of state building is the rationale that order and stability are at the centre of any peaceful state and that authority and effectiveness are key functions required for this sound state and, therefore, should be surrendered to it. This approach is often applied as a strategy in the conflict and post-conflict stages of the conflict cycle. It, therefore, rationalizes the *raison d'être* for the intervention of international actors (Garret, W. et al. 2018).

Principles of UN Peacekeeping missions

In view of the fact that the role of peacekeeping is a highly sensitive engagement, there is the need for clearly outlined principles to be in place to set parameters of operation in the maintenance of peace and security on the world stage.

According to the United Nations Peacekeeping (n.d.), there are three basic principles that guide UN peacekeeping operations. They are structured in such a way that they cater for inter-relatedness as well as mutually reinforcing. They are: consent of the parties; impartiality; and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

Consent of the parties

The deployment of UN peacekeeping operations takes place only upon the consent of the main parties involved in the conflict. This, therefore, calls for both parties to commit to a political process. Their approval, therefore, opens doors for the UN to roll out its operations as and when needed, within the conflict zone. The lack thereof of such an arrangement would see the mission oscillate towards enforcement action, thus becoming party to the conflict.

◆ Impartiality

This is a vital element that speaks to the maintenance of cooperation and consensus among the central actors in conflict. This should, however, not be mistaken to mean neutrality; UN peacekeepers are not neutral actors as would be the case with humanitarian agencies as they are expected to respond to breaches or violations of agreement.

◆ Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

In as much as the UN peacekeeping operations are stipulated as being non-enforcement in nature, the use of force can be applied as and when needed with UN Security Council's authorization, if acting in the defence of the mission's mandate and in self-defence.

Some situations that are considered/categorized as hostile/volatile necessitate the use of all means necessary as the UN Security Council sanctions robust mandates in a bid to neutralize hostile forces, disorganize political processes such as elections and protect civilians who are at risk of attack, and/or lend a hand to national authorities in restoring and upholding law and order.

◆ History of PSO in East Africa

Currently, there are 12 U.N. peacekeeping missions. Four of the 5 most complex missions are in Africa (Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan) (Howard, 2021). However, since 1960, there have been more than thirty UN peacekeeping missions across Africa, the most of any region, cognizant of the fact that a handful of ad-hoc security operations launched by REC/RMs are increasingly playing crucial roles in peacekeeping efforts (Felter & Renwick, 2021).

◆ Democratic Republic of Congo

United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC): July 1960 – June 1964

This PSO was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance (UNSCR 143, 1960). ONUC's mandate was subsequently redefined to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary

and advisory personnel not under the United Nations command, as well as all mercenaries (Boulden, 2015).

It is therefore clear that ONUC was the first attempt of a PSO in state building. ONUC's civilian component filled crucial gaps in the administrative and medical functions (Jacobson, 1964). One needs not look further than paragraph 2 of UNSCR S/4387 (1960) which states: Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as maybe necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the National security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks (UNSCR S/4387, 1960).

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC): November 1999 – May 2010

The second PSO mission in DRC was established on Tuesday 30 November 1999 (UNSCR 1297 (1999)). MONUC's mandate was to use "all necessary means" against militias in the country's eastern region, one that is famed for its abundant mineral wealth.

Originally deployed as a small-scale observation mission, MONUC was ultimately transformed into a Chapter VII mission with nearly 20,000 military personnel at its peak. Worldwide, MONUC is the most extensive UN peace operation. It is revolutionary in the sense that its mandate goes well beyond any other given mandate in the past. Moreover, in December 2008 MONUC became the first UN peace operation ever to make civilian protection its top priority (Reynaert, 2011).

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO): May 2010 – Ongoing

Under UNSCR 1925 (2010) the Security Council resolved that starting from July 2010 MONUC would be transformed into the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO). Due to the oscillation of dynamics into a political context, MONUSCO mainly focused on stabilization and peace consolidation.

Over time, MONUSCO has become synonymous with the difficulties inherent in managing a UN peacekeeping operation in a complex crisis – characterised by international civilian staff and uniformed peacekeepers from dozens of countries – and in an uncertain global context where the Mission was pulled in different, often competing, directions by the Security Council (Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, 2019).

Rwanda

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR): October 2013 – March 1996

UNAMIR was rolled out on 4 August 1993 and was mandated to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali, monitor the ceasefire agreement, including the establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures among others (UNSCR 872 (1993)). Its mandate was extended so that UNAMIR could act as an intermediary between the warring Rwandese parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible; and monitor developments in Rwanda, including the safety and security of civilians (UNSCR 912 (1994)).

South Sudan

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS): July 2011 - Ongoing

Established on Friday 8 July 2011, UNMISS was primarily mandated to protect civilians, monitoring human rights & supporting implementation of cessation of hostilities agreement (UNSCR 1996 (2011)). UNMISS is arguably one of the most ambitious PSO's in terms local-level peacebuilding and the level of decentralization from the capital to its field offices. The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan is


unique as the first UN peacekeeping mission with an explicit and comprehensive peacebuilding mandate (Karlsrud, John; da Costa, Diana, 2012).

Somalia

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): January 2007 – Transition to ATMIS - Ongoing

Initially formed off the back of IGASOM (IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia), AMISOM was mandated to support the national reconciliation congress in Somalia (UNSCR 1744 (2007)). It is important to note that AMISOM did not start out as a stabilization force; it was only after 2011 that it slowly took on an increasingly complex set of stabilization tasks (Lotze & Williams, 2016). Moreover, AMISOM is not a traditional peacekeeping operation but was rather tasked with a combination of objectives that revolved around VIP protection, war-fighting, counterinsurgency, and facilitating humanitarian assistance which complicated efforts to support it through mechanisms designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping missions (Boutellis & Williams, 2013). Perceived as one of the most complex PSO mission, AMISOM faced various challenges such as building trust, a perceived culture clash, varying opinions on joint assessments and avoidance of capacity substitutions (Boutellis & Williams, 2013).

Kenya's Peace Keeping Missions



Challenges facing Peace Support Operations

The theatres in which PSOs operate have always presented unique challenges based on various factors, some internally-driven whilst others externally driven. It is worth noting that these upheavals do have a bearing on the duration which a PSO takes to be rolled out, to deliver on its mandate and to wind up upon its term coming to an end.

The section presents these challenges in a three-tire approach. It addresses the external factors the institutional dynamics that play out within the theatre and individual/personal factors that touch on the individual persons deployed to work in the PSO.

These are the dynamics that are beyond control of internal actors within the PSO. These bring to the fore the

very fact that PSOs have externalities that however silent, invisible and/or distant they may be or seem to be, they determine the success rates or total failures of the mission. The following are the main factors that can be classified in these categories, pointing out how they manifest.

Funding since the conceptualization of PSOs has always taken centre-stage in discussions as they have always proven central and critical to the success of the operations. According to the United Nations General Assembly's Fifth Committee (June, 2021) a budget of \$6.37 Billion for 12 peacekeeping missions from July 2021 to June 2022 was approved. Of those missions, the Eastern African region had the following missions and operations considered under the package. The table below provides a summary of the above-discussed.

Mission/Operation	Total Appropriation
MONUSCO (Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)	\$1.12 billion
UNAMID (African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur)	\$45.72 million
UNISFA (Interim Security Force for Abyei)	\$280.58 million
UNMISS (Mission in South Sudan)	\$1.20 billion
UNSOS (Support Office in Somalia)	\$560.07 million
UNLB (United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi)	\$65.69 million
RSCE (Regional Service Centre in Entebbe)	\$40.27 million
Peacekeeping Support Account	\$356.41 million
TOTAL FIGURE DISBURSED BY UN	\$6.37 billion
ALLOCATION TO THE EASTERN AFRICAN REGION	3.39233 billion

Table 1: Peace Support Operations Financing in the Eastern African Region (July 2021 to June 2022)

Source: United Nations (2021)

The challenge of funding has also plagued the ability of operations to realize their full mandate. A case in point is Somalia which saw the cutting back of finances by the European Union (EU) in 2017. This was

informed by the argument that EU involvement in the fight against violent extremism and terror organizations needed to be carried out beyond the Horn of Africa. The EU funding 90 percent of the African Union's

Counterterrorism Force was an area of concern (Mutambo, A, 2022).

Tied support in the Peace Support Operations environment is another limiting factor to the success of state building as it sometimes means that funding is directed on the basis of donor preference. In Somalia, according to Mutambo (2022), the EU cut back resources to the AMISOM, redirecting it to the same nation on the insistence that continued activity be carried out under an outfit that will focus on state-building. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) was the model fronted with experts arguing that the full control and pacification of Somalia from the Al Shabaab is far from achieved.

"What we have in Somalia is not even an operation. It is a war. Until the enemy is fully neutralized, we cannot start the rebuilding process as susceptibility to attack is real." (Anonymous 1, 2022). The pre-emptive stance of the above-stated quote was noted when the ATMIS base in Middle Shabele region South West of Mogadishu was attacked on the 3rd of May 2022, costing the lives of a number of Burundian troops (African Union, 2022).

There are external actors that play a role in terms impeding the efficacy of PSOs as they stand to gain from protracted conflicts and instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. "An UN official in eastern Congo counted 64 airplane movements in an ordinary day in Shabunda (Kivu). 150 tons of coltan leave eastern Congo each year and are exported worldwide via Belgium or Dubai" (Le Monde August 2001 as cited in Iyenda, 2005).

The above-stated verbatim quote is the story of the DRC, whereby global networks finance chaos in the Eastern region of the country through rebel movements that facilitate the extraction of resources through clandestine means. These have constantly eroded the gains of peace-keeping missions in the country, appreciative of the fact that the mission in the then Zaire started in 1960 under the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) (UN, 2022). The blame is not only on western powers as reports point to neighbours of the DRC on its eastern side as being actively involved in the conflict (Kumar, K.S., 2013), in spite of efforts of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region being mooted since July 2012 towards conflict resolution in the eastern DRC.

The response of PSOs in the true spirit of the UN Charter Chapter 1 Article 1 (1) calls upon all member states to remain seized of the need to maintain international peace and security. Objective 6 of the African Union (AU) is to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. This, in tandem with the spirit of

the UN Charter, therefore translates to multi-national responses where states are called upon to send troops/military, police and civilian personnel to conflict zones such as it is in the case of Somalia and DRC. In Somalia for example, the current military component is comprised of troops drawn from Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and Burundi. These are deployed in six sectors across the southern and central parts of Somalia (AMISOM, 2022). They operate in a theatre where Somali language is spoken. Notable as well is the presence of Turkish troops under TurkSom in Mogadishu (Daily Sabah, 2020), American Special Forces based in Mogadishu (Martinez, L., 2017), British forces in Baidoa (British Embassy-Mogadishu, 2021) under operation TANGHAM. The presence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia advancing their state interests also presents additional actors in the Somalia stabilization debate.

Two challenges prominently manifest from the above-stated multinational engagement: divergences in language, and military doctrine²⁴. Of the countries of the Horn in Somalia, language is a challenge. Kenya and Uganda speak English, Djibouti and Burundi speak French while Ethiopian troops speak Amharic. The western and gulf powers also bring in, in addition to the languages previously mentioned, Arabic and Turkish. The local community speak Somali language.

The military doctrinal aspect is also a factor, especially since, over and above the fact that the diverse troops on the ground prescribe to their own doctrines, they do take part in training the Somali National Army (SNA) thus engage them, prescribing to their own doctrines. The resultant effect is that SNA in essence in a common army just by the name; they cannot coordinate a common assault against the Al Shabaab. This compounds the attainment of state building in Somalia.

The vagaries of nature present another challenge that has over time proven an impediment to success of missions. In the DRC, the forest cover has not only provided an ideal hideout for rebel forces, it provides a steady source of nutrition and a base from which various rebel groups are able to launch attacks. Sitawa and Mwasaru (2022) make a similar observation with the occupation of Boni forest by the Al Shabaab as the natural resource is of strategic importance to the group as it provides a source of food and water. This aspect presents a ragged terrain that often slows down security operations.

The Somalia context presents a contrary perspective in that the arid and semi-arid conditions coupled with ever increasing temperatures as well as

²⁴is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.

unpredictable rainfall patterns driven by climate change create and prolong drought conditions. This exacerbates both intra and inter-communal conflicts due to competition for scarce resources.

Access to sophisticated weapons as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are challenges that present themselves in times when peace enforcement needs to be carried out. With long and porous borders (both land and maritime), such weapons are easily accessible, especially fuelled by black market trade of minerals, contraband and wildlife (endangered species or parts) by these rebel groups. According to the United Nations Security Council (UNSR) Report of 6th October 2021, the weapons used by the Al Shabaab after ballistics assessments as well as review of video footage carried out on the Bosaso Prison attack shows that the group has Serbian manufactured 60mm M73 mortar (traced to Saudi Arabia), grenades (traced to Uganda People's Defence Forces), M4 rifles (traced to Somali National Army) and AK 47 machine gun rifles. Florquin, N (2013) and UNSC (2015) also noted that some of the heavy weapons traded in Bakara market between 2010 and 2012, and 2015 were Dushka 108 mm (heavy machine gun), PKM (general-purpose machine gun). The Al Shabaab, for example, has an estimated budget of USD 100million of which 24 million dollars goes to weapons and ammunition. They can access the latest weapons which the SNA cannot access due to the arms embargo placed on Somalia (Africa News, 2022).

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become a big threat not only to the rate of advancing peace enforcement in conflict zones, but also to the lives of peace keepers, humanitarian workers and the local community. These devices, according to the International Peace Support Training Centre (2022), are made from basic items that are easily smuggled across porous borders. They are deployed by either being buried in the ground along routes to hit convoys, they are loaded in vehicles and driven into targets such as military camps in form of Vehicle-based (VBIED) and body-borne (BBIED), targeting crowds which may preferably include security personnel.

In line with the above is the real threat of injury or loss of lives that is faced by both soldiers and civilians in PSOs. In DRC, a helicopter carrying 8 peacekeepers was brought down in 29 March 2022 in Tshazu. (Bujakera and Mahamba, 2022).

We lost friends on that aircraft. We hope it was a technical issue. Because it was flying low (300 feet), it may have been hit by an RPG round or a lucky strike for the fire of a machine gun round (Anonymous, 2022).

In Somalia, as previously mentioned, the Al-Shabaab attacked and overrun Burundian African Union (AU)

peacekeeper's base in middle Shabelle killing 3 civilians, 30 soldiers and injuring 22 (Torelli, C., 2022). Al Jazeera (2022) reported that the attack, according to the Al-Shabaab, claimed 173 soldiers.

The threat of HIV/AIDS and other diseases has had an effect on the wellbeing of all the three components engaged in the PSO environment i.e. military, police and civilian. In as much as there has been no direct impact established between the prevalence of HIV and its effect on PSOs, it has been noted that the prevalence of the disease has affected their capability to perform regional peacekeeping roles. They are predisposed to infections as they are among the most mobile populations in the world because of the nature of their careers. They have also been seen as vectors who spread diseases in the areas of operation and as well return home to infect their partners upon the end of their deployment (Tripodi & Patel, 2011). For some armies, the disclosure of ones' HIV and AIDS status as positive would render them unfit for mission which is considered as an opportunity for some additional income. Military officers and service personnel who do not disclose their status when deployed in mission areas that have frail/weak or lack healthcare services and facilities then face the challenge of lack of anti-retroviral drugs. They deteriorate healthwise due to increased immuno-deficiency caused by increased viral loads, which sometimes results in death.

Sexual exploitation and abuse has also been noted as one of the challenges that impede the effectiveness of PSOs. "International peacekeeping missions have been accused of sometimes creating a predatory sexual culture, where reports involve everything from peacekeepers coercing vulnerable individuals to provide sexual favours in exchange for food or meagre pay, to reported instances of rape at gunpoint." (Nordas, 2013).

Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers and/or by civilians working under the wider auspices of peacekeeping missions is a crime of the highest order; it is an extreme form of abuse of power against vulnerable and marginalised individuals carried out by those brought in to protect those very populations (Karim & Beardsley, 2016). The resultant effect of such behaviour on PSOs is the creation and/or escalation of hostilities and antagonistic relationships between host communities and the peacekeeping forces. In some cases, it has become a basis for peace keepers and security forces becoming targets of local militia groups, especially in Islamic communities such as Sudan. The United Nations, as cited by Agence France-Presse (2021), observed that peacekeepers from South Africa, Gabon, Cameroon and the DRC were most mentioned as being involved in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Prior to the surfacing of such allegations, a total

of 1,265 soldiers, police and other staff had been accused of such abuse since 2010.

The prevalence of pandemics is another challenge that has proven to affect state building not only in the Eastern African region. Parts of DRC for example have been affected by the Ebola virus. Of all the pandemics, the Corona Virus Disease of 2019 had the greatest impact on PSOs.

The stay-at-home guidelines saw an approximated 10% of international civilian staff work outside their designated mission areas leading to a huge deficit on the ground. Peace negotiations that were to take place were either cancelled or went the 'zoomplomacy' way. All troop rotations of peace keeping troops were frozen for some time. Among the approximately 80,000 AU and UN soldiers and police officers deployed in Africa at the peak of the pandemic, approximately 40% were due for rotation and replacement (Sitawa, 2020).

Playing the state sovereignty card has played a role of regional, continental and international actors in intervening and preventing/diffusing conflicts. Burundi and Ethiopia have fallen victim to such a challenge. In the case of Burundi, the late President Pierre Nkurunziza, however, remained non-committal to opening up political space and the readiness of regional leaders and partners to prevent him from realizing his 3rd term bid for presidency. He also resisted the presence of election observers from outside which resulted to contested elections. In the case of Ethiopia, when the conflict began Mutambo (2020) observed that a few hours after South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his capacity as AU Chairperson, appointed three ex-presidents (former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano, Liberia's ex-President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and former South African President Kgalema Motlanthe) to mediate in the Tigray conflict, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, turned down the offer to have them engage as AU's special envoys to Ethiopia. The outcome of this was a full scale conflict that was driven by Mr. Abiy's underestimation of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which could have led to his overthrow had he not received backing from external actors in form of military support.

Rifts among members of the East African Community have also been pointed out as one of the impediments to state building through ineffective dialogue, negotiation and mediation. The International Crisis Group (2019) avers that in 2015, the EAC established the Inter-Burundi Dialogue which ended in failure after a three-year tenure. Historical political rifts among member states involved, coupled with rivalries on economic basis, as well as heightened personal hostilities among their leaders, prevented the region from coming up with a workable agreement on how to resolve the crisis.

The presence of safe havens for leaders of countries in conflict has been mentioned as a challenge to state building. The trend in the region has been that leaders of countries in turmoil have established themselves and their families in neighbouring countries in the region as they continue to engage and finance conflict. Kenya and Uganda have been accused by human rights groups as being noncommittal to clamping down the perpetrators of the war in South Sudan (Radio France international, 2021). Wambui (2021) also contended that Kenya Illicit Finance Risks and Assessment highlights how politicians in South Sudan have the freedom to purchase high end properties in Kenya, establish joint business exploits with Kenyan citizens. They also transact freely using local banks across countries.

Children are another unspoken factor that is bound to affect state building in countries in conflict and, by extension, state building. Human Rights Watch (2012) reported the presence of children within the TFG forces, TFG militias, and its allied militias. The TFG was responsible for engaging in the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

"There are children in the TFG, aged 13 to 15 years. There were 80 to 90 in my group of 300 who were between 13 and 16 years old." "I have many friends who have joined the TFG and many of them were under 18. Some are soldiers guarding the presidential palace and some participate in the fighting." (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Cases of children used as sexual slaves means that girls fall pregnant and give birth to children who are of these armed groups. They end up knowing no other way of life except that of the militia. Society also treats escapees/returnees as pariahs as they are seen as part of the militia groups. The aspect of whether they were abducted or not is also not considered. The probability of such groups re-joining these militia groups is high and thus their continuation of the cause of the group is a definite.

The multidimensional nature of PSOs-PKOs makes them challenging to coordinate.

You realize that under this arrangement, the military component, the police component and the civilian component bring on board different cultures, training doctrines, backgrounds and working cultures. These aspects may lead to friction in the mission environment when it comes to coordination on implementing the mandate of a UN mission.

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the United Nations engagement in countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations has the unique ability to employ a mix of civilian, police and military capabilities, under a unified leadership to support a fragile peace process. At the

same time, United Nations peacekeeping operations are almost always deployed alongside a variety of external actors, with widely differing mandates, agendas and time horizons. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is thus further compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the United Nations and the range of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflict and post-conflict settings (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008).

State and non-state actors. These are basically the groups who have varied interests they want to achieve while working in the mission area. They could be part of the government or non-government. They come in various forms among them being government forces and leaders, the warlords, the non-governmental organizations, media, terrorist groups, criminal organizations, social movements, civil society and multinational organizations. With varied competing interests presented by these actors, the mission leadership must find a way to work around these interests for the benefit of the mission with aim of achieving the mission mandate.

TCCs/PCCs, regional and other inter-governmental organizations, the range of humanitarian and development actors involved in international crisis management, as well as national and local actors in the countries where United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed should all be considered. In this regard, the UN Principles and Guidelines document supports a vision of a system of inter-locking capabilities in which the roles and responsibilities and comparative advantages of the various partners are clearly defined (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008).

Emblems of the UN/AU no longer a source of protection. In the traditional mission as it were, the UN/AU symbols of peace could assure peacekeepers protection. They were highly regarded as the UN/AU were perceived as impartial, unbiased and neutral. However, with the advent of Multi-dimensional PKOs/PSOs where mandates are robust, the peacekeepers have become targets of the belligerents/adversaries. In the past, when a peacekeeper displayed the UN emblems, they were spared. Lately it has been witnessed in missions where the belligerents/adversaries attack UN/AU peacekeepers camps and convoys. This has been witnessed in MINUSCA, MONUSCO, AMISOM among others. To mitigate this, the UN/AU should put in place more robust strategies to protect peacekeepers because the traditional approach

is facing a challenge. The UN/AU need to create awareness on the neutrality of peacekeepers to be able to get peacekeepers to be perceived as not being party to the conflict contrary to what adversaries perceive them to be. The peacekeepers should be accorded enhanced security unlike what was accorded traditionally. It is important to note that since the commissioning of the Brahimi Report of 2000, the UN has adopted more robust strategies towards peacekeeping by deploying Quick Reaction Forces to the peacekeeping theatre. A classic example is the QRFs deployed into MONUSCO to provide security for the peacekeepers as well as degrade the threats therein to allow the mission achieve its mandate.

Rebel groups' motives behind attacking PKOs have received several possible explanations. UN peacekeepers are sometimes attacked due to the fact that they become an actor in the conflict which tend to protect the weaker side from total defeat. A weak government will receive protection from the PKO, while a strong government will aim at upholding the status quo. On the other hand, relatively stronger rebels will challenge the PKO in order to restrict their behavior and/or make them withdraw, creating a better opportunity for rebel victory (Ruggeri et al., 2013; Salverda, 2013). It can also be a strategy to uphold the bargaining range. When facing battle losses, rebels must clinch to being perceived as strong, compared to the strength of the government. The military weakened rebels will then attack PKOs, as a strength performance, in order to be perceived as stronger (Fjelde et al., 2016).

Further, a recent attack on UN peacekeepers was witnessed in the Democratic Republic of Congo which was condemned widely by the UN and the International Community. This has made the UN go back to the drawing board, thus employment of robust peacekeeping methodologies.

Fourteen UN peacekeepers were killed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2017 in what was called the "worst attack" on the UN in recent history. The death toll is the highest since a 1993-gun battle in Mogadishu, and adds to the hundreds of UN peacekeepers killed in Congo to date. Senior UN officials have been quick to lay the blame for the December 8 attack on the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group responsible for some of the worst recent massacres in eastern Congo. Since 2015, MONUSCO (the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission) has targeted the ADF for neutralisation, deploying attack helicopters, heavy artillery and hundreds of troops in a series of joint operations with the Congolese army. While these operations had been put on hold for most of 2017, the Security Council's call to bring the perpetrators to justice will add strong pressure for the UN to resume the

offensive against the ADF. This might send a good signal about the UN's readiness to respond to such attacks, but it would almost certainly make the situation riskier for the people living in eastern Congo and the peacekeepers (United Nations University, 2017).

The changing nature of security leading to frequent changes in mandates. Security in mission areas is fluid. It changes from time to time. It is unpredictable and sometimes very dangerous. These frequent and unpredictable changes make it difficult for the UN/AU to focus fully on a specific mandate. This is because there are many emerging security challenges in these mission areas. The nature of conflict has also changed over time from inter-state to intrastate, hence leading to emergence of complex tasks for the contemporary peacekeeper, ranging from state rebuilding, governance, human rights, security sector reform, DDR to demining.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The tasks that a United Nations peacekeeping operation will be required to perform are set out in the Security Council mandate. Security Council mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it

presents. Since United Nations peacekeeping operations are normally deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace agreement, Security Council mandates are influenced by the nature and content of the agreement reached by the parties to the conflict (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, 2008).

In as much as strides have been made to engage women as much as possible in the peace keeping and state building processes in various parts of the eastern African region, a lot remains to be done as this potential is yet to be fully unlocked. Sitawa, Sitienei and Muhidin (2021) posit that the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action are key documents which called for the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) to introduce a series of measures that would propel the gender balance and gender equality at all levels of peacekeeping missions. The Plan of Action placed importance on the significance of women participation in all stages of a peace process. Notable though are certain notions that are majorly unfounded which are aimed at locking women out of the negotiation rooms, for example a move premised upon the centrality of resources and power in peace processes as opposed to addressing gains holistically.

Way Forward

The following recommendations are provided as a way forward to enhance the effectiveness of PSOs as they strive to deliver on state building in Africa.

1. Sustainable sources of funding: The African Union has a peace fund that has always suffered budget inadequacies. There is need for members of the AU to commit resources to this kitty that would not only cater for troop deployment in times of conflict, but it would ensure timely deployment prior to conflicts going full-blown.
2. Awareness creation surrounding sources of funding to support peacekeeping missions and security operations are key as these would support training in and response to peace support operations.
3. There is need for stable and up-scaled funding to support courses on counter-improvised explosive devices that will skill troops operating in mission/operation zones where IEDs are used. In addition to this, troops should be well equipped with the necessary devices for search and disarming of IEDs.
4. There is need for more investment in the use of technology for purposes of surveillance and patrols. This will limit the casualties accrued due to surface to air attacks by enemy forces.
5. Pre-deployment training is a key factor that would enhance the efficacy of PSOs. Key aspects such as life skills would prepare troops effectively so that they are aware of the do's and don'ts in the mission areas, especially on matters of sexually transmitted diseases as well as sexual exploitation and abuse.

Way Forward

6. The need to consider ad hoc security coalitions as a potential addition to the conventional UN and AU-sanctioned missions would go a long way in reacting to conflicts before they go full-blown. The rise of ad-hoc security coalitions usually by individual states with stakes involved often choose to act rapidly – usually a coalition of regional states joining in (Karlsruh & Reykers, 2020).
7. On account of language barriers and multidimensional nature of missions, there is need for close coordination and deliberate efforts to ensure that there is an open channel of communication as well as prompt and timely flow of information among the military, police and civilian components in mission areas. Tensions must be managed proactively during operations to minimize misunderstandings and resentments which could undermine staff relationships which eventually may lead to failure to achieve the mandate given. Mission leaders must rally all staff towards working for a common goal and objectives under the collaborative leadership of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT).
8. The AU needs to push for a common military doctrine to be part of the discussion whenever states intend to capacity-build militaries of states that are in conflict. The case of the SNA is one that calls for a relook into how various partners are going about training (with) them.
9. There is need for investment in the welfare of children born out of unions with militia. The aim is to provide psycho-social support to help them recover from the trauma. Awareness creation across societies that host returnees should be carried out so that their assimilation is deliberately expedited.
10. Women should be engaged in peace processes at the conflict stages and in state building at the post conflict stage. Mechanisms should therefore be put in place to break stereotypes and misgivings that compromise the involvement of this important group.
11. The rape and plunder of resources in the eastern African region has got to be dealt with the sincerity it deserves. Resource extraction in clandestine ways that call for destabilization of states to avoid having structures that will demand taxes should not only be condemned but brought to a halt.
12. States and governments of the eastern African region have got to commit to supporting peace support operations through sanctioning of leaders of states in conflict who wish to invest in other states except their own. Such a position will push them to fully commit to the peace process in their home countries.

Conclusion

The prospects of realizing the capabilities of peace support operations as key factors to state building in view of the prevailing situation in the eastern African region remain elusive. Addressing the above-stated challenges as guided by the proposed way forward will go a long way in turning the tide. Further, it is important to note that peace support operations by themselves cannot deliver state stability as state building remains founded on local/home-grown solutions that speak to the unique needs of nations, not within the territorial confines but within the context of intra- and inter-ethnic nationalities. This would simply translate to the admittance of our diversities and leveraging on the wealth of strengths inherent in them. Community peace building approaches, both within and across ethnic nationalities, that candidly address the wellbeing of all should be embraced. As well, such approaches should adhere to the tenets of social capital: trust, information and communication, group networking, norms of reciprocity and social inclusion. In conclusion, state-building interventions suggest that the deployment of PSOs does not serve the sole purpose of being a tool for preventing the resumption of conflict, but rather an integrated part of the overall purpose – namely to assist in re-building states where the intervening actors effectively have had to undertake basic law and order functions while trying to build national capacity to assume responsibility.

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Elections Management for Peaceful Outcomes in Eastern Africa: challenges and prospects



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Abstract

Elections all over the world remain a crucial variable in the democratization process. Depending on how they are managed, elections do make or break countries. Poorly organized elections are one of the key obstacles to national/regional stability and, thus, they undermine consolidation of democratic gains in a number of emerging democracies. Even in mature democracies, as witnessed in the United States (US) 2020 election, elections can fall victim to conflict and catalyze negative political divisions and instability.

While a majority of countries in eastern Africa region have in the recent history held periodic elections as stipulated in their respective constitutions, a few of the elections have been held in a peaceful environment with positive outcomes. Others have fallen below the internationally acceptable standards of a good election. These have resulted in post-election crises with devastating outcomes such as the 2007²⁶ and 2017 elections in Kenya, the 2015 election in Zanzibar²⁷, 2021 general elections in Ethiopia, and the 2016 and 2021 general elections in Uganda. From a technical standpoint, however, only a handful of the elections held in the region (Tanzania 2005 and 2015²⁸ general elections and Kenya's 2002 general election) may pass the test of a competently run "free and fair" contest.

Introduction

Countries in eastern African region have some semblance of liberal democratic system of government. In such a system, elections play a critical role in constituting and periodically renewing governments. As postulated by some liberal scholars, elections are the platform for political accountability and a means by which leaders give an account on the mandate they were given by the electorate.

Though elections are not synonymous with democracy, every country that professes democracy should hold regular free, fair and credible elections. As averred by Mozaffar and Schedler, the outcome of an electoral process depends on how the process abides by the principle of 'procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty', that is, certainty in the process leading to balloting (level playing field in the electoral cycle) and uncertainty on the eventual winner. In other words, the main aim of an electoral process is that the rules of the game do not predetermine the winner. While the rules must be clear and certain to all, it should make it

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²⁶Report of the Independent Elections Review Commission (IREC), Government of Kenya, 2008

²⁷Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group Tanzania General Elections 25 October 2015, page 37.

²⁸Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group Tanzania General Elections 25 October 2015

impossible to know and declare the eventual winner of the elections until the process has been complete. The principle of 'procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty' is important and must be the basis against which elections are conducted. All variables discussed in this paper must play together to ensure a fair and transparent electoral process whose outcome reflects the will of electorate.

Methodology

This paper is based on the notion of behavioral theory of elections that postulates that all actors in the electoral space are rational and adaptive. The paper draws from scientific empirical data and research to put both historical and political dynamics of elections as catalysing or destabilizing factor in securing fledgling democracies in the eastern Africa region. It, therefore, reflects on documented historical and contemporary challenges facing a number of electoral management bodies (EMBs) as well as other actors in the electoral process, and makes policy, legislative and administrative recommendations for future improvements in enhancing electoral democracy in the region.

Discussion

Standards and Principles for a Democratic Election

From the onset, we need to acknowledge the fact that there is no perfect election ever held anywhere in the world, including in mature democracies such as the United States, Europe, India and Brazil. This notwithstanding, there are basic standards, principles and globally acceptable best practices in electoral administration all democracies, including the emerging ones from the eastern Africa region, should strive to achieve so as to promote peace and stability. Some of these are discussed below.

Best Practice in Institutional Independence

The status of electoral management bodies (IEBs) as autonomous agencies of respective governments and independent branches of governments may not reflect the full nature or convey the scope of the perception of independence of these institutions. The concept covers the freedom of these electoral institutions and insulates them from the influence or interference by a ruling political party, political elite or other entities. It is believed that this will guarantee fairness and impartiality of EMBs. Another attribute which the regional EMBs may want to safeguard is their financial autonomy and ability to recruit, appoint or dismiss any staff member without reference

to any other authority. While these concepts are fairly well developed in the region, there are still challenges in accessing money from the consolidated fund. This usually leads to delays in the implementation of electoral activities, late procurements and puts pressure on election timelines.

Best Practice in Electoral Reform and Legislation

An electoral system design and legislative agenda should embrace applicable constitutional provision relevant to elections, other election laws and other laws that may impact on election. Such a legislative agenda also includes electoral regulation and procedures, directives and instructions. Codes of conduct may also have direct impact on the electoral process. Whereas the electoral regime is well developed in Kenya²⁹, other countries in the region may want to borrow from Kenya and improve on it. In doing so, whether within constitutional provisions or within the election laws, they may want to give consideration to the size of EMBs and rationale for the number they arrive at. In given situation, the size may be determined by the geo-political division of the country or number of political parties that should be represented in an EMB. The general trend is to have an EMB of three to five members.

Best Practice in Electoral Planning and Budgeting

Best practices in electoral administration require EMBs to undertake comprehensive short-term and long-term planning. This will ensure that the entire institution from EMB headquarters to its field operations staff, and key stakeholders such as political parties align their actions with the planning vision and calendar of respective EMBs. Though a number of EMBs in the region have taken positive steps to embrace long-term planning and coordination, frequent leadership changes at the level of commissioners usually undermine the spirit and the desired vision in long-term planning and budgeting for electoral activities. The best practice EMBs in the region may adopt is backwards planning. They need to find out how much time they have and then execute what they have to, get teams together and develop plans through participatory processes, and share plans with relevant government agencies to inform their resource allocation, and engage with political parties and other stakeholders. Best practice is, therefore, to start early – an election is a process, not an event; be innovative and look out for new ideas and approaches;

²⁹Report of African Union Elections Observation Mission to the 4 March 2013 General Elections in Kenya

be flexible since election environment is ever changing; think historically and understand the electoral dynamics; and take inter-agency and multi-stakeholder approaches in planning and coordination.

Best Practice in Electoral Security Planning and Operations

Persistent cases of electoral violence and the way security agents respond to such create obstacles to democratic consolidation as the electoral environment remains fragile as a direct or indirect result of the violence. Lack of proper training on electoral security and crowd control, and high handedness by security personnel usually contribute to post-election violence as witnessed in Kenya's 2007 and 2017 elections. In Uganda, security personnel have been accused by the opposition politicians and election observers of obstructing electoral justice and supporting the incumbent in the successive elections. It is, however, worth noting that while progress has been made in security sector reform agenda in Kenya, some structural and underlying factors that led to the 2007-2008 violence, and gave the security agents a leeway to use excessive force on unarmed civilians have not been fully addressed.

Best Practice in Electoral Campaign Financing

Unregulated election financing by political parties and candidates is an impediment to achieving vision for a good election in the region. It gives political parties in power the appetite to loot public coffers to finance the next election. Unregulated election financing also ferments inflows of illicit funds and proceeds of crime and corruption into the countries that are planning to have elections. Such monies are used to acquire weapons and ammunition, hire political goons, buy votes, and finance other illicit political activities. Less transparent election campaign financing may also foster illicit relationships between perpetrators and public officials, regional governments and instability. The goal of including political campaign financing as a thematic area for electoral security is to recognize the connections between money and electoral violence and the imperative to disrupt these connections through accountability and transparency enforcement mechanisms. Thus, election/political campaign financing regulation are designed to address supply side of financial resources that enable electoral violence and manipulation to occur.

Best Practice in Conflict Management within and Among Political Parties

Many countries in the region have adopted new technology as a way of improving efficiency, building public confidence and promoting integrity in electoral administration. From the experience across the region, a few lessons can be drawn as best practice for the future of election administration. First, in nearly all elections in the region, technology has not delivered the desired results. However, the challenge has not been on technology failure, but rather the need to appreciate the fact that employing technology in an organization involving thousands of people, that operates for only short periods of time - that is, the month during which voter registration takes place, election day itself, and the period immediately thereafter - requires proper capacity development plan and its roll out. In a region where mobile phones and computers are becoming part of daily life, the tech challenge that have been witnessed across the region are not with the electoral technology that different countries have deployed, but a human error and managerial failure.

Kenya's 2013 massive technology failure was a classic example of poor preparation and external influence and interference in the operations of a relatively new EMB, with a new staff, operating under a new legal framework, with lots of new technology. IEBC was definitely not prepared for the new technology it deployed but did so due to pressure from the political class. Undisputable fact is that the failure of technology in 2013 was not a failure of the technology itself, but a series of human failures around poor decision-making and resultant delays. The decisions were made by individuals with tremendous authority with fairly little technical and operational expertise in election management. Technical challenges were therefore inevitable.

Best Practice in Adoption of Electoral Technology

Political violence has extensively been used in the region, more so in Uganda and Kenya, as a tool in frustrating competitive politics and for getting party tickets and winning elections. The broader goal in arriving at best practices in political party conflict management is to address and punish violence and incentives around it, especially gender-based violence and violence against women candidates as a campaign tool. In this region, political competition remains the primary source of electoral violence. Electoral violence prevention and mitigation measures should impose standards on

political behaviour (and sanctions for non-compliance), foster intra and interparty dialogue, and provide a forum for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) within and among political parties and players. The best practices may include establishment and enhancement of the mandates of party consultative mechanisms (PCMs) such as the Political Parties Dispute Tribunal (PPDT) and Political Parties Liaison Committees (PPCLs) in Kenya. Such mechanisms can be voluntary or statutory in nature and may be convened by either the parties themselves or other players such as EMBs.

Best Practice in Election Results Management

The opacity in election results involving computation, relay and announcement by a majority of EMBs in the region is a major cause of violent conflicts and instability across the region. The broader goal of identifying best practices, particularly the adoption of technology in election results management, is to promote integrity and transparency, and to reduce the potential for public mistrust in the announced results, thus becoming a trigger for post-election violence. Transparency in the ballot counting process can be enhanced through parallel vote tabulation conducted by political parties or CSOs, where appropriate. Best practice from other democracies include public awareness and equipment testing being performed, and paper trail maintained to enhance public trust in the results management process.

Best Practices in Electoral Justice and Electoral Dispute Resolution

In emerging democracies, election outcomes are usually disputed by losing candidates. The manifestation of such disputes may take different forms, ranging from violent protests, boycotts, and mediations to resorting to judicial mechanisms. The broader goal in ascertaining best practices in electoral justice and electoral dispute resolution mechanisms is to reduce the potential for election violence due to failure to effectively adjudicate electoral disputes. Such mechanisms can be formal or informal. The relative effectiveness of EDR and electoral justice mechanisms depends on the independence of the adjudicating body. Even though EDR regime is well developed in Kenya and Uganda as compared to Tanzania. Public confidence on independence from governmental or political influences of the Uganda's and Ethiopia's EDR

mechanism is low as compared to Kenya. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms can also be employed to resolve disputes including the involvement of non-state stakeholders such as civil society and private sector initiatives, efforts by faith-based organizations and mediation by eminent personalities. In instances where electoral violence may occur at a scale or magnitude that may not be handled by a competent domestic dispute resolution mechanism, procedures do exist for the International Criminal Court's (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor to initiate investigations and take over such cases, as with cases involving 2007 elections in Kenya.

Best Practice in Election Observation, Coordination and Building Partnerships

Regional and international partners, organizations and institutions have remained engaged in the electoral processes in the region since early 1990s. The partnership has been in the form of provision of technical assistance and support and deployment of election observers and monitors. The involvement of international partners, particularly from the West is largely informed by their national interests and the geo-political dynamics - desire for stability in the region. Regional organizations feel obligated to participate in these processes as a way of demonstrating comradery with their member states. From political and diplomatic front, technical assistance and support are aimed at conducting credible elections that would serve as foundation for democratic development and national/regional stability. Best practice in the international electoral assistance for the region should take into consideration that such support should not replace what national governments are expected to invest in, and that such assistance is strategic and coordinated, and is not viewed as interference in the affairs of partner countries. From election observation stand point, international and regional observer missions are expected to consider the various factors impacting on the credibility of the electoral process as a whole, and determine in own judgement whether elections are conducted according to the standards for democratic elections to which countries have committed themselves, with reference to national election-related legislation and relevant regional, and other international commitments. Such missions are to act impartially and independently and should conduct themselves in accordance with the standards expressed in the international declaration of principles to which they are signatories.

³⁰Report of African Union Elections Observation Mission to the October 4, 2021 Elections in Ethiopia.

Best practice for regional and international organizations that plan to engage in elections in the region, particularly in election observation and monitoring, is to treat elections as a process, not an event. They need to start early and engage in monitoring the entire process. The Supreme Court of Kenya's nullification of the 2017 Presidential Election serves as a learning experience for regional and international organizations. The court based its verdict on a calculated failure by IEBC to adhere to the legal provisions in key processes. This means the court elevated key processes to same level with election outcome (validity of vote received by each candidate). Regional and international observers had already passed a verdict that the Kenya's 2017 election was free, fair and credible. Observers and monitors need to note that credibility of an election goes beyond seeing voters orderly queuing to vote and pass a verdict based on that. They need to go deeper into what the Supreme

Court of Kenya termed a "black box" where votes would go in and come out differently as they are announced at the national tally center. In Ethiopia, despite withdrawal of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from the 2021 Elections, citing harassment and assassination of opposition politicians, African Union Observer Mission³⁰ still went ahead to describe the election as...an improvement compared to the 2015 election and positively overall, urging the government to continue the commitment to democracy. Ethiopian political and governance space has not been stable since then. Secondly, with the emerging trend in the region where many EMBs are adopting sophisticated electoral technology, particularly for voter registration and result management, regional and international partners should invest in skills that would enable them to fully understand the technical aspect of the technology being deployed in a given election.

Conclusions

Building Electoral Operational Efficiency and Competence

Review and reforms of electoral systems in the region should have as one of the key outcomes the improvement of the operational efficiency and capacity. The opposite more often than not translates into electoral fraud or partisanship in key electoral and judicial institutions. Besides efficiency, there should be institutional and staff competence. For elections in the region to produce positive and peaceful outcomes, these two principles must be embraced. They help to generate public confidence and excite public participation of the electorate in the processes. Further, EMBs need to establish a fund mechanism where they could draw funds when there are delays in disbursement from national treasuries. If EMBs in the region exert their independence, and exhibit impartiality and fairness in their operations, they will be capable of conducting elections with peaceful outcomes, free from violence and conflict.

Strengthening Electoral Security

Security and civilian rapid response mechanisms such as early warning, early response (EWER) are valuable tools to provide specialized quick reaction forces (QRFs) or for security forces to rapidly respond to a crisis and for civilian authorities to mediate electoral disputes. Best practices on electoral security should focus on enhancing electoral security administration as a sub-practice area for partnership between EMBs and security force to gain the skills and capabilities to conduct electoral security threat assessment, planning, training and execution. State agencies should establish coordination and communications mechanisms which could be EMB led, security force led, or some mixed operations. With any of the models there remains a need to decentralize electoral security administration as conflicts are often localized and prevention measures can be more effective with knowledge of the local conflict history and dynamics. The EMB and security forces should conduct a review following the election and document challenges and define opportunities for future planning and response.

Effective Campaign Financing Regulations

A stronger and stiffer campaign financing regulations and strengthened enforcement of compliance, coupled with civil society monitoring and oversight by relevant government agencies can bring accountability and transparency to election campaign financing, and provide a deterrence for the use of campaign funds for violent purposes.

Conclusions

Enhancing Trenchancy Through Electoral Technology

Credibility of any technology depends on the credibility and the capacity of those who operate that technology. Rushed decisions on adoption of an electoral technology coupled with concerns on the integrity of staff of EMB have not generated the desired benefits of the expensive electoral technologies that have been deployed by a number of EMBs in the region. Best practice for EMBs in the region would be when making a decision tech type to be deployed and procuring such a technology, there must be a set plan for a lengthy and proper review of every proposal before a contract is signed, so that all the components can be on site months before they are used to allow for proper training and skill development for the EMB staff who will be operating the technology. Only then can technology be successfully embedded in the organization's management to carry out the required tasks.

Enhancing Electoral Justice and EDR

Although a number of countries in the region have elaborate electoral dispute resolution mechanisms in their constitutions and elections laws, victims of electoral frauds do believe these mechanisms are not well grounded to ensure electoral justice is served. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as involvement of non-state stakeholders such as civil society and private sector initiatives, efforts by faith-based organizations and mediation by eminent personalities have also been deployed in the region with some level of success. Going forward, regional and international organizations should invest resources and efforts in establishing and strengthening regional quick response EDR and ADR mechanisms to help strengthen local efforts if and where necessary. Member states should demonstrate commitment in such efforts, including referring to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) cases where electoral violence may occur at a scale or magnitude that may not be handled by competent domestic or regional dispute resolution mechanisms.

Stakeholder Engagement

On stakeholder engagement and partnerships, while regional and international partners usually have healthy engagement with EMBs in the region, there is a feeling among local partners that EMBs are more open and accountable to the donor community and regional organizations as opposed to the national actors. Best practice should take cognizance of the fact that although close relationship with EMBs is necessary to enable honest exchange of views and discussions of even sensitive issues around elections, it should not result in national organizations and institutions either being or feeling ignored or taken for granted. Regional and international partners should promote national ownership and support for the elections. Such engagement and partnerships should prioritize networking and stakeholder relationships on both the demand (non-state actors) and supply (government agencies) in the electoral process.

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Photo Credit: African Union Mission in Somalia

Trends in Violent Extremism: Prospects for Securing Eastern African States



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Abstract

The global community is tormented by terrorism and violent extremism. Africa, in particular, has become a de facto inter-continental convergence zone for terrorist and violent extremist groups that incubate in, enter, traverse, and/or exit Africa depending on geo-political and strategic operational developments. Such movements and operational dynamism have been enabled by vibrant and ever evolving violent extremist's ability to infiltrate various regions of the continent, thereby resulting in very disastrous consequences and implications on peace, security, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and socio-economic development. This paper covers the conceptualization of violent extremism, violent extremism trends in Africa, a review of counter-violent extremism interventions, regional cooperation in preventing and countering violent extremism, explore prospects for securing Eastern African States, draw conclusions, and offer recommendations to tame the phenomenon of violent extremism in all the regions of Africa.

Keywords: terrorist, violent extremism, foreign terrorist fighters, infiltration, diffusion, governance, kinetic operations, soft approaches.

Introduction

The global community has, for a long time, been tormented by terrorism and its associated phenomena such as violent extremism, transnational organized crime, money laundering, terrorism financing, drug trafficking, racketeering, human trafficking, as well as pillage of minerals, fauna and flora. Africa has experienced various types of conflicts, notably, violent extremism, terrorism, political violence, and resource-based conflicts that have dominated the continent's peace, security, and stability landscape over the years. Terrorist and violent extremist groups have alarmingly multiplied over the years and, in the process, progressively developed ties with major global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) such that all the regions in Africa are now affected by the scourge.

The phenomenon of violent extremism has progressively evolved or mutated over time depending on the relevant real or purported push, enabling, and pull factors. All regions of Africa have progressively been engulfed in terrorism and violent extremism over the years and terrorist/violent extremist groups have either

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been formed in or moved to Africa from mainly the Middle East as part of strategic responses to operational outcomes in those theatres. The groups that operate or have operated in Africa include Boko Haram, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Mourabitoun, Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGP), Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP); Macina Liberation Front (MLF); Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State (IS) in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, Al Shabaab in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and the Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ) in Mozambique. The groups have committed and continue to commit terrorist and/or violent extremist activities that have deleteriously impacted on humanity, human rights, the rule of law, peace and security, development, and democracy. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2020), the African continent loses US\$97 billion annually to violent extremism.

This paper covers the conceptualization of violent extremism, violent extremism trends in Africa, a review of counter-violent extremism interventions, regional cooperation in preventing and countering violent extremism, prospects for securing Eastern African States, and recommendations to tame the phenomenon of violent extremism in all the regions of Africa.

Conceptualization of Violent Extremism

Violent extremism has become a topical issue on the international peace and security landscape. It has multiplied several-fold over the years and become more lethal with time. However, what is it that is called violent extremism? Is it universally defined? Bak, Tarp, and Liang (2019) point out that "[i]n spite of being a concept recogni[z]ed across the international community as one of the critical development challenges of our time, a uniform definition of VE – one that is able to ensure a shared understanding of the phenomenon it represents – does not exist." Indeed, it is lamentable that there continues to be a lack of a globally agreed definition of such a heinous phenomenon which has progressively gone neck-to-neck with terrorism in terms of prevalence and destructive consequences. This results in the terms 'violent extremism' and 'terrorism' being used interchangeably or, at worst, the two being synonymous with each other except for cosmetic differences. This prompted Bak et al (op. cit) to attempt to define violent extremism as:

[A] violent type of mobilization that aims to elevate the status of one group, while excluding or dominating its 'others' based on markers, such as gender, religion, culture and ethnicity. In doing so,

violent extremist organi[z]ations destroy existing political and cultural institutions, and supplant them with alternative governance structures that work according to the principles of a totalitarian and intolerant ideology.

They, further, associate violent extremists with three attributes, viz: totalitarianism and intolerance, anti-status quo political project, and use of violence.

Violent extremism is also often confused with radicalization, whereby the latter is generally the process by which an individual, group, or movement transforms into extremism – which may not necessarily be violent yet, as some become extremist but not violent.

The spread of terrorism and violent extremism on the African continent can be attributed to various causal factors, inter alia, widespread poverty, poor communication and mistrust between government and local communities, weak government presence in some communities, poor provision of basic needs to some communities, limited socio-economic opportunities, widespread unemployment, poor accountability by politicians, rampant corruption, perennially unresolved political grievances, real or perceived injustices, marginalization, impunity, discrimination, and religious or tribal segregation/persecution. In buttressing this, Katz, D. B. (2022) states that "[d]espotic leadership, inept governments combined with rampant corruption and non-existent service delivery has created the atmosphere of desperation from which many with no job or prospects flee into the arms of terrorists. Ironically, in terrorist or violent extremist groups they can find some degree of self-pride, comradeship, a purpose, and even paltry economic prospects." The factors enumerated above create conditions of disillusionment, hopelessness, and frustration in local communities thus constituting a fertile ground for terrorist and extremist groups to create and propagate their narratives and eventually win the sympathy, hearts and minds, and support of the vulnerable.

Why Violent Extremism?

Violent extremism can be a tool for dominance and influence. It can be attributed to both internal and external factors including intra-group and inter-group rivalry as well as ideological justifications. Mrozczyk, J. and Abrahms, M. (2021), citing (Abrahms (2008), explain the use of violence using the Strategic Model of Terrorism which posits that "aggrieved groups turn to terrorism [and/or violent extremism] because it helps to achieve their political platform".

They, however, criticize the model in that indiscriminate targeting of civilians is both ineffective and counterproductive to the violent extremists as states seldom give in to their demands; governments will

resolve to increase their impetus against the violent extremists; the victimized public will turn against the violent extremists; and the groups will most likely not sustain their operations.



Figure 1: The Spread of suspected Islamic State-linked activity in Africa (2013–2020)

Source: Adapted from Whiteside, P. (2020)

Violent extremism trends in Africa

Violent extremism has proliferated in Africa over the years owing to the emergence in or drifting of various groups from other operational theatres into the continent. According to Olojo and Donnelly (2022)³², despite the initial focus on the Middle East and Afghanistan, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, "...sub-Saharan Africa has drawn increasing attention in the last decade. Seven of the world's top 10 countries facing the greatest violent extremist threat are in Africa, with the expansion of the Islamic State group (ISIS) and al-Qaida-affiliated groups on the continent." This augurs with Whiteside's (2020) observation as shown in Figure 1 above.

Figure 1 above shows that the majority of the African countries either have suspected IS-linked activity or are registering an upsurge in IS-linked activity. The rapid spread of IS in Africa has seen the group virtually extending its tentacles throughout the continent with Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) operating in the Liptako-Gourma triangular region of the Sahel that includes parts of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali; Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) operating primarily in the Lake Chad Basin – which includes Cameroon, Chad,

Niger, and Nigeria; Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) that operates in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – itself a recent addition to the East Africa Community regional bloc - and ISCAP has linkages with Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ) in Mozambique; as well as Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). ISCAP carries out sporadic attacks in Uganda and also threatens the peace and security of countries such as Rwanda whilst the Mozambique-based ASWJ incessantly attacks Tanzania using increasingly sophisticated weapons against both civilian and security targets. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (2021) also notes that the IS "... continues to expand through affiliates, especially throughout Africa, where it now maintains provinces in West Africa (ISWAP), the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Central Africa (ISCAP). Al Qaeda and Islamic State-linked jihadists have destabilized countries that had previously escaped the scourge of terrorism, including Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Mozambique."

According to Whiteside (2020), "... analysis of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) database shows that the amount of activity (battles, attacks or kidnaps etc.) involving IS-linked or affiliated

³²Olojo, A. and Donnelly, P. (2022); Three Ways to Make Communities Count in Combatting Violent Extremism in Africa; United States Institute of Peace. Accessed online at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/three-ways-make-communities-count-combatting-violent-extremism-africa> on 24 April 2022.

groups in Africa, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa, has grown substantially in the last five years, despite waning elsewhere." This concurs with the finding by African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) (2021) that during the period from January 2017 to December 2021, a total of 7,216 terrorist attacks were recorded – of which 56% were

against civilian targets, 33% were against military/security targets, 4% were against international organizations, while 7% were against government installations, infrastructure, and officials.

Furthermore, the share of IS-related activities in Sub-Saharan Africa is increasing relative to the whole world's as shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Islamic State-linked Attacks/Incidents each year by region

Source: Adapted from Whiteside, P. (2020) citing ACLED

The Covid-19 pandemic caused significant loss of focus on and impetus in countering violent extremist groups yet the terrorist and violent extremist groups shed little in terms operational capabilities, thus the perpetuated threat. The five most terrorism-affected countries in Africa over the years include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Burkina Faso. However, in East Africa and the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have recorded higher incidences of violent extremism-related incidences relative to other regional countries. The most affected regions, in terms of both number of attacks and deaths, were, in descending order, Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, and North Africa (ACSRT, 2021).

While violent extremism is predominantly driven by local push/pull factors, extremist groups are also influenced by, and draw inspiration from groups that are outside of their local contexts and geographical spheres. This trend manifests itself in the swearing of allegiances of local groups to external groups like IS and Al-Qaida which either tactically withdraw from the Middle East to Africa; flee off-balance to and seek safe havens in Africa, resulting in the relocation of significant numbers of their fighters who then join the conflicts in Africa as foreign terrorist fighters (FTF); or support local groups inspirationally, financially, and materially. Harshé (2021) points out that "... [a]s the Al Qaeda as well as the IS began to lose ground in the west Asian region, the foot soldiers as well as the ideologues of these Islamist groupings

began to find spaces in Africa to carry forward their activities." However, it is noteworthy that whilst a significant number of FTFs are returnees or those moving to Africa from elsewhere, there has been a growing trend of intra-African flow of fighters that migrate from their countries of origin to countries battling terrorism and violent extremism. This is evidenced by the diffusion of ISCAP elements into ISJW operations in Mozambique and Tanzania as well as penetration of Al-Shabaab units from Somalia to Kenya and other parts of East Africa region.

The African continent has also experienced, alongside terrorism and violent extremism, a growing wave of unconstitutional changes of government which weaken democratic legitimacy and undermine the rule of law in affected countries. The resultant political instability provides safe havens for terrorist and extremist groups, thus creating generalized insecurity that gives rise to popular uprisings, opportunistic violent extremism, vicious cycles of insecurity, and coup d'états.

In terms of modus operandi, most terrorist and violent extremist attacks in the continent are carried out using small arms and light weapons (SALWs). However, as Figure 3 below shows, there has been a significant (10%) use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as weapons of choice as well as use of a combination of IEDs and SALWs whilst kidnapping for ransom (KFR) accounts for 8% as a modus operandi to raise funds for sustenance of their operations following payment of ransom.




Figure 3: Relative Modus Operandi for African Terrorist and VE Groups in 2021

Source: ACSRT Database (2021)

The growing use of SALW has been facilitated largely by diversion from national stockpiles, inter-terrorist/violent extremist group arms transfers, and proliferation of artisanal weapons. Diversion from national armouries has emerged as a major source of terrorism financing (TF) in Africa, especially in Libya, Mali, and Mozambique. This has mainly been facilitated by battlefield capture of weapons and logistical supplies by terrorist groups, thus bolstering their arsenals (Shane and Becker, 2016). According to ICCT Report (March, 2021), these diversions have mainly occurred in Libya and Mali following the Tuareg insurrection in 2013 which got backing from terrorist organizations in the region that was preceded by the Malian forces' hasty and off-balance withdrawal from the military bases in the country's north, leaving packed armouries which have reportedly been looted by both terrorist and violent extremist groups for both operations and income generation (ibid p.23).

Anders (2018) concludes that arm transfers among terrorist networks have become a significant source of terrorist financing in Africa. This is supported by the discovery of same model and sequentially serial numbered, and similarly defaced weapons which were 'used in attacks carried out by different al-Qaeda

affiliates, including against the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, the Cappuccino restaurant and Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou, and the resorts in Grand Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire, between 2015 and 2016.'

Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) is a primary source of terrorist financing. Van Offelen (2020) points to the extensive use of KFR by al-Qaeda affiliated groups in the Sahel-Sahara region in the past two decades, hence the emergence of a 'lucrative kidnapping industry'. This is in sync with Micallef, Farrah, Bish, and Tanner's (2019) finding that abduction revenues constituted at least 90 percent of terrorist financing in the Sahel region between 2005 and 2010. They attribute the recent decline in the number of KFR for foreigners largely to the scarcity of potential foreign targets in the region than the emergence of alternative and more lucrative financing strategies.

The growing use of sophisticated IEDs by terrorist and violent extremist groups points to the enhancement of the groups' technical knowhow and prowess to manufacture and successfully deploy such devices which are highly lethal, leading to higher resultant deaths from fewer attacks. The attacks have largely resulted in civilian casualties relative to other target or incidental groups as shown in Figure 4 below.




Figure 4: Proportion of Total Deaths from Terrorist/VE attacks in Africa.

Source: ACSRT Database, 2021

The ACSRT's records regarding the lethality of terrorist/violent extremist attacks on civilians and security personnel are in line with the **Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)** (2021) findings shown in Figure 5 below. It shows that over the years the terrorist/violent extremist attacks on East African

countries have generally resulted in less casualties post-2020 relative to the preceding period. It further shows that more civilians than security forces have become casualty to the attacks in all East African countries with Somalia topping the casualties in both categories.




Figure 5: Lethality of Terrorist/VE attacks in East Africa (2018-2022). Source: Developed from Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) Database (2022)

In 2021 and 2022, in East Africa, terrorist and violent extremist incidents were recorded mainly in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda, with Al-Shabaab and ISCAP as the main active terrorist groups in the region. The region recorded a decline of 45% in number of attacks and 24% in deaths in the first quarter of 2021 relative to the same period in the preceding year. In spite of this, since then, violence has continued to surge in Mogadishu as Al-Shabaab continued their onslaught on military establishments, hotels, restaurants and other soft targets, thereby demonstrating its ability to orchestrate complex attacks against critical infrastructure as well as to use IEDs which translated into higher casualties than for the same period in 2020. In Uganda, the October and November 2021 attacks in Kampala, which were attributed to Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and ISCAP, caused significant damage to property and resulted in injuries and loss of lives. **According to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)** (2021), “[t]hree of the bombings caused casualties, claiming the lives of four civilians and injuring seven. The region’s Islamic State groups, namely IS Central Africa Province and local affiliate Islamist militant group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have claimed responsibility for two of the attacks, while the other two incidents remain unclaimed.”

The ASWJ that operates in the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado sporadically attacks southern Tanzania. The ACSRT (2021) reports that the region recorded a 54% decline in number of attacks and 88% reduction in the number of deaths in 2021 compared to the same period in 2020. This drastic decline could be

attributed to massive counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism operations by Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM) and its backers against ASWJ that dismantled terrorist camps and hideouts across Cabo Delgado.

Clarke (2021) projects that violent extremists would intensify their operations post-2020 following the temporary loss of tempo during the year. Data gathered by the ACSRT reveals that indeed activities associated with terrorism and violent extremism shot up in the first half of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020 and that the increase was consistent with the previous years except for 2020 when the continent witnessed a decline. The ACSRT further attributes the decline in the number of terrorist attacks and deaths in 2020 to three main factors, namely, the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic that interestingly also affected the movement of terrorist fighters partly due to the fear of contracting the virus as well as the lockdowns imposed by governments across the continent to contain the spread of the virus; intensive counter terrorism operations by national, regional and international forces across Africa; and the infighting among some of the active terrorist groups on the continent, particularly between ISGS and JNIM on one hand and Boko Haram and ISWAP on the other.

The ease of restrictions on movements and the opening up of economies might have contributed to the increase in the terrorist attacks post-first quarter of 2021 and the rise could continue. While this scenario paints a gloomy picture, a closer look reveals a decrease in attacks in most hitherto hotspots such as the Sahel and the Lake

Chad Basin. What is driving the continental increase for the period under review is the number of attacks and deaths taking place in the Great Lakes region specifically DRC, where a plethora of terrorist and violent extremist groups are wreaking havoc among communities in Ituri, North-Kivu, and South-Kivu provinces in the Eastern part of the country and sporadically carry out cross-border incursions in Uganda.

A review of Counter-Violent Extremism Interventions

African governments have strived to eliminate violent extremism from their respective countries and regions. They have commonly executed counter-violent extremism programs with the support of external partners.

The support of partners in combating terrorism and violent extremism on the continent has been traditionally characterized by competing interests of external stakeholders which has hindered cooperation. Sahel regional countries have experienced vested investment-related interests in them such as oil and mineral extraction. This explains some former colonizer countries' readiness to intervene against security threats in those countries.

Other countries, including the United States of America, have developed geostrategic vested interests that include the establishment of their foreign military bases in the region, especially following the 9/11 attacks which were followed by the proliferation of Al-Qaeda from the traditional hotspots of the Middle East to the Sahel-Sahara region of Africa. Despite the ever-increasing levels of foreign assistance, it has been observed that the investment has not yielded the desired results on the ground. In this regard, Schmidt (2020) points out that [United States of America's] [e] establishment figures claimed that the battle against violent extremism was far from over and that U.S. military leadership was critical to victory. They pointed to ongoing insurgencies in the African countries of Mali and Nigeria in the Western Sahel and Somalia and Sudan in the Horn. Other progressives countered that U.S. policies have been ill-conceived and counterproductive — and that foreign military intervention has exacerbated the crises.

This argument is reinforced by Obe and Wallace (2021) who observe that "[i]n the Sahel, both US and European Union (EU) efforts to reinforce states through military training have been largely ineffective. Western-trained military forces were behind successive coups in Mali and directly created the power vacuum in parts of the country where jihadist forces took control." They therefore advocate for equally political and military solutions to prevent and counter violent extremism.

In fact, the need by non-African countries to deploy in the region to combat terrorism, violent extremism, and other associated phenomena such as kidnapping for ransom (KFR) has resulted in growing militarization of the region at the expense of attention to grassroots development in light of the various socio-economic and environmental stresses bedeviling the local communities. In this regard, Emir Lamido Sanusi³³ made the following clarion call to all stakeholders to pay attention to the social and climatic factors that widen and deepen the recruitment base of terrorist and radical extremist groups:

If there is one thing that has come out positively from all the discourses on security in the Sahel, it has been a wake-up call [...] Lake Chad has lost 90% of its water reserves. That led to desertification. It basically threw out farmers, agricultural production went and industry went. And people basically became jobless. You had a large youth bulge of people with no future. No one really paid attention to that until Boko Haram exploded.³⁴

The counter violent extremism interventions have been traditionally government-led security force interventions that have completely failed to dislodge the violent extremists from their operational theatres. Kinetic operations, by their nature, are confrontational and they result in guaranteed destruction of grass roots. Prioritization of security cooperation without insisting on strict observance of the rule of law is detrimental given that the youth and other vulnerable targets for recruitment by terrorist and violent extremist groups are highly susceptible and vulnerable, thus can easily be convinced by the recruiters' strong poor governance-related rhetoric. This necessitates the promotion and mainstreaming of strategies to prevent violent extremism towards sustainable peace, security, and development.

African countries have traditionally employed piecemeal and non-coherent strategies to tackle violent extremism. However, the coming of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) and the United Nations Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015) as well as various African Union's Counter-terrorism Framework instruments have inspired African countries towards newer multi-stakeholder approaches such as human security approaches, whole-of-government, and whole-of-society approaches to countering and preventing violent extremism. The following African Union's instruments have inspired member states' resolve to comprehensively deal with terrorism and

³³Emir Lamido Sanusi is the Emir of Kano State of Nigeria and former Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria.

³⁴Melly, P. (2017), Sahel Breeding Insecurity, The Africa Report. Number 94, p. 24 Available online at <https://issuu.com/theafricareport/docs/tar94>. Accessed on 24 April 2018.

violent extremism:

- 1 The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999) which, inter alia, defines terrorist act rather than terrorism, identifies a number of terrorist offences such as activities that contribute or aid terrorism, and also spells out different areas of cooperation between the member states viz extradition, extra-territorial investigations, and mutual legal assistance.
- 2 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) which underscores the need to promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of AU's development and integration agenda. It also calls for "respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities" which fuel flames of violent extremism.
- 3 African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance & Local Development (2014) which, in sync with Pillars 1 and 4 of the United Nations' Global Counter-terrorism Strategy (2006), seeks to, inter alia, promote:
 - ◆ effective combating of corruption.
 - ◆ decentralization/devolution of governance.
 - ◆ public participation in political and resources governance.
 - ◆ multi-stakeholder participation
- 4 Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples' Rights while Countering Terrorism (2015) which obligates AU member states to ensure fulfilment of their obligation to prevent terrorism. In this regard, states must carry out counter terrorism in accordance with the state's obligations under international human rights, humanitarian, and refugee law.
- 5 Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa (1996).
- 6 The Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (2002) - The Robben Island Guidelines.
- 7 The Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action on Accelerating Prison and Penal Reform in Africa (2003).
- 8 The Guidelines on Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-trial Detention in Africa (2014).

Various AU Member States have gradually responded to the AU's clarion call to ratify and domesticate various AU instruments for combatting terrorism and countering/preventing violent extremism. In this regard, East African countries including Kenya and Sudan have adopted and implemented national counter-terrorism strategies whilst a handful, including Burundi and South Sudan, have either initiated the processes towards developing or, during routine engagements with or respective National Counter Terrorism (CT) Assessment Missions by the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), expressed willingness to initiate development of their respective National Strategies and Plans of Action against Violent Extremism. Some, like the DRC and Uganda, have indeed initiated development of these instruments with the technical assistance of the ACSRT.

Most of the East African countries have adopted, albeit gradually, a cocktail of measures that indicate a paradigm shift from predominantly kinetic interventions to soft approaches that recognize the complementary and synergistic roles of government, local communities, and non-state actors in preventing the spread of violent extremism. Some notable improvements have been registered in the mainstreaming of gender dynamics and youth empowerment through their co-option in the entire stages of respective violent extremism-targeted program/project cycles.

In the interim, it can be argued that kinetic interventions are sadly the solution of choice for African countries, whereby the authorities seek to outwit violent extremist groups militarily and gain lost territories and communities. However, the sole use of hard power, whilst ignoring proactive attention to the conditions conducive to the germination and sprouting of violent extremism, has been self-defeating. Temporary gains recorded by military operations against violent extremist groups need to be augmented by soft approaches. In this regard, East African regional countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania have made significant strides in awareness campaigns for resilience against violent extremism, gender mainstreaming, and youth co-option with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania opening space for youth-led groups like Youth, Arts, Development and Entrepreneurship Network (YADEN), Uganda Muslim Youth Development Forum (UMYDF), and Global Network of Religions for Children (GNRC) respectively to win hearts and minds of as well as build capacity of youths and local communities.

All in all, the predominantly hard power counter-violent extremism endeavours, mostly driven by external non-African countries and which seldom pay attention to local push and pull factors as well as socio-economic

dynamics, have contributed to the general failure rate of such efforts as evidenced by prolongation, perpetuation, evolvment, rejuvenation, and spreading of the conflicts. Noteworthy is that countries like Somalia have largely failed in their endeavours against violent extremism owing to parachuted hard solutions that are complemented by general political reluctance to find lasting solutions at the expense of constructive top-down and, more importantly, bottom-up engagements.

Regional Cooperation in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor African Union (AU) have endeavored to spearhead the fight against terrorism and violent extremism and promote cooperation at all levels in that regard. The OAU adopted the Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination Among African States (1992) that calls for enhanced cooperation and coordination between African states in order to enhance the effectiveness of its initiatives against the first real manifestations of extremism which, inter alia, include manipulation of religious, cultural, ethnic, tribal, sectarian, and social differences to incite and justify hostilities against African states. Similarly, the AU adopted the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa (2001) which constitutes Africa's post 9/11 unanimous call for strengthened police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, anti-financing of terrorism, and the exchange of information.

Regional economic communities and member states have also progressively put elephantine strides towards promoting intra- and inter-agency, bilateral, regional cooperation, and inter-regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in East Africa has mainly manifested itself in joint security forces' programs and law enforcement and judiciary cooperation mechanisms under the auspices of the East Africa Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which transformed into African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Such cooperation efforts have given birth to regional mechanisms such as the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO), the Djibouti Process, the East African Fusion and Liaison Unit, and the East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). These have facilitated cooperation, coordination, and joint capacity building in law enforcement, military, and intelligence matters that include, amongst others, border security,

crime scene forensic and other criminal investigations, as well as cyber security.

The IGAD regional body established and operationalized the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) to facilitate region-wide research and capacity building on matters of violent extremism as well as the countering and prevention of violent extremism in the region. These noble regional initiatives have also been augmented by various synergistic AU-facilitated, civil society-spearheaded, and external partner-financed national and regional inter-faith and intra-/inter-community dialogue platforms which have predominantly focussed on socio-economic issues, governance matters, youth unemployment, women empowerment, victims of terrorism-centred programs, community-tailored interventions, environmental protection, research, capacity building and policy advocacy, among others.

Prospects for securing Eastern African States

East African states are equally exposed to locally emergent and externally generated ebbs of violent extremism as other regions and the phenomenon has reached unprecedented levels in terms of spread and lethality. The need for concerted and synergistic efforts that require all stakeholders' hands on the deck and total commitment cannot be overemphasized.

It is therefore imperative for the regional countries to advocate for more soft approach-focused external support than military support. The funds and logistical support so received should be channelled towards socio-economic development-oriented programs in tandem with implementation of human rights and rule of law promotion-centred programming. These will inculcate stakeholders' interest and foster a culture of trust for the authorities and processes, thereby reaping buy-in for prevention and countering of violent extremism programs.

It can be confidently postulated that despite the fact that violent extremism will stay with humanity for the foreseeable future, all is not yet lost as far as East African states' efforts towards combatting violent extremism is concerned. It is encouraging to note that the regional countries have gradually appreciated the productivity of blending hard and soft approaches against the phenomenon.

Concerted efforts must be put towards holistically dealing with the national and regional threat whilst investing in keeping 'foreign' violent extremist groups from both outside Africa and other regions of the continent (North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa) at bay.

Conclusions

Violent extremism has graduated into a topical issue on the African peace, security, and development landscape over the years. The rise has been fuelled by various factors that are mainly governance-related and the shrinking of the general socio-economic space especially for the youth. The situation has been exacerbated by the confusion of violent extremism and terrorism, hence the largely kinetic approaches to counter the phenomenon at the expense of constructively blending both hard and soft approaches for more productive outcomes. From the foregoing discussion the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Violent extremist activities have declined from 2020 relative to the prior period of 2018 to 2019. However, the incidents have been rising since 2021 owing to the loosening of Covid-19-related movement restrictions thereby gifting violent extremists more space for movement and execution of their operations.
2. The activities of violent extremist groups have been facilitated by foreign extremist elements who join and reinforce local extremists' hotspots out of Africa or from other regions of the continent. ASJW based in Mozambique is a notable violent extremist group from a neighbouring region that carries out sporadic incursions into Tanzania.
3. The predominant use of military operations, however mightier, against violent extremist groups has proved futile and fatal with regards to achieving sustainable peace and security in Africa.
4. The influx of foreign military aid to the continent towards countering violent extremism at the expense of socio-economic development-oriented aid has proved ineffective and, in fact, rejuvenates the impetus of violent extremist groups in the prosecution of their heinous operations.
5. East African states have, rightly so, endeavoured to blend hard and soft approaches. However, some states are still lagging behind owing to political unwillingness and tugs of war, thereby derailing the impetus towards sustainably preventing the germination and mutation of violent extremism at all levels.
6. The regional member states have invested greatly in regional cooperation, resulting in the establishment and operationalization of a number of regional mechanisms that facilitate research collaboration, capacity building cooperation, and joint military, judicial, law enforcement, and information exchange.

Way Forward

Given the foregoing discussion throughout this paper, the following courses of action are recommended to improve the respective stakeholders' efficacy in combatting violent extremism and associated phenomena of terrorism and organized crime:

1. Enhancement of State capacity, through equipping relevant institutions appropriately, recruitment, and training of security services and law enforcement institutions and personnel to perform effectively.
2. Addressing the underlying causes of terrorism and violent extremism and empowering local communities to improve their resilience and reduce their susceptibility to recruitment into such groups' ranks.
3. Striking an effective balance between military responses and soft approaches to downgrade the appeal of violent extremist groups, thereby undermining recruitment overtures and radicalization efforts at all levels.
4. Strengthening state-level and regional cooperation on control of weapons, marking of weapons and developing appropriate databases to lessen illicit proliferation and circulation of weapons.
5. Investing in disrupting illicit financial flows, through capacity building at all levels (community, national, bilateral, and regional) to thwart terrorism financing.
6. Improving inter-agency coordination and international cooperation through extensive sharing and exchange of information in counterpart institutions.
7. Enhancing national and regional investments and collaboration in research, capacity building, advocacy, law enforcement, military operations, information sharing, judicial matters, and psychosocial support for effective prevention and countering of violent extremism.
8. Ratifying and domesticating outstanding relevant international, continental and regional counter-/prevention of violent extremism instruments. This should be followed by holistic conception, design, development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of grassroots-tailored programs or projects.

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Gender and Peacebuilding in Eastern Africa: evaluating interventions in conflict hotspots



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Abstract

In recent years, there has been increasing literature on the essence of women's issues to peacebuilding, the gender dimensions of peacebuilding, and a number of frameworks and suggestions on the operationalization of gender equality and peacebuilding. In peacebuilding processes, men tend to dominate formal roles and this leads to mainly having male peace negotiators, male peacekeepers, male formal leaders and male politicians. More than often, power is unequally distributed between men and women and the majority of women do not have a voice in local and national processes of decision-making. In the Democratic Republic of Congo and in eastern Africa countries of Somalia and South Sudan, the dynamics and correlation between gender and peacebuilding are similar. The socio-cultural environment in Eastern Africa. Peacebuilding efforts, particularly political negotiations, rarely consider and value the contribution women may make to the process. Peace processes where women were excluded include the IGAD-led peace process that was initiated in South Sudan. There was little to no participation by women, with no women included in the South Sudanese government delegation. During the negotiations leading up to the Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC that was subsequently signed in Pretoria, South

Africa in December 2002, only 12 per cent of women participated. The belief that women are vulnerable and victimized by violent conflicts prompts most peace negotiators to emphasise patriarchal hierarchies.

Key words: Gender, peacebuilding, conflict, women peace and security, UNSC Resolution 1325, governance

Introduction

Both men and women have played significant roles in peacebuilding on the African continent and have taken part in active conflicts, yet acknowledgement has often been directed towards the contribution of men. The stereotype is that women are less capable within peace processes, therefore they are often viewed as victims who need to be protected by men in conflict. In peacebuilding processes, men tend to dominate formal roles and this leads to mainly having male peace negotiators, male formal leaders and male politicians. More than often, power is unequally distributed between men and women and the majority of women do not have

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a voice in local and national processes of decision-making. In times of conflict, this inequity is heightened as power becomes centralized and the male dominated military takes more control.

It is argued that linking gender and peacebuilding together can positively influence peacebuilding, both in theory and in practice. The approach, however, needs to be carefully constructed in light of the current situation of the state, the change in gender roles before, during and after war, the political and cultural openness to change, the capacity of the organizations, and the conflicts and tensions, which may occur because of the two agendas. This paper conceptualizes gender and peacebuilding, and assesses the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2242 vis a vis the currently reality of women's participation in peacebuilding. The paper aims to explore gender and peacebuilding in Eastern Africa and to evaluate interventions in conflict hotspots within the region. The conflict hotspots that the paper focuses on are Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan, looking at the commonalities in the correlation between gender and peacebuilding in the three countries. The paper finally explores gender and peacebuilding on the African continent in relation to the African Union's Agenda 2063.

Conceptualization of Gender and Peacebuilding

Gender and peacebuilding is an exploration of the linkage of gender and peacebuilding conceptually and practically. In recent years, there has been increasing literature on the essence of women's issues to peacebuilding, the gender dimensions of peacebuilding, and a number of frameworks and suggestions on the operationalization of gender equality and peacebuilding. Gender is defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization as the relations between men and women, both perceptual and material. Gender is constructed socially and not determined biologically as a result of sexual characteristics of being either male or female. In most societies, the roles of men and women differ, and this includes access and control of resources, and participation in decision-making. The term is also used to describe a relational concept, implying a relationship between men and women and among men and women. According to Singh (2013), gender refers to a structural relationship between men and women which is linked to the state, the economy, and to other macro- and micro-processes and institutions.

In peacebuilding processes, men tend to dominate formal roles and this leads to mainly having male peace negotiators, male peacekeepers, male formal leaders and male politicians. More than often, power is unequally

distributed between men and women and the majority of women do not have a voice in local and national processes of decision-making. In times of conflict, this inequity is heightened as power becomes centralized and the male dominated military takes more control (Coomaraswamy, 2015). Over the past two decades, research has shown how violent conflict and peacebuilding processes affect women, girls, men, and boys differently. Often, there is not a clear-cut moment between violent conflict and peace, but rather peacebuilding takes place somewhere in the trajectory between a social condition of full-scale warfare and peace. This period is also one of fluidity of societal norms, power relations and gender roles and their redefinition. Violent conflict creates new spaces, new roles and new vulnerabilities for people according to their gender identity. Post violent conflict, some of these remain and others renegotiated.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 & 2242 vis a vis the reality of women's participation in peacebuilding

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted ten resolutions under the title of women and peace and security, which together form the architecture of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The resolutions lay out measures and interventions designed to ensure the protection of women's rights, the prevention of conflict, the participation of women in peace and security governance, and effective and gender-responsive relief and recovery efforts in conflict and conflict-affected settings (Chilmeran, Shepherd and Tiller, 2021).

In October 2000, UNSC Resolution 1325 proposed a framework to address WPS at the local, regional and international levels. The resolution became the first internationally-recognised document to acknowledge the disproportionate impact of conflict on non-combatants, and that women and children constitute majority of refugees and internally displaced persons worldwide. UNSC Resolution 1325 recommends that the UNSC, UN member states and civil society should endeavour to address the need for the participation of women in all decision-making and peace processes; the importance of integrating gender perspectives and training into peacekeeping operations; the obligation to protect women from gender-based violence in conflict zones; and the need to mainstream gender into UN reporting systems and programme implementation mechanisms. The resolution thus seeks to address the reality of the impact that armed conflicts, human rights abuses and humanitarian law have had on

women, as well as the need to create gender parity at all levels of decision-making within UNSC mandated missions. It also serves to remind governments of the still unachieved goals of gender equality previously set by national and international instruments. UNSCR 1325 not only emphasises the protection of women and their meaningful participation in peace and security processes, the resolution also acknowledges the need for women to play a greater role in preventing and resolving conflict. The UN has committed itself to 50-50 gender balance throughout the organisation, which includes the equal participation of women in all aspects of peace processes, including peace support operations (PSO). Since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325, there has been increasing recognition of women's efforts to build sustainable peace (Matambo, 2021).

According to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, many challenges have been faced in the past two decades in implementing all four pillars of UNSC Resolution 1325. Women too often remain excluded from negotiating tables and decision-making processes in the realm of peace and security. Similarly, conflict-related violence continues to affect women despite high levels of commitment to prevent such violence. Gender perspectives also often continue to be ignored in the development and implementation of post-conflict relief and recovery measures. Some reasons behind these shortcomings are caused by challenges to reach out to and engage men as partners in the implementation of the WPS agenda and to have them acknowledge that society as a whole benefits from its advancement, not only women.

The UNSC adopted Resolution 2242 in 2015. The resolution seeks to map out new avenues for WPS work and incorporates new challenges in to the WPS agenda. The normative provisions of the resolution are extensive, including several related to counterterrorism (CT), preventing, and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) (Chilmeran, Shepherd and Tiller, 2021). UNSCR 2242 urges the participation of women and women's civil society organisations in the development of strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism, reiterating the importance of incorporating women's civil society organisations into the governance of peace and security, including counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism. UNSCR 2242 certainly drives a degree of engagement and alignment between WPS and CT and P/CVE, however, there is no real evidence that the normative provisions have been operationalised consistently. Domestic interpretation of international norms, processes to align norms with values and principles that inform national responses to terrorism and violence extremism, state political interests, and

contextual security needs all contribute to variation within the national framing of the normative provisions of the agenda. When it was adopted, UNSC Resolution 2242 also called for the operational numbers of women in military and police roles to have been doubled by 2020, however, the gender imbalance in PSOs appears to persist. According to the UN, since 2015, the number of employed women in peacekeeping only rose from 4.8 per cent to 10.9 per cent.



Gender Representation in Peace Support Operations and Peacebuilding Processes: An Assessment of Somalia, DRC and South Sudan

Both men and women have effectively undertaken peacekeeping in active conflicts, yet the contribution of men has been more acknowledged while that of women has failed to be fully recognised. Amidst the diverse roles and operational functions of PSOs, men and women form a partnership that compliment responses to challenges during conflict and the post-conflict processes defined under the African Union's 2007 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) protocol. In executing tasks, women often face persistent and structural stereotyping. They are perceived to be less capable within a peacekeeping environment, and are often viewed as victims who need to be protected by their male counterparts. These unspoken but underlying beliefs often affect women peacekeepers and peacebuilders' operational efficiency, as they are viewed as caregivers and as posing a high risk of sexual vulnerability (Matambo, 2021). The United Nations Population Fund has shown that women are less likely to be deployed to missions in countries that have low levels of development, or to states that experience higher levels of violence (especially sexual and gender-based violence). In instances where personnel have been deployed to missions where security had deteriorated during peace operations, women often remain confined to bases for security reasons, while their male colleagues are free to manoeuvre and perform tasks (UNFPA, 2012).

As these countries are logically in greater need of gender-sensitive peacekeeping, this practice is counterproductive. Greater numbers of women peacekeepers lead to more credible protection responses that meet the needs of all members of local communities. Women in patrol units are better able to reach both men and women, and a female presence at checkpoints has been credited with promoting a less confrontational atmosphere. There are many instances where women have, however, taken active roles as combatants, peacemakers or peacebuilders. Women's effectiveness across all aspects of security was

evidenced, for example, in Liberia, where the women-only police unit in the UN mission (UNMIL) demonstrated competency in riot control.

◆ Gender and peacebuilding in Somalia

During the Somali civil war many women were at the centre of conflicts fought between their sons, husbands and other male relatives and for the sake of their families, many women have been active in peace making and peacebuilding. In Somali society, men, specifically the elders, traditionally have the means to make peace through dialogue and mediation (Gichuru, 2014). Although women are typically excluded from decision-making forums where peace accords are negotiated, they have been effective in influencing elders and others to intervene in conflict and they mobilize resources to finance peace meetings and support demobilization. While men typically focus on achieving a political settlement, with the assumption that peace will ensue, women's vision of peace exceeds this and includes sustainable livelihoods, education, truth and reconciliation. Somali women have also led the way in mobilizing civil society engagement in peace work, although few of their initiatives for peace have been documented. Many women peace activists have found the struggle for peace inextricably linked to that for women's rights. In internationally-sponsored peace processes women have successfully lobbied for places in decision-making forums and for seats in parliament. And they have made some gains in formal politics, holding seats in the different Somali parliaments and some cabinet posts but their political role remains severely compromised. The emergence of religiously driven politics presents Somali society with a new challenge: some Islamic groups are supportive of women's participation in politics; others are against it, which threatens to undermine the few political gains that women have made (Horst, n.d).

Excluded from the all-male arena of clan-based politics, Gichuru (2014) notes that women have directed their collective political acumen and agency into the civil society space that opened up after state collapse. Within the somewhat inchoate definitions and boundaries of civil society, Somali women have operated as key players and shown keen leadership. Some women would argue that Somali civil society organizations' engagement in peace work did not start until women took a dedicated leadership role. Inspired by their involvement in the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995, women in Mogadishu in 1996 built on their growing experience in cooperating for peace to establish the Coalition for Grassroots Women Organizations (COGWO) as a platform for peacebuilding that united women's voices and efforts. COGWO has

worked to promote women's rights and to support victims of violence, but its major contribution to peacebuilding in Somalia has been in stimulating the engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs). Somali women-led CSOs have achieved much in the past two decades. They have helped to disempower the warlords, reduced the significance of clan affiliation, ensured civil society representation is essential to any peace and reconciliation process, and made progress on the participation of women in politics. However, Somali women still face constraints in breaking through gender-based inequalities and cultural and practical barriers to equal political participation (Keating & Waldman, 2019). In PSOs, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), formerly the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has had an increased number of women deployed under the mission over the years since its establishment in 2007. The AMISOM archive for news states that Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia, Fiona Lortan, gave a keynote address at the ATMIS International Women's Day ceremony in which she said that several women have also taken up frontline and active roles in driving combat vehicles like the tankers and armoured personnel carriers, and being positioned in the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).

◆ Gender and peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Since the late 1990s, the African Great Lakes Region (AGLR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in particular, have been ravaged by interstate and intrastate conflicts. Negotiations were undertaken, under the supervision of the international community and regional organizations, in order to broker agreements among the belligerent parties and establish sustainable peace. These agreements include the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the 2002 Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, the 2002 Pretoria Agreement (DRC and Rwanda) and Luanda Agreement (DRC and Uganda) on the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC, the 2008 Goma Statements of Commitments made by armed groups out of the Kivu Conference on Peace, Security and Development, and the 2013 Addis Ababa Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework on the DRC (Kanyangara, 2016). However, in many instances, peacebuilding has been disrupted by the emergence of new armed groups and the re-emergence of former armed groups involved in human rights violations and mass atrocities, including crimes against humanity (Report of the United Nations Joint Office for Human Rights and Human Rights Violations, 2014).

Such peacebuilding efforts have so far failed to foster the participation of women.

Speake (2013) notes that peacebuilding efforts, particularly political negotiations in the DRC, rarely consider and value the contribution women may make to the process. Speake (2013) further gives the example of the negotiations leading up to the Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC that was subsequently signed in Pretoria, South Africa in December 2002, where only 12 per cent of women participated. The belief that women are vulnerable and victimized by violent conflicts prompts most peace negotiators to emphasise patriarchal hierarchies. Mobutu Sese Seko, former President of the DRC, is quoted as once having said, "until proof to the contrary, the boss in our land is the one who wears the pants. Our female citizens should also understand this, accept it with a smile, and with revolutionary submissiveness." (Coquery-vidrovitch, 1997). Although the constitution of the DRC guarantees equitable representation of women and men in public institutions and enjoins the state to combat discrimination against women as well as sexual violence, additional work needs to be done to engender women's participation in all spheres of public life. At the continental level, the DRC ratified the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa in 2008 to protect specific aspects of women's rights. It also enacted the Gender Parity Act in 2015 to implement the constitutional provision on women's equal representation, providing a broader framework for promoting women's participation in decision-making (DRC Constitution, Articles 14 and 15).

According to Vinas (2015), the process leading to the adoption of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework did not provide for the participation of women, as women who participated were simply observers with no decision-making power. The framework's normative content had no specific provision dealing with women-related issues. The gender gap in peacebuilding simply reflects the hostile socio-cultural environment within which most women live and work in the DRC. Vinas (2016) further states that during the presidential elections in 2006, there were four female candidates, none in 2011, and only one female candidate in 2018. Women accounted for only 8.4 percent (42 women) of 500 elected members of the National Assembly in 2006, whilst 4.6 percent were elected the same year in the 108-seat Senate. At the provincial level, only 43 women were elected as members of the 11 provincial assemblies in a total of 632 seats in 2006. Women's representation in the National Assembly did not improve much in 2018 as

compared with the Senate. Currently, the National Assembly has a total of 50 women Members of Parliament (10 percent) whilst the Senate quadrupled women's representation from five to 20 Senators (20 percent) (Actualité.cd, 2019). The government also reflects gender inequity in the way the cabinet has been constituted since the return to democratic rule in 2006. However, the newly appointed cabinet of April 2021 is 27 percent female (15 women out of 56) against 17 percent (12 female ministers out of 67) in the previous government (Economist Intelligence, 2021).

In PSOs, Keita (2022) documents it that women represent 26.5 per cent of all Individual Police Officers and 16.7 per cent of all Formed Police Units. Only 5.4 per cent of all members of the MONUSCO Force are currently female, which nevertheless represents an increase of over 2 per cent since 2019. It can be surmised that historical marginalization, cultural stereotypes, discrimination fuelled by religious practices, and the objectification of women account for the marginalization of women in official peace negotiations as well as political representation and decision-making roles.

Gender and peacebuilding in South Sudan

The 2011 transitional constitution of South Sudan accords women full and equal dignity, and provides for affirmative action through a quota of at least 25 percent representation in the country's legislative and executive organs (Mutasa and Virk, 2017). The constitution also includes customs and traditions of the people as a source of legislation. Customary laws and courts are the primary means through which the vast majority of South Sudanese access justice in a deeply patriarchal society; these have the potential to reinforce practices that perpetuate gender inequality (Bubenzar and Lacey, 2013). Translating constitutional principles on gender equality into practice, thus, remains a formidable challenge that has been exacerbated by the country's ongoing conflict. In South Sudan, patriarchal gender norms are deeply implicated as drivers of conflict, where they afford men power and privileges over women as in many other places in the world, yet men, as much as women, are affected by rigid societal norms that exert pressure on them to conform to their gender identity. It is important to address notions of masculinity, particularly those that encourage violence. Cattle-raiding, for example, is a major driver of conflict and insecurity among pastoral communities in the country. Participating in the raids is seen as a rite of passage for young men and a symbol of manhood, as is owning a gun (Mutasa and Virk, 2017). With raids often turning

deadly in a country awash with small arms, cycles of revenge and perpetuating violent conflict are generated.

In 2011 when South Sudan attained independence, the government agreed to the AU's 2006 Post-Conflict, Reconstruction, and Development (PCRD) strategy, which calls for gender mainstreaming to inform nation- and state-building (Khadiagala, 2012). Juba ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in September 2014 and in addition, the government of South Sudan and the UN signed a joint communiqué to address conflict-related sexual violence in October 2014. The challenges of translating avowed principles on gender equality into practice were formidable before renewed conflict in 2016, but are even greater now that they have been exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, in which sexual and gender-based violence have become a weapon of war. The UN described women and children as deliberate targets, with countless incidents of sexual violence (Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, 2020). As a result, women in South Sudan are seen as victims, with less attention paid to their role as actual and potential agents of peacebuilding. Contrary, they have continually called for the cessation of hostilities and for both sides to abide by signed agreements, campaigned vocally for the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes, and engaged in persistent advocacy for the incorporation of gender-based perspectives in the August 2015 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.

Mutasa and Virk (2017) state that when the IGAD-led peace process was initiated, there was little to no participation by women, with no women included in the South Sudanese government delegation, and only three women included in the SPLM-IO delegation to the first high-level roundtable discussion held in Addis Ababa in January 2014. Van der Wolf (2014), however, describes women's mobilisation though, campaigning actively to strengthen their voices in the peace process and how subsequent negotiation rounds saw women delegates included in the negotiating teams from both the main warring parties, due in large part to these advocacy efforts. Furthermore, the South Sudan Women's Peace Network – with support from UN Women – developed an agenda for peace and sustainable development earlier on, which sought to define women's priorities in the negotiation process and called, among other things, for a national dialogue to promote national reconciliation, healing, unity, and cohesion. The subsequent Addis Ababa agreement provides for the inclusion of women in the transitional government, as well as their continued involvement in its implementation. It further mandates the Transitional Government of National Unity to

review the ongoing constitution-making process and to reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission, to ensure the inclusion of diverse stakeholders including women.

Another challenge is the disconnect between women's representatives and local communities. Women at the grassroots level (including those in IDP camps) are often unaware of women in government and leadership positions who could help them in getting their voices heard at the state and national levels (Mutasa and Virk (2017). UN Women has supported the creation of rural empowerment centres as part of its efforts to support gender equality and inclusive peacebuilding in South Sudan. Several national women's organisations, such as Eve Organisation for Women Development, have also sought to increase their engagement with rural women with a view to promoting the inclusion of the diversity of women's experiences and interests in peacebuilding processes. Even so, greater and more sustained efforts are needed to bridge the gap between the country's female elite and women at the grassroots level, to promote a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding, and to strengthen local ownership of peace processes at all levels in South Sudan.

Following the events of, and since, July 2016, gender, conflict, and peacebuilding remain important issues in South Sudan, as Zainab Hawa Bangura, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict emphasised after visiting the country in August 2016. The African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan report recommended that any structured process around healing and reconciliation be gender-sensitive and involve women as key stakeholders.



Gender and Peacebuilding in relation to the African Union's Agenda 2063

The AU advocates for the meaningful participation and leadership of women and their efforts towards silencing the guns, enhancing good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, the rule of law towards a peaceful and secure Africa as outlined in Agenda 2063. The continental body's commitment to promoting the participation of women in the peace and security agenda and in Africa's overall development is demonstrated in its policy formulation and allocation of resources. Human, institutional and financial resources have been channelled towards attaining gender equality and women's empowerment, as a critical goal and strategy in the realisation of Aspiration 6 of Agenda 2063 that recognises the centrality of women in Africa's development. These efforts also act as a

catalyst for the achievement of the goals of UNSC Resolution 1325 to drive the women agenda in the peace and security architecture.

In 2014, Mme. Bineta Diop was appointed as the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security mandated to promote and elevate the voices of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as advocate for the protection of their rights, including putting an end to sexual and gender-based violence. Mechanisms such as the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation, commonly known as FemWise Africa, compliment Mme. Diop's efforts. FemWise-Africa has mobilised women and girls from all over the continent and the Diaspora as it aims to promote and

professionalise the role of African women in mediation processes, conflict prevention and peace-making efforts.

Over the years, Africa has also developed strong, progressive and articulate policies to support the commitment towards the realisation of real transformation for gender equality and women's empowerment. The AU Continental Results Framework (CRF) for Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the WPS Agenda in Africa is a key reference tool to ensure effective assessment of, and reporting on the delivery of the commitments at the continental, regional and national levels in Africa. It provides twenty-eight (28) indicators for tracking and reporting on the implementation of the WPS Agenda.

Conclusions

This paper has explained that both men and women have played significant roles in peacebuilding on the African continent and have taken part in active conflicts, yet acknowledgement has often been directed towards the contribution of men. The findings of this paper have shown that when executing tasks, women often face persistent and structural stereotyping. They are perceived to be less capable within a peacekeeping environment, and are often viewed as victims who need to be protected by their male counterparts. These unspoken but underlying beliefs often affect women peacekeepers and peacebuilders' operational efficiency, as they are viewed as caregivers and as posing a high risk of sexual vulnerability.

In Somali society, although women are typically excluded from decision-making forums where peace accords are negotiated, they have been effective in influencing elders and others to intervene in conflict and they mobilize resources to finance peace meetings and support demobilization. Men, specifically the elders, traditionally have the means to make peace through dialogue and mediation. While men typically focus on achieving a political settlement, with the assumption that peace will ensue, women's vision of peace exceeds this and includes sustainable livelihoods, education, truth and reconciliation. Somali women have also led the way in mobilizing civil society engagement in peace work, although few of their initiatives for peace have been documented. In DRC, although the constitution guarantees equitable representation of women and men in public institutions and enjoins the state to combat discrimination against women as well as sexual violence, this paper has proved the need for additional work to engender women's participation in all spheres of public life. In South Sudan, the challenges of translating avowed principles on gender equality into practice continue to be exacerbated by the ongoing conflict, in which sexual and gender-based violence have become a weapon of war. Women and children are deliberate targets, with countless incidents of sexual violence. As a result, women in South Sudan, like in the other two countries discussed, are seen as victims, with less attention paid to their role as actual and potential agents of peacebuilding. These women have, however, continually called for the cessation of hostilities and for both sides to abide by signed agreements, campaigned vocally for the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes, and engaged in persistent advocacy for the incorporation of gender-based perspectives in the August 2015 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement.

In conclusion, this paper has found that the gender gap in peacebuilding in Eastern Africa simply reflects the socio-cultural environment within which most women live and work. It is, however, necessary to applaud the AU's advocating for the meaningful participation and leadership of women and their efforts towards silencing the guns, enhancing good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, the rule of law towards a peaceful and secure Africa through the AU CRF for Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the WPS Agenda in Africa.

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Establishing a Regional Approach to Countering Terrorism and Cross-Cutting Security Challenges in Eastern Africa: lessons from other regional blocs



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Abstract

The forces of globalization are among the factors that have helped to transform terror-related insurgencies into 'pan-surgencies', making terrorism a transnational threat. More than 10 such formation, violent extremist organizations [VEOs] with radical religious, political, or social ideologies, that are active in the East African Community (EAC) are allied to al Qaida or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The proliferation of transnational networks of illegal financial systems, individuals, and weapons has necessitated unilateral and multilateral approaches to combatting terrorism and violent extremism (VE) in the EAC. Shared approaches are increasingly becoming popular among states in their regional economic communities (RECs). In Africa for instance, as of March 1, 2022, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced that Tanzania will be hosting its Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre in Dar es Salaam. This is in accordance to the bloc's 2015 resolutions geared towards the adoption of regional efforts against terrorism, organised crimes, and VE. SADC joins other RECs in other parts of the world that have implemented a harmonised action plan in the fight against terrorism and VE. EAC, which has a shared terrorism strategy has also

been in talks since August 2021 on setting up a shared counterterrorism centre. The roles of the proposed shared counterterrorism centre will be training, sharing ideas, and gathering and sharing of intelligence information.

International institutions are viewed as having an important role in bringing synergy amongst states. Traditionally (realist construct) the state has been viewed as the referent object of security. However, at the turn of the century there has been a shift in perspective, human security has emerged where the civilian is now considered the referent object of security. Following the 9/11 attack in the United States, global security paradigms have shifted, security threats no longer focus solely on the state, they now target civilians. Additionally, these threats have transcended borders, which has led to the change of security arrangements across the globe. Due to the nature of current terrorist activities that cuts across international borders, terror-related activities are being conducted in the same space as transnational crimes. This has led to VEOs being recognized as threats to collective security. Thus, this paper is underpinned by

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the neoliberalist (liberal institutionalism) theory which assumes that conflict and competition can be reduced through state cooperation.






This paper assesses the frameworks of existing counter terrorism centres pioneered by RECs such as the SADC Regional Counter Terrorism Centre (RCTC), IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), and the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC, of the European Union) to find the best way for EAC to establish an effective regional counter terrorism centre, that has the capacity to deal with terrorism and transnational crime.

Key words: Regional approach, counter terrorism, East African Community, neoliberalism, security

Introduction

Terrorism has emerged as one of major threats to peace and security among East African Community (EAC) member states. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 48% of the global terrorism deaths (ReliefWeb, 2022). The impact of terrorism as highlighted by the Global Terrorism Index shows the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as having a high impact, meaning that terrorism is a major threat to peace and security, while South Sudan had little to no impact (ReliefWeb, 2022). The eastern Africa region has continued to face political instability coupled with terror threats. This has affected development activities in these countries. For instance, Somalia, with its insurgent cum pan surgent group.

There are several other VEOs in the Eastern Africa region, they include:

-  i Al Shabab – Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen affiliated to al Qaida. This group started in Somalia as an insurgent and later on pledged allegiance to al Qaida. Its areas of operation are Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania
-  ii Islamic State in Mozambique - Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) – This group operates in Mozambique.
-  iii Islamic State in Central Africa Republic (ISCAP) – They are affiliated to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This group mainly operates in the central Africa region and mainly Uganda and DRC. Of which he Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) is affiliated to.
-  iv Jabha East Africa – active in Somalia.
-  v Islamic State in Somalia – active in Somaliland.
-  vi Islamic State in East Africa – active in Tanzania.

The strategies enforced to counter these threats vary in each of the EAC member states. Kenya has the most sophisticated national action plan. They have established the Kenya National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). This body coordinates national counter-terrorism measures to prevent, detect, deter and disrupt terrorists' acts (National Counter Terrorism Center, 2022). Tanzania also has an NCTC, the Tanzania National Counter Terrorism Center, which primarily liaises with international partners on counter violent extremist efforts and works with South African Development Community (SADC) (U.S Department of State, 2021). The other member states have yet to establish NCTC's, thus CVE efforts are done through law enforcement and military forces. For instance, Burundi and Uganda are part of ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) contributing troops (African Union, 2022).

The threat that terror possess has transcended borders, as seen by the activities of VEOs like ADF. This has translated to a complex security dynamic, where transnational crimes and terror-related activities are occurring in the same spaces. Thus, to effectively counter terror, it is essential that RECs can identify these activities and develop effective regional measures.

This paper seeks to establish the best practices to implement an effective regional counter terrorism center in the Eastern Africa. It cross-examines existing functional regional counter terrorism centers, and highlights their comparative advantages. It proffers policy recommendations in regards to the proposed EAC counter terrorism center. Acknowledging that terror-related activities are not conducted in isolation, this paper also highlights other security challenges that the region faces that must be dealt with to enhance the functions of a counter terrorism regional center. It utilizes secondary data obtained through literature review of books, journal articles, reports, legal structures, policies, and laws to obtain the information presented.

Examining Currently Operational Counter-Terrorism Centers

The European Union's European Counter Terrorism Centre

The European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) was established by the European Union (EU) in 2016. This was in response to the terror attacks that the member states of the economic bloc were facing at the time (European Counter Terrorism Centre, 2022). In 2015, 1077 terror-related arrests were carried out, with a recorded 151 lives lost and 360 injured in a series of attacks that

took place in the EU (European Counter Terrorism Centre, 2016). Security concerns in the region were on an upward trajectory at the time, and the main concern was jihadist terrorists. The number of attacks in the EU had risen from 2014 where there was a total of 211 reported failed, foiled, or completed attacks (European Counter Terrorism Centre, 2016). The highest number of attacks were reported in the United Kingdom (UK) (103), followed by France (73), and Spain (25) (European Police Office, 2016). The total number of individuals who were arrested on suspicion of terrorism-related offenses in 11 of the member states, most notably was in France (424).

After the formation of the counter terrorism center there has been a steady number of arrests due to terror-related offences that have been recorded in the region - in the year 2016 (1011), 2017 (1219), 2018 (1056), and 2019 (1316) (Statista, 2021). Notably there was a drastic drop in 2020 when there were a total of 449 individuals who were arrested on terror-related offenses in the EU, including the UK (European Police Office, 2021); of course, bearing in mind that this particular significant decrease could be attributed to the operational changes that occurred due to governmental restrictions imposed in March 2020 (European Police Office, 2021).

The formation of the ECTC is a cornerstone event, being the first of its kind showcasing a new level of cooperation when it comes to harmonizing national counter terrorism efforts within a Regional Economic Community (REC). Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the EU, but after the 9/11 attack on American soil, terror evolved into a global and borderless threat (Voronova, 2021). This was not the first step towards a shared-action plan against terror and violent extremism (VE) in the EU, the foundation of this center initiated by the EU can be traced back to the Trevi Group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale) (Bunyan, 1993). The group's work is based on intergovernmental cooperation between the 12 states, a process which excludes the main EC institutions - the European Commission and the European Parliament (Bresler, 1992).

In June 2002, the EU adopted its first fundamental action plan, the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, which provides a common definition of terrorist offences and the corresponding penalties within the bloc's jurisdiction (Europa, 2015). In 2005, after attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively, EU adopted an overarching counter-terrorism strategy based on four pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response (Voronova, 2021).

Prevention is the first priority under the policy implemented by the EU. It is geared towards addressing the causes of radicalization and terrorist recruitment through the identification of the propaganda, methods, and instruments utilized by terrorists (Europa, 2018). Protection of citizens, infrastructure as well as the reduction of vulnerability of attacks is the second priority in the EU counter-terrorism strategy (Europa, 2018). The third pillar, pursuit, is focused on the pursuit of terrorists across borders, while human rights and international laws are upheld (Europa, 2018). Through this pillar the EU focuses on tackling terror financing, enhancing and improving the cooperation and information between police and judicial authorities, and dismantling the means of support and communication used to strengthen terrorists. The fourth and final pillar is response, whose point is to prepare, minimize, and manage the consequences of any terror attacks that may occur (Europa, 2018). This mainly deals with the aftermath, the coordination of the response, and adequately dealing with the victim's needs. The strategy was also fashioned to have a global reach - emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the EU and non-EU states and international institutions.

Legislative developments have occurred over the past decade, creating a complex and multi-faceted framework. Firstly, the 2002 framework has been updated to include cyber-attacks when it comes to the list of terrorist offences - thus allowing for cyberterrorism to be charged, as well as travelling and receiving training for terrorist purposes (Voronova, 2021). In this digital era the issue of financing of terrorism is an emerging issue as social media, crowd funding geared towards terrorist activities is an emerging trend that has been noted in the EU (European Police Office, 2016).

Additionally, to combat terror financing, the EU has adopted the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive which complements the existing EU Framework on Combating Money Laundering and Terror Financing (Voronova, 2021). This 2018 directive is aimed at increasing transparency, setting up centralized bank account registers and retrieval systems, enhancing the powers of EU Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) while facilitating their cooperation, and enhancing cooperation between financial supervisory authorities (European Commission, 2018). To further cybersecurity, EU legislators have increased the region's resilience to cyber-attacks through the Network and Information System (NIS) Directive. This is a wide set of

measures to boost the level of security network and information systems (cybersecurity) to secure services vital to the EU economy and society (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018).

The Southern African Development Community's Regional Counter Terrorism Center

On 1 March 2022 Southern African Development Community (SADC) opened a regional counter terrorism center, the SADC RCTC, to advance counter-terrorism prevention (Southern African Development Community, 2022). The center will be hosted in Dar es Salaam, the commercial center of Tanzania, and is part of the bloc's 2015 resolutions to adopt regional efforts against violent extremism, terrorism, and organized crime (Materu, 2022). The establishment of this center has in part been influenced by the presence of the Ansar al-Sunna (ASWJ) in the northern province of Mozambique of Cabo Delgado.

The ASWJ is a local religious group turned militant group in 2015, and has been engaged in insurgent fighting against Mozambique's government since 2017 (Gartenstein-Ross, Chace-Donahue, & Clarke, 2021). The group was founded by Tanzanian and Mozambican religious leaders who have links to Salafist circles in Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia (Gartenstein-Ross, Chace-Donahue, & Clarke, 2021). The ASWJ has links to the greater Horn of Africa region, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Omondi, 2021). In 2022, the armed group has been responsible for the spike in abductions and destroyed homes in Cabo Delgado, with an estimated more than 700,000 people being displaced since the insurgency began four years prior (Adriano, 2022).

It was in retaliation to the violence and loss experienced in Mozambique that SADC in conjunction with Rwanda deployed troops to Cabo Delgado in June 2021. According to South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, who has been elected as the chairman of the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, the deployment of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) has had a positive impact in the region (Aljazeera, 2022). The Global Terrorism Index Report of 2022 supports this statement – as it has been noted that Mozambique experienced the largest drop in terror-related deaths, the number of deaths dropping to 93 which is 82% less than the previous year (ReliefWeb, 2022). The organ with the mandate to support and achieve security and the rule of law among the SADC member states is the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security which was launched in 1996 (Southern African Development Community, 2012).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development's Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

Unlike the two previously assessed blocs, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is not an economic bloc, instead it is a development-based bloc. It is not surprising that a development bloc would take interest in counter terrorism (CT) and counter violent extremism (CVE) efforts. The United Nations Human Development Report of 1994 put into perspective the role of development in peace and security. It was in this report that the concept of human security was initially introduced and examined in regards to both global and national human security concerns (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). This report was revolutionary in its address towards security concerns, by emphasizing on crucial nature of investing in human development instead of arms, broadening the concept of development cooperation, and the engagement of policy makers in addressing merging peace dividend (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). It is in line with this school of thought that the efforts by IGAD are mandated.

The IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) was formed to deal with the challenges that terrorism and VE activities in IGAD's bloc presented to its mandate to promote peace and sustainable development. The understanding of the concept 'Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism' (PCVE) is broad as it has been adopted across various spectra by governments, practitioners, and academics (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018). This is not the only term in this field that has a broad spectrum of definition; the regional strategy that has been adopted by the ICEPCVE defines VE as an inclusive term that covers terrorism among all other forms of communal violence, politically inspired, and sectarian (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018). The regional strategy provides that VE is made up of two interrelated issues: firstly, it is an ideology that is anchored on violence; and, secondly, it is an ideology that exploits perceived or real grievances alike (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018).

IGAD marks a distinct difference from the previous regional actors mentioned. Their strategic shift is to move from an 'over-reliance' on hard approaches – that is military, law-enforcement or policing resources, and covert responses, and shift towards non-coercive efforts, and thwart the strategies of violent extremists (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018). This constitutes policies, actions, and tactics that are designed to delegitimize the ideologies of violent

extremists, reducing their chances of gaining support. Distinctly, this approach by IGAD places populations and communities such as the civil society, faith-based groups, women, and youth at the center of the fight against VE (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018).

Highlighted above are the strategic action-plans that various regional entities have utilized to counter terrorism in their regional blocs. Through various engagements such as joint deployment, shared legislative action, and critical shift on CVE strategy these blocs are enhancing their CT efforts. From these entities there is a lot to be captured on how best the EAC bloc can ensure its own regional counter terrorism center will be effective once operating.

Cross-Cutting Security Challenges among EAC Member States: Weaponry, Small Arms and Light Weapons

Arms proliferation is an issue that permeates the eastern Africa region. There are small arms markets in the bloc, for example, in the latest member state in the economic bloc - DRC. Weapons enter DRC through Rwanda, Sudan, and mostly through Uganda which reportedly accounts for the largest portion of the arms moving into DRC (The New Humanitarian, 2003). The proliferation of light weapons in the area has largely been caused by porous borders and a large influx of refugees moving into the northern part of the state from Rwanda, Uganda, and Sudan (The New Humanitarian, 2003). DRC currently has over 132 militia groups that take advantage of the porous borders, movement of people, and the political instability in DRC and its neighbours to smuggle arms into the state (Kivu Security Tracker, 2022). These are avenues of vulnerability that can be exploited by terror cells in the region, as they move arms across similar channels and hide their activities under the cover of activities done by the existing militia groups and arms smugglers.

In Kenya, a similar problem is present, with places like Dadaab Refugee camp functioning as a small arms trafficking point (The New Humanitarian, 2003). The camp is strategically placed as it is located at the porous border between Somalia and Kenya. There is a large number of refugees moving in the area, and a complex security environment due to the communities in the region, who are armed. These factors make it difficult to easily identify the means by which small arms and light weapons are smuggled into Kenya and makes disarmament difficult. Al-Shabaab takes advantage of this to smuggle weaponry into the state, and also help in exacerbating the security dilemma among the communities in the northern

part of Kenya, who fear that disarmament leaves them vulnerable to the attacks by the terror group and other communities (Omondi D. G., 2020).

Violent Extremist Organizations and Criminal Gangs and Groups

Like terrorism, organized crime does not have a universally agreed upon definition – varying groups, scholars, and governments have varying parameters, for instance under the ENACT (Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organized Crime) project, organized crime is defined as 'a serious crime that is planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis, usually, but not always motivated by financial gain...' (ENACT Project, 2022). Among the key differences between organized crime and terrorism is the purpose – terrorism is generally carried out to achieve a political, social, or economic change through the use of mass terror, while organized crime is conducted with the aim of material gain be it financial in nature or otherwise (ENACT Project, 2022).

There is increased attention on the threat that combined transitional organized crime and terrorism pose to global development, peace and security. The United Nation's Secretary General's Plan of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism recognizes this connectedness (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). There have been numerous manifestations in this nexus among the EAC member states. For instance, DRC has a long history of internal and/or cross-border conflict (Ebo'o, 2018). This has created fertile ground for the emergence of militia groups within the state that operate in DRC states through porous borders, among them ADF, which also operates and has orchestrated attacks in Uganda (Thompson, 2021). ADF was founded as an Islamist rebel group driven by the impulse to launch an insurgency against the Ugandan government in the 1990s (Thompson, 2021).

The 21st Century welcomed many changes for the armed group. In 2001, ADF is noted as having downgraded and gone to the interior terrain of eastern DRC, where they remobilized through the recruitment of Congolese members (Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012). This led to the group developing economic stakes in the trans-border Rwenzori economy, venturing into markets such as agriculture, gold mining, and timber (Nantulya, 2019). Reports indicate that ADF began to use the name Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen (City of Monotheism of the Holy Warriors) (Nantulya, 2019). The Islamic State central propaganda apparatus first referenced its 'Central Africa Province' in April 2019. After this IS began to take credit for ADF assumed attacks in DRC. For instance, in October 2020, ADF attacked Kangbaya Prison in Beni and freed more than 1,300

inmates in an effort to liberate ADF fighters and recruit more (Candland et al., 2021).

This shift by ADF is key in the future of the EAC counter terrorism centre and its CT and CVE efforts, there are a number of militias and organized crime groups in the region who can easily be radicalized and gain affiliations with terror groups. Further complicating an already complex security environment. In Kenya there has also been increased research on the link between criminal gangs and terror groups. ENACT has acknowledged a growing operational connection between criminal gangs and transnational organizations.

The threat that gangs pose in Kenya has been growing over the last decade. The exact number of gangs in the country is difficult to pinpoint due to varying reports. However, a reported 43 gangs were identified as operational just in Mombasa City in the year 2018 by the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC). In 2020 the then Mombasa County Commissioner, Gilbert Kitiyo, reported to the media that the number had risen to 132 gangs (Omondi D. G., 2020). With the 2022 general elections nearing, the level of activity by gangs in the city, especially by juvenile gangs has notably increased. Some of these groups have enjoyed political support, especially during election periods (International Peace Support Training Centre, 2019).

These gangs, especially those that are juvenile in nature, often suffer from poor socioeconomic circumstances and have a strained relationship with societal authorities, be it police or the government (International Peace Support Training Centre, 2019). These individuals are vulnerable to radicalization from terror groups, as terror groups are capable of providing these individuals with financial support, and also providing validation for their grievances against the societal authority in place (Moghadam, 2008). In turn, these juvenile gangs provide a channel of recruitment and expansion of the terror group into new areas. This more frequently occurring trend of engagement between terror and organized crime groups must be dealt with as it increases the reach of radicalization – in vulnerable communities where these gangs exist, and in detention and rehabilitation centres where convicted gang members can go on to radicalize their fellow inmates.

Financing of Terrorism

Terror activities require financing and support. While some of the systems highlighted below are used for legitimate transactions, they have been vulnerable to the illegal transfer of funds to support terror-related activities. There are several ways terror financing occurs in the EAC bloc, including the

Hawala system, digital currency such as cryptocurrency, and money laundering.

The Hawala system is most commonly used in Africa, the Middle East, and on the Indian subcontinent (CFI, 2021). Efforts by governments to place restrictions on the formal means of money transfer has led terror groups to transferring illicit funds via the Hawala system. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Report of 2013 titled 'Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen' detailed the abduction of illegal migrants in Kenya. These migrants were then ransomed and the payment made through the Hawala system. The collected funds were utilized to finance illegal actions. This issue can not simply be solved through the elimination of the Hawala system, as it has proven to be critical. For instance, in Mali when formal banking systems collapsed after the Taureg rebellion in 2012, it was the Hawala system that kept the economy going amongst the local population (Africa Com, 2020). VEOs take advantage of the lack of strict regulations and the general lack of traceability that this system offers to move money around the EAC bloc. This is a major concern in EAC as Kenya stands as one of the leading states when it comes to the use of Hawala in the globe (Africa Com, 2020).

Cryptocurrency is a digital currency. General information on how this system works is still not widely known and the system is underregularized. While it has not become the main financing channel for VEOs, it is still vulnerable to exploitation.

Money laundering in the EAC has become prevalent, this is in part due to the lack of joint measures that are adequately employed to prevent money laundering. According to the Centre Report, the proceeds of crime in South Sudan have been laundered in Kenya and Uganda where they are invested. The National Anti-Money Laundering (NAML) Laws have not been characterized by divergencies and enforcement deficiencies.

The security issues highlighted above are not unique to the EAC, other blocs are also experiencing similar challenges that pertain to terrorism and transnational crimes. The EAC bloc can learn from their efforts, including the development of a harmonized action-plan, how to carry out successful CT efforts with partners, and how to tackle radicalization.

The East African Community Regional Counter Terrorism Centre

In 2014 a summit comprising the member states' heads of state proposed a shared counter terrorism strategy which was geared towards creating a harmonized approach (PSCU, 2014). While some states did adopt the proposed strategies such as enhancing national counter terrorism mechanisms it was not implemented across

the board. Following this in August 2021 the EAC announced that it would be setting up a regional counter terrorism centre. The roles of the proposed shared counter terrorism centre will be training, sharing ideas, and gathering and sharing of intelligence information (The East African, 2021).

While this is a commendable step, as the nature of terrorism in the region is transnational and collective

security is key, the centre will be severely handicapped by lack of harmony in the region. As seen in the cases highlighted before, the success of an RCTC is hinged on the presence of strong national mechanisms to counter terror-related acts, and harmonize policies and frameworks. If the EAC member states are unable to enhance and grow their national mechanisms, then the RCTC will be ineffective.

Policy Recommendations

1. The EAC's counter terrorism center's strategic plan must be hinged upon harmonized national policies. This is key when conducting CT and CVE efforts, as seen in the case of EU where a regional accepted definition of terrorism has made it easier to harmonize national criminal laws. Or in SADC where joint efforts have led to distinct change in Cabo Delgado.
2. Intel sharing should be the cornerstone for joint counter terrorism efforts in the region. There are numerous actors in the region that are carrying out CT, CVE, and PCVE efforts such as the United Nations, states such as USA and Denmark. For these efforts to be effective and not redundant, informed coordinated effort is crucial.
3. The EAC counter terrorism center should reinforce the existing institutional framework of the economic bloc. It is crucial that the center be able to borrow from the existing frameworks and enhance the current measures. Such action creates incentive for member states to develop the existing mechanisms, for instance proper implementation of the NAML Laws across the varying states.
4. Offer psycho-social support to victims of terror attacks and returnees. These persons are vulnerable to radicalization and de-radicalization respectively, having gone through psychologically straining circumstances. It is important to conduct doctrinal revisions targeted towards these individuals and provide support through qualified professionals.
5. It is key that this new center keeps track of the emerging trends around the globe. For instance, cryptocurrency is an under regulatirized area leaving it vulnerable to leveraging by VEOs.

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
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